



Asia-Pacific Counter-IED Fusion Center

Monthly IED Activity Report



DOI: 31 October 2018

About the APCFC


The Asia-Pacific C-IED Fusion Center is the premier center for irregular warfare analysis in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. The center develops and synchronizes C-IED and EOD programs and regional engagements. The center re-resources USARAPC C-IED training to ensure U.S., Allied, and Partner Nations



Month at a Glance — October

The Indo-Pacific region experienced 94 IED events in October: 73 events in South Asia, 20 events in South East Asia, and one event in Northeast Asia. These events consisted of 347 devices. There were 40 IED detonation events, 12 IED found and cleared events, one IED hoax event, and 41 IED cache events. There were 41 casualties in October: five civilians killed, 19 civilians wounded, four host nation forces killed, and 13 host nation forces wounded.

There were 94 IED events in the Indo-Pacific region in October 2018



Icons depict events for October 2018; heat map depicts event density from October 2017 - October 2018

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
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
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

October IED events



October IED events by Country



October IED Casualties



This document is intended for those personnel performing military, intelligence, law enforcement, or security duties in support of C-IED operations.

Click on an entry to advance to the associated page.


October Executive Summary

SOUTH ASIA

IED events in October 2018 were 45% higher than events in October 2017 (73 events versus 40 events). Detonations typically represent the largest portion of events in South Asia. Device counts were six times higher in October 2018 than in October 2017 (309 devices recovered versus 48 devices).

Compared to September 2018, events in South Asia increased by 37% in October 2018 (46 events versus 73 events). This change is primarily due to violence associated with upcoming elections in some Indian states and in Bangladesh. Election violence is very common in South Asia, as was demonstrated with the sharp increase in events during the 2017 Nepal election cycle, during which hundreds of IED events occurred. IEDs are often the weapon of choice for South Asian political activists, as explosive material can be easily acquired through both licit and illicit means. The devices, such as sutali bombs, crude bombs, hand bombs, and thread bombs, usually incorporate black powder and are impact detonated. These devices are typically not powerful enough to kill; however, their detonations create chaos at polling places and intimidate political opponents and voters.

South Asia IED Events
October 2017 - October 2018




		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	49	9	0	251	309
	Year	762	352	29	1920	3063
Event Count	Month	34	7	0	32	73
	Year	442	223	19	256	940

SOUTHEAST ASIA

IED events in October 2018 were slightly lower than events in October 2017 (20 events versus 24 events). IED events in Southeast Asia typically range between 20 and 30 events per month, with occasional outliers when large-scale coordinated attacks occur (such as the 63 IED events that occurred in May 2018 due to increased activity in Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia). Device counts were 12 times higher in October 2017 than in October 2018 (474 devices recovered versus 38 devices) due to clearing operations following the end of the siege of Marawi in the Philippines.

IED activity in October 2018 was slightly lower than September 2018 (20 events versus 27 events). In the Philippines, IED events dropped to their lowest level since March 2018. Interestingly, IED events also occurred in Southeast Asian countries that do not always experience consistent IED activity. For instance, IED activity in Vietnam has occurred more frequently in the last year, with five events incorporating 20 devices. IED activity in Malaysia has also become more consistent month-to-month over the last year, with 11 events incorporating 64 devices.

Southeast Asia IED Events
October 2017 - October 2018




		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	7	14	1	16	38
	Year	187	534	7	629	1357
Event Count	Month	6	5	1	8	20
	Year	160	74	8	131	373

NORTHEAST ASIA


IED activity in Northeast Asia is consistently low, with the majority of events occurring in China as expressions of personal grievances against the government or society. Other forms of criminal violence, such as knife attacks in public venues, are more common than IED activity. When IED events do occur in China, they are usually small-scale detonation events occurring in the eastern part of the country or in Hong Kong.

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from OPEN SOURCES are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations. Event refers to specific IED activity categories: IED Detonation, IED Found/Cleared, IED Hoax, IED Cache.


PACOM IED Events - Past 12 Months



Past Year IED events by Country



Past Year Device Count by Country




		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	63	23	1	260	347
	Year	952	886	36	2550	4424
Event Count	Month	40	12	1	41	94
	Year	605	297	27	389	1318


NOTE: The APCFC Monthly IED report includes both event counts (detonation, found/cleared, hoax, and cache) and device counts. It is important to note that a singular IED event may include multiple devices. For instance, a single IED cache event may contain several devices.

IED Activity - Past 12 Months

Switch Type



Group Affiliation



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics are presumed to be approximations. Graphics represent known switch type and group affiliation.

Incident Highlight: October Defensive Suicide Detonation

On 5 OCT, two suspected Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) militants detonated two suicide belts during a raid on their hideout in Mirsharai, Chattogram (Chittagong). Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) members received information on the hideout from detained militants and executed the raid. When security forces approached the building, militants opened fire and a short time later, detonated their devices. RAB officers later recovered an additional five unspecified IEDs, bomb-making materials, documents, firearms, ammunition, and bladed weapons. Documents in the building indicated the militants planned to conduct attacks against the Chattogram Courthouse.

The 5 OCT events were the first defensive suicide detonations since November 2017, when three suspected JMB members detonated their vests to avoid capture. Since March 2017, there have been 32 PBIED events throughout the country, primarily perpetrated by members of JMB/Neo-JMB. Of the 32 events, 18 have been PBIED detonations, four found and cleared, and 10 discovered in cache recoveries. JMB conducted all the PBIED detonations to avoid capture during raids by security forces, often killing not only the militants, but also their family members.



October 2018: Damage to the building where the militants detonated their suicide belts

Starting shortly after the 2016 Holey Artisan Bakery attack by Neo-JMB, Bangladesh's security forces conducted numerous operations and targeted actions against suspected militants. These activities effectively disrupted JMB's ability to conduct offensive attacks. Security forces have neutralized approximately 80 militants since July 2016, including the senior leaders of JMB/Neo-JMB and others involved in the planning and execution of the 2016 bakery attack. Neo-JMB, which follows ISIS ideology, continued to weaken throughout 2017 and into 2018. Though JMB resurged somewhat in India, having conducted the January 2018 Bodh Gaya bombing, the group remained quiet in Bangladesh. The arrest of several high-profile JMB/Neo-JMB militants in India, such as bomb maker Boma Mizan, has likely contributed to the drop in IED activity on the Bangladesh side of the border.


Despite the gains by security forces in both India and Bangladesh, JMB/Neo-JMB continue to be a persistent problem. In mid-October, security forces raided two JMB hideouts in the first named operation since 2017, "Gordian Knot," during which the leader of JMB's media wing was killed. These events show that JMB still poses an active threat, despite months of reduced activity. Likewise, the capability to procure explosives, build devices, and plan operations remains intact, signaling the possibility that mid- to senior-level leaders and facilitators continue to operate.

Sources: Hindu (11/28/17) New Indian Express (8/9/18) Asian Age (9/16/18) Daily Star (10/6/18) Dhaka Tribune (10/16/18) Daily Star (10/18/18)

Special Assessment: South Asia Cross-Border Activity

Introduction

In October, India and Bangladesh conducted trade talks for the first time since 2016, during which they signed a trade agreement that included provisions for access to overland and water routes. Cross-border trade activity stands to benefit both countries through joint investment in trade infrastructure (such as ports and overland terminals), increased access to construction and raw materials, and the creation of jobs to support growing economic activity in trade hub areas. Other countries in South and Southeast Asia stand to benefit from improved trade routes as well. For example, landlocked Bhutan, Nepal, and northern Burma will likely profit from increased trade activity via land routes. Likewise, general infrastructure development linking countries in the region (such as the Bangladesh-Nepal bus line, passenger cruises on the Brahmaputra River, and the India-Thailand highway), and internal infrastructure development (such as road building projects in India's Red Corridor) have the potential to increase investment and economic activity in new ways.



The establishment of new trade and transportation infrastructure will likely have many positive effects for the region. However, it is also likely that illicit activity will increase alongside licit trade and development. Well-established smuggling routes linking South and Southeast Asia crisscross the region, fueled by multiple, active insurgencies. In particular, the area between Burma, India, and Bangladesh is strategically significant because it links Central Asia to Southeast Asia (both of which have active illicit markets, particularly for drugs). Militant organizations often use funds from this illicit trade to pay for weapons and explosives, salaries, and to acquire operational funding. Security forces have noted, particularly in Bangladesh, that cross-border smuggling directly fuels militant operations.

Cross-Border Activity

The border area between Bangladesh and India is over 4,000km long. Much of it is porous, easing movement of smuggled goods, drugs, arms and ammunition, fake Indian currency, and IEDs by both criminal and terrorist networks. Bangladeshi authorities also estimate that 2,000 militants have crossed into India along the same smuggling routes. Some of these militants straddle the criminal-terrorist line by facilitating militant operations in Bangladesh for profit in India, and vice versa. Cross-border militant activity has commonly occurred along the India-Bangladesh border for years, with one of the most notable incidents occurring in Burdwan, West Bengal in 2014. In the Burdwan Incident, an explosion at a JMB bomb-making factory exposed their operations across four West Bengal districts; the militants were producing large quantities of IEDs to smuggle into Bangladesh.


Over the last two years, Bangladeshi security forces have recovered many caches of explosives, including commercial grade explosives (CGE; those explosives used for commercial purposes, such as mining) produced in India during raids on Bangladeshi militant hideouts. These finds prompted Bangladeshi security forces to uncover smuggling routes and networks in the wake of the 2016 Holey Artisan Bakery attack in Dhaka; Neo-JMB militants reportedly smuggled the grenades and firearms used in the attack into Bangladesh from Bihar, India. Following his arrest in February 2017, JMB/Neo-JMB facilitator and bomb-maker Boro Mizan admitted that he used the porous border in Chapai Nawabganj to smuggle arms and explosives into Bangladesh from India for use during the 2016 Bakery attack. Mizan also worked with Neo-JMB leader and bomb maker Sohel Mahfuz to smuggle CGE into both Chapai Nawabganj and Jessore, fueling militant operations in 2016 and 2017. More recently, on 27 OCT, Bangladesh's Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) detained a smuggler in Zakiganj, Sylhet, Bangladesh with 12.4kg of gel sticks and 100 electronic detonators believed to be from mining operations in Meghalaya, India. The RAB suspects a militant group planned to use the explosives to disrupt upcoming elections.

High visibility of cross-border criminal-terrorist smuggling and activity has recently led to an increased dialogue between Indian and Bangladeshi border security forces. In July, border security forces held a four-day conference during which they sought to create a common understanding of the criminal-terrorist problem set in remote areas and to discuss mitigation measures specific to those areas, such as new or improved border fencing, increasing understanding between border guard forces, and the clearance of waterways and drainage. The conference specifically discussed the lack of fencing along the 1,880km-long border between northern Bangladesh and India's Tripura, Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Assam States. As a result of the conference, Indian and Bangladeshi border security forces agreed to adopt a zero-tolerance policy towards smuggling of arms, explosives, drugs, and people across the border, which will empower both forces to better address cross-border illicit activity.

CGE Proliferation

In South Asia, a multitude of violent extremist groups commonly employ IEDs. Though it is difficult to determine just how many of these IEDs incorporate CGE across South Asia, it is very likely a primary source of explosive material. One reason

Special Assessment: South Asia Cross-Border Activity



for this is the sheer amount of CGE found throughout the region used for mining operations. India mines coal, iron, and other resources which necessitates large-scale production of CGE. Compounding the large amount of explosive material available in the region, difficulties regulating CGE have increased the likelihood that nefarious actors will this item. Interestingly, militants have often commented that it is easier to get explosive material in South Asia than firearms and ammunition. The Indian Government has realized that the issues of regulation fuel IED use and other illicit activity, and have thus been attempting to address deficiencies. Barcoding individual gel sticks and lengths of detonation cord have been somewhat effective, but militants have circumvented these measures in various ways with such simple approaches as defacing the barcodes.

The movement of CGE from use in legitimate mining operations to employment in IEDs requires access to well-placed individuals, including those involved in the production, transportation, storage, and use of CGE. Skimming of explosive materials by industry members and their resale on the black market often lead to large caches of material recovered in areas

along major thoroughfares, such as national highways, or near production or storage facilities. For example, a recent case filed in Bangladesh showed that a warehouse employee and transportation contractor skimmed thousands of tons of fertilizer, and resold it between 2013 and 2016 (see SA SIGACTs). Many skimmers and smugglers may not know they are directly contributing to domestic and foreign militant activity (as CGE is also used in land management projects, such as clearing land for farming and tree stump removal), and they likely engage in this activity because of its ease and profits.

To date in 2018, Indian security forces recovered 129 IED caches nationwide, and 50% of those occurred in states bordering Bangladesh. West Bengal has the highest number of cache finds in the entire country, with Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand (states rife with Naxal activity, mining, and smuggling) placing second and third. Border towns between the states make convenient transit points for smuggled goods. Security forces have intercepted several large caches of explosives moving from Jharkhand into West Bengal, where domestic militants could use them or smugglers could move them into Bangladesh to support violent operations. On 28 MAY, West Bengal police recovered an explosives cache in Birbhum district, along the border with Jharkhand state, reportedly intended for JMB in Bangladesh. The cache contained 11,000 gelatin sticks, 50,000 detonators, and a large quantity of ammonium nitrate. Mining is one of the main industries in Birbhum district and it is probable that the CGE and ammonium nitrate recovered were skimmed from an industry warehouse or intercepted during transportation.

Conclusion

Infrastructure development and increased trade in South Asia stands to positively impact one of the most densely populated regions of the world. Joint development projects with neighboring countries will likely strengthen local economies and increase access to goods and services throughout the region. Along with economic development, it is also key that security cooperation across borders increases, as it is likely that nefarious actors and smugglers will attempt to exploit improved infrastructure and increased access to materials. New smuggling routes that mirror legitimate trade routes, particularly into previously isolated areas, have the potential to create new security concerns for the region. Proliferation of unregulated or poorly regulated explosives by smugglers along new routes could increase IED activity in areas already prone to violence and extremist activity.

Militant organizations, many of which have differing goals and ideologies, all generally benefit from the destabilization of countries in the region. Destabilization can lead to increased corruption, gaps in policing and security forces, and increased tolerance for black market and smuggling activity. Cross-border facilitation of weapons, fake Indian currency notes, and explosives, in addition to improved movement of facilitators, smugglers, and militant groups, could contribute to local and regional destabilization. Thus, South Asian countries all stand to benefit from dialogue and actions that support local and regional security and stability.

Sources: Hindustan Times (12/2/14) The Hindu (1/2/15) Telegraph (8/8/16) Economic Times (4/10/15) Daily Star (3/5/17) Dhaka Tribune (5/31/17) Daily Star (11/4/17) Indian Express (3/30/18) News18 (4/12/18) RSIS (4/12/18) NDTV (4/23/18) Hindustan Times (5/29/18) India West (6/11/18) News 18 (6/11/18) Daily Hunt (7/25/18) Economic Times (8/13/18) PostCard (9/6/18) Economic Times (9/24/18) India Today (10/11/18) Economic Times (10/14/18) Live Mint (10/25/18) Daily Star (10/29/18) Hindu (10/29/18)

Person of Interest / VEO of Interest

POI: Ashin Wirathu



AREA OF OPERATIONS: Burma **AFFILIATION:** 969 Movement, Ma Ba Tha ("Organization for the Protection of Race and Religion) **PSEUDONYM:** "Burmese bin Laden", "Face of Buddhist Terror"

Ashin Wirathu is an ultranationalist Buddhist monk leader from Mandalay, Burma accused of inciting violence against Burmese Muslims and conspiring to persecute them via public sermons. In 2001, he became involved in the 969 Movement, which seeks to prevent the expansion of Islam in Burma. Two years later, in 2003, he was sentenced to 25 years in prison for inciting anti-Muslim violence; however, he was released after being given amnesty in 2012. Shortly after Wirathu's release, inter-religious riots fueled by his sermons erupted in several places across the country leading to the deaths of dozens of people and the destruction of property.

In March 2017, the government-appointed Buddhist committee in Burma banned Wirathu from speaking to the public for one year. However, Wirathu's messages continued to spread via social media platforms. Some social media platforms have attempted to block his content for violating community standards, though these measures have been reported as unsuccessful.

On 14 OCT, Wirathu delivered his first speech since March 2017 at a pro-military rally that attracted hundreds of supporters. No violence ensued; however, his signature rhetoric protested calls for the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate Burma's generals for genocide and crimes against humanity against the Rohingya Muslim minority.

Various sectors of society have an ambiguous relationship with Wirathu; they fear his ability to recruit, mobilize, and motivate Buddhist extremists, but do not necessarily disagree with his message. These same sectors, including the government, support blocking Rohingya Muslim citizenship (a pillar of Wirathu's campaign encouraging Buddhist nationalist values). Wirathu's nationalist and anti-Muslim campaign will likely continue in the near future, and it is likely that his message will continue to pervade despite international pressure.

Sources: The New York Times (6/20/13) BBC (5/2/13) The Guardian (4/18/13) BBC (1/23/15) Aljazeera (3/11/17) The Daily Star (10/15/18) Scroll.in (2/27/18)

VEO: Jama'at-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh & Neo-Jama'at-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh

AREA OF OPERATIONS: Bangladesh and India **TTPs:** beatings, bombings, assassinations, kidnapping, torture, suicide attacks, Guerrilla warfare, sabotage, hostage taking **Founded:** 1998 (JMB) and 2014 (Neo-JMB)

Following reduced coverage for several months, JMB and Neo-JMB emerged into the media spotlight in October. The 5 OCT defensive suicide detonations and the execution of Operation Gordian Knot by Bangladeshi security forces on 16-17 OCT demonstrated the resiliency and continued pervasiveness of these extremely dangerous militant groups. There were only three IED detonation events involving JMB or Neo-JMB in the first nine months of 2018 in Bangladesh. In contrast, October has witnessed four detonation attributable to JMB or Neo-JMB, in addition to several cache and found/cleared events.

JMB, an organization active since 1998, has conducted operations in Bangladesh (including the 2005 serial blasts) and in India (including the 2014 Burdwan Incident). Neo-JMB, a breakaway group founded by JMB members, has conducted several high-profile attacks (including the 2016 Holey Artisan Bakery attack) and generally espouses ISIS ideology. (**See June 2016 and October 2016 VOI for further historical information on both groups.**) JMB has long been the target of security forces action following the 2005 nationwide serial blasts; however, starting in 2016, Neo-JMB's actions overshadowed those of the JMB. Following the Holey Artisan Bakery attack, police and Rapid Action Battalion began a systematic campaign to destroy Neo-JMB, which has led to the neutralization of over 80 militants in the last two years, including all but two of the senior planners and leaders.

Though security forces have imprisoned or neutralized many of the senior leaders of these groups, the organizations continue to recruit and to plan operations. In response to these continued threats, Bangladeshi security forces have fought hard to prevent them from successfully conducting attacks. Attempts to capture militants alive for questioning have continued to lead to increased intelligence and more effective subsequent operations. The sharing of intelligence between India and Bangladesh regarding JMB funding and supply operations has not only contributed to the degradation of the group, but has also contributed to an increase in trust and partnership between each nations' respective security agencies.

As the national elections approach, it is possible that JMB and Neo-JMB will attempt a resurgence. In previous election cycles, political groups in Bangladesh have used militants to attack opponents and to attempt to disrupt the polling process. Whether through direct or indirect means, political groups could attempt to leverage JMB capabilities and networks to create chaos or to influence the elections.

Sources: BDNews 24 (8/17/16) RFA (2/2/18) ICG (2/28/18) BDNews 24 (8/10/18) Asia Times (10/11/18)

South Asia: October Significant Activity

South Asia Cooperation

At the end of October, India and Bangladesh signed an agreement that would open land and water ports for increased trade of goods and the movement of passengers. Goods, including raw materials and consumable items, from Nepal, India, and Bangladesh would become more accessible in the region and would also increase trade with Bhutan. The agreement stands to positively impact all the countries in the region, with particular gains to more remote areas in the Seven Sisters area of India and in Bhutan. The agreement also secures a passenger service along the Brahmaputra River from Kolkata, India, through Bangladesh, to northeast India. **Live Mint (10/25/18) Economic Times (10/25/18) Hindu (10/29/18)**

Bangladesh

Allegations of the black market sale of over 52,000 tons of urea fertilizer from a state-run warehouse belonging to Bangladesh Chemical Industries Corporation in Bogura led to charges against the former warehouse manager and the owner of a contracting company. The case documents showed that multiple sources filed complaints against the pair regarding the transportation of the urea; the pair allegedly sold the stolen product between 2013 and 2016, and reportedly embezzled USD 18 million. **Daily Star (11/1/18)**

India

In October, a pro-ISIS social media channel known as “Strangers in Kashmir” broadcasted in the Jammu and Kashmir region recommended using drone technology to facilitate suicide attacks on security institutions and government facilities. The message, broadcast in English, also referenced militants’ concern that other militants will betray their attack plans to security forces. **Times of India (10/3/18)**

According to an October editorial, India’s coastal regions must further reinforce their assets against terror attacks resembling the 2008 attacks on Mumbai. Though defenses have increased significantly since the Mumbai attacks, the Coast Guard has less than half the aircraft required to patrol the 7,500 km coastline. Inter-agency coordination challenges, a lack of personnel at coastal police stations, and issues tracking maritime vessels remain significant impediments to coastal security. Experts conclude that technology solutions, to include drones, are necessary to successfully monitor and prevent future attacks on India’s coastal regions. **Hindustan Times (10/15/18)**

On 16 OCT, India’s National Security Guard (NSG) Commandos introduced a new UAS referred to as a “kamikaze drone.” The UAS is an indigenously developed and weaponized vehicle designed to operate in pairs. One UAS is equipped with explosives to break windows, allowing entry to a building, while the accompanying UAS detonates its payload of explosives in the target zone. The NSG reportedly has four of these UAS in their inventory, though only two have been tested successfully. Security forces can also reportedly conduct surveillance and monitor communications with the drones. **India Today (10/16/18)**

On 19 OCT, Indian government officials issued a ruling that Rohingya refugees living in New Delhi must submit to biometric identification. Many Rohingya fear this is the first step towards deportation back to Burma, as India deported seven Rohingya on 5 OCT for being in the country illegally. Some Rohingya have previously commented that they would rather die than forcefully returned to Burma, where they had faced years of mistreatment and human rights abuses. There are about 40,000 Rohingya, mostly Muslims, currently residing in India as refugees. **News 18 (10/19/18)**

On 20 OCT, India’s National Investigation Agency (NIA) released via social media a list of 258 of the country’s most wanted terrorists. The list does not rank or prioritize the individuals in any fashion, but 18 of them have significant rewards associated with their capture. The terror suspects listed were considered to be “India’s greatest internal security threat,” according to home ministers P Chidambaram and Rajnath Singh. The suspect with the highest bounty is the leader of the Indian Maoist movement and the General Secretary of the Communist Party of India (Maoist), Mupalla Lakshman Rao (alias Ganapathy) (**see September 2016 POI**). **Deccan Herald (10/22/18)**

Sri Lanka

On 26 OCT, Sri Lanka’s President Sirisena attempted to relieve the current Prime Minister Wickremesinghe of

South Asia: October Significant Activity


his position, and install former President Rajapaksa in his place. The move came as Sirisina's United People's Freedom Alliance decided to quit the unity government with Wickremesinghe's United National Party. Many in the government disagreed with the move and lodged protests, while mobs and protest groups filled the streets. Rajapaksa has been accused of multiple human rights violations during the end of Sri Lanka's war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, Tamil Tigers). The Sirisina administration has also made claims that PM Wickremesinghe's ministers were plotting to assassinate the President. It is very possible that this situation could turn increasingly violent if the government is unable to restore order and resolve the internal conflicts.

Daily Star (10/27/18) Star (10/28/18) CNN (10/28/18) VOX (11/1/18) BBC (11/1/18)

Maldives

In October, Maldives continued towards its transition of power following the September elections, despite attempts to discredit the results by out-going President Yameen. Most notably, on 24 OCT, 49 out of 85 lawmakers submitted a resolution to overthrow the 2015 terrorism conviction of former President Nasheed, who has been living in exile abroad since 2016. International human rights organizations alleged that the arrest and trial of Nasheed, who has been a champion for democracy in the Maldives, was politically motivated. Other politicians, such as eight of the 12 MPs who were forced out of parliament in 2017 for voting to impeach the parliament speaker, were also reinstated. Others had their names cleared of charges and accusations against them, as many of the charges were deemed politically motivated. **MI (10/11/18) MI (10/23/18) MI (10/24/18) MI (10/29/18)**

Bangladesh: October IED Events



There were nine IED detonation events and 13 IED cache events.

On 3 OCT, local police recovered an IED cache following a raid on a JMB gathering in Fouzdaripara, Meherpur, Khulna. Police subsequently detained four suspects. The cache contained eight cocktail bombs, three petrol bombs, three electrical circuits, three machetes, and jihadi books. **Dhaka Tribune (10/3/18) Daily Star (10/4/18)**

On 13 OCT, unknown militants detonated an IED in front of a Hindu temple in Harinagar Bazar, Shamnagar, Satkhira, Khulna. While evading arrest, the militants dropped four crude bombs that police later recovered as a cache. **New Age BD (10/14/18)**


On 30 OCT, RAB-13 recovered an IED cache following a raid on a suspected Ansar al-Islam (formerly Ansarullah Bangla Team) meeting in Kaliganj, Lalmonirhat, Rangpur. Authorities detained five suspects. The cache contained gunpowder, batteries, capacitors, handguns, ammunition, cell phones, ID cards, and jihadi literature. **New Age BD (10/31/18) Daily Star (11/1/18)**

IED events increased in October to the highest number since March 2017, primarily due to an increase in cache finds in conjunction with the arrest of political activists. Increased IED activity commonly occurs in Bangladesh before and during elections, as exemplified by the violence in the run-up to the 2014 elections.


JMB and Neo-JMB, whose ability to conduct operations has been greatly reduced since 2017, had an increase in activity in October (10 out of the 16 events for the month). In particular, they detonated two defensive suicide devices during a raid in the beginning of the month (see Incident Highlight). During “Operation Gordian Knot,” militants detonated multiple IEDs and fired small arms at security forces. JMB and other Islamist organizations (e.g. Ansar al-Islam) may attempt to create chaos and disruptions before and during elections to discredit security forces and the Awami League led-government.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	17	0	0	70	87
	Year	71	14	0	262	347
Event Count	Month	9	0	0	13	22
	Year	36	7	0	60	103


Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



Past Year IED Events by Type




Past Year Devices



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

India: October IED Events



There were 25 IED detonation events, seven IED found and cleared events, and 16 IED cache events.

On 4 OCT, security forces seized a cache of miniature IEDs from a Maoist training location. The cache contained several “packet IEDs” weighing between 250-500 grams that would be hung from nearby trees. Sources suspect that militants emplaced IEDs to harm security forces during the upcoming Chhattisgarh elections. **Times of India (10/7/18)**

On 18 OCT, Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) militants detonated an IED targeting a security forces armored vehicle crossing the Trichal-Lassipora Bridge in Pulwama District, South Kashmir. The detonation killed three security force personnel and wounded seven. **India Today (10/18/18) The Statesman (10/19/18)**

On 24 OCT, security forces seized a cache from a Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA) hideout in the East Garo Hills District. Security forces suspect the cache belonged to the deceased GNLA leader, Sohan Shira. The cache contained one IED without a detonator, IED components, three mortars, one grenade, small arms, ammunition, and other items. **The Northeast Today (10/24/18)**


On 27 OCT, militants detonated a large IED targeting a security forces patrol in Bijapur district, Chhattisgarh, killing four CRPF and wounding two. The patrol was traveling in an armored vehicle on a road near Murdanda Camp when the IED detonated. It was later reported that this attack was not related to the upcoming elections in the state. **NDTV (10/27/18)**

Overall IED activity in India has increased throughout the country this month compared to last month, due to upcoming elections in Chhattisgarh and increased activity in Jammu and Kashmir. Ahead of November elections in Chhattisgarh, the Maoists increased their violent activity. During the 4 OCT event, Maoist militants adopted the technique of hanging IEDs near polling places to target voters and election officials directly. Security Forces anticipate Maoist-related activity will increase due to the elections. In response, the government will deploy an estimated 65,000 personnel from Central Security Forces to maintain security near polling stations.


In the Jammu and Kashmir region, the international militant group JeM has reportedly resurged in the region and are attempting to recruit youth. There were multiple events this month that were reported to have been tied to JeM, starting with the event on 18 OCT. The majority of reports of JeM activity involve small arms fire, but recent reports indicate handlers instructed JeM operatives to conduct more complex attacks involving buddy teams, IEDs, and small arms fire. In northeast India, IED activity dropped in October. The 24 OCT cache suspected to belong to the deceased GNLA commander, Sohan Shira, highlights the pervasiveness of weapons and explosives maintained by the militant groups in the northeast. Though this was not the first Sohan-related cache recovered, it is notable that security forces are still recovering his caches eight months after his death.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	32	9	0	179	220
	Year	521	220	6	1640	2387
Event Count	Month	25	7	0	16	48
	Year	272	110	6	176	564


Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



Past Year IED Events by Type




Past Year Devices



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Nepal: October IED Events



There were two IED cache events.


On 11 OCT, police recovered an IED cache during a vehicle search at a checkpoint in Kakarbhitta, Mechinagar, Jhapa, Mechi and detained two suspects. The cache contained explosives, weapons, drugs, citizenship documents and identification, letters from a known separatist organization, and other items. **Setopati (10/11/18)**

On 24 OCT, Armed Police Forces recovered an IED cache and detained two individuals during a stop of two rickshaws near the Indian border in Bhairahawa, Rupandehi, Lumbini. The cache contained 375 packets of explosives. **Jagran (10/24/18)**


IED activity remained low in October for the second straight month. Both events occurred in different parts of the country along the Indian border. The events highlight the issue of cross-border smuggling and criminal activity that occurs in many countries in the region (see **Special Assessment**). Militants have previously used explosives brought over the border from India to conduct IED attacks, and it is probable that criminal enterprises on both sides of the border support these activities

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	0	0	0	0	0
	Year	165	118	23	13	319
Event Count	Month	0	0	0	2	2
	Year	133	107	13	12	265


Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



Past Year IED Events by Type



Past Year Devices



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Sri Lanka: October IED Events





There was one IED cache event.

On 20 OCT, police recovered a LTTE IED cache believed to be a war remnant from the civil war at Thalladi Airstrip, Mannar. The cache contained one hand bomb, one LTTE –produced hand bomb, explosives, four fuses, four rifles, one mortar, and ammunition. **Daily News (10/20/18)**

IED events in Sri Lanka are rare. The last IED event occurred in July 2018, and there have been only five IED events this year. While it is probable that IED activity will remain low, an increase is possible if the government does not restore stability (see SA SIGACTs). It is also possible that general violence, including IED activity, could increase if the government does not proceed with truth and reconciliation investigations related to civil war-era atrocities on both sides and if the Sirisena-led government does not follow through on its promises. Inter-communal violence also flared earlier this year between Buddhists and Muslims, and it is possible that violence could escalate again if the country further destabilizes.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	0	0	0	2	2
	Year	0	0	0	4	4
Event Count	Month	0	0	0	1	1
	Year	0	0	0	4	4



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Southeast Asia: October Significant Activity

Philippines

Communists and Marxists internationally celebrate October as a commemoration of the 1917 Russian Revolution (also known as “Red October”). Armed Forces of the Philippines suspected the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) was planning protests for 17 OCT and plotting to oust President Duterte (titled “Red October Plot”). However, no such actions took place, possibly because these activities received high levels of visibility. The CPP denied any involvement in the plot and claims the plot was a military conspiracy to extend martial law. Despite inactivity, opposition rhetoric from both perspectives will most likely continue while the New People’s Army nears its 50th anniversary in December. **Fight Back News (9/30/18) SCMP (10/3/18) PNA (10/16/18)**

23 OCT commemorated the one-year anniversary of the liberation of Marawi from the ISIS-backed and inspired terrorist groups Abu Sayyaf, Maute, Ansar al-Khilafah, and Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF). An unspecified number of displaced civilian residents are still living in government-supported enclaves while a joint plan for recovery, rehabilitation, and peacebuilding is underway. All four Islamic insurgent groups have decreased in size since the siege of Marawi, but maintain a presence in the southern Philippines while continuing to conduct nefarious activities aimed at civilians and military forces. **PCIJ (10/18/18) Diplomat (10/25/18)**

Thailand

On 8 OCT, officers of Thailand’s 43rd Ranger Task Force conducted a search for suspected militants in Thepa, Songkhla. During the course of the investigation, suspected militants and security forces exchanged fire, killing one militant. Authorities had earlier identified the deceased as Madamoh Semsan, who was wanted for his involvement in the theft of vehicles, murder, and assault in 2017. After the firefight, the Rangers detained two more suspects, who also may have been involved in the 2017 events. The recent investigation leading up to the arrests demonstrates the active role of security forces to track those responsible for the 16-17 AUG 2017 events. Militants had used the stolen vehicles to create VBIEDs parked in various locations across Pattani and Songkhla. VBIEDs are common occurrence in southern Thailand. As such, crimes involving car theft are a significant concern for security forces. **Bangkok Post (8/16/17) Bangkok Post (10/8/18)**

On 11 OCT, two suspected militants armed with AK-47s opened fire, wounding three border patrol officers in Rusoh, Narathiwat. The officers were returning to their base in a pick-up truck when militants ambushed them. **Thaiger (10/12/18)**

On 24 OCT, Thai and Malaysian leaders met in Bangkok to discuss the stalled peace process regarding the Southern Thai Insurgency (STI). Spokesman of Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), Abul Karim Khalid, shared that the group is emphasizing flexibility and readiness for “sincere and authentic” negotiations with Bangkok; however, the BRN also stated that “there will be no peace or security” in the south if the governments do not accept the group’s proposals. **Asia Times (10/22/18)**

Burma

On 15 OCT, members of 10 ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) that signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement met with top leaders from the government and military in Naypyidaw to discuss Burma’s stalled peace process that began in 2011. The tripartite summit was the first time EAO leaders, State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and military chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing have come together. Members of the summit discussed several issues, including incorporating members of the EAOs into the Burmese Army (Tatmadaw). Ultimately, the summit agreed to create a unified army in which EAO members could serve. Other points of discussion, such as secession from the union and regional autonomy, remained unresolved. The EAOs’ demands include a federal democratic union with limited autonomy, while the military demands that ethnic groups not secede from the union. **Radio Free Asia (10/16/18) Radio Free Asia (10/15/18)**

During 18-27 OCT, landmine detonations wounded seven civilians in northern Shan State in Namsan, Namkham and Kyaukme townships. The Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) claimed that the Tatmadaw emplaced the mines along public roads. Frequent clashes have occurred in Shan State between the Tatmadaw and other EAOs, to include the TNLA, the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP), and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), since the Tatmadaw launched a military offensive against TNLA-controlled areas. **Irrawaddy (10/29/18) BNI (10/30/18)**


Burma’s social welfare, relief, and resettlement minister stated that the first 2,000 Rohingya refugees currently displaced in Bangladesh will return to Rakhine state on 15 NOV as a part of the repatriation process supported by the UN. To date, only 8,000 refugees have requested to return to Burma. In Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh alone, there are an estimated 880,000 to 1.12 million refugees from Burma living in camps. Demands by many in the Rohingya camps in Bangladesh include issuance of national ID cards and equal rights under Burmese law as prerequisites for repatriation. **Irrawaddy (10/31/18)**

Malaysia

In early October, Malaysian officials revealed the 24 SEP arrests of eight men for suspected terror links and extremist activities. The arrests involved five Frenchmen, one North American, one man from the Middle East, and one Malaysian. The suspects were between the ages of 24 and 38, and involved with an Islamic Center in the Malaysian state of Perlis. The arrests came after a foreign intelligence agency shared with Malaysia that a Yemen-based terrorist group had been planning to set up a learning center in Southeast Asia. The investigations revealed that the suspects have connections with a madrasah in Dammaj, Yemen, operated by Sheikh Muqbil Hadi Al Wadi’i, a Salafi Jihadi scholar. The madrasah follows the Salafi Jihadi teachings that permit the killing of non-Muslims and even Muslims that do not adhere to strict religious practices. **The Star (10/7/18)**

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Philippines: October IED Events



There were three IED detonation events, four IED found and cleared event, one IED hoax event, and seven IED cache events.

On 9 OCT, local police and military EOD forces cleared a RCIED from a national highway in Macasampen, Guindulungan, Maguindanao, Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), Mindanao. The device contained four 81mm mortars and one 60mm mortar connected to two cell phones, which differs from commonly-seen devices containing only one or two mortars. Two hours later, security forces cleared another RCIED 25 miles away, along the same national highway, in Tamontaka, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Maguindanao, ARMM, Mindanao. This device contained one 81mm mortar connected to a cell phone. No direct connection has been made between the two events, but officials believe that the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) emplaced both devices. **MSN (10/10/18)**


On 13 OCT, authorities recovered an IED cache from four female members of the New People's Army at a residence in Agbannawag, Rizal, Nueva Ecija, Central Luzon. Authorities detained the four members for recruitment, extortion, and propaganda activities in the local area. The cache contained two IEDs, firearms, ammunition, magazines, two laptops, 10 cell phones, four USB memory sticks, three memory cards, three SIM cards, subversive documents, and other items. **World News (10/14/18) Malay Business Insight (10/15/18)**

On 18 OCT, an IED detonated during a police transport of the Food and Drug Administration Director in Napolidan, Lupi, Camarines Sur, Bicol, Luzon. The detonation killed three police officers and wounded three. A brief firefight and ambush with 20 armed members of the New People's Army occurred after the detonation. **Bernar News (10/18/18)**


IED activity in October was slightly lower than September, with the majority of events being caches in Mindanao perpetrated by Communist insurgents. The number of detonations decreased significantly, potentially due to the changes in mid and senior police and military leadership, who implemented increased security measures such as checkpoints and incentive programs for surrendering explosive materials and devices. Local citizens also continue to report IEDs to the police and military, which has contributed to successful discoveries of devices prior to intended detonation. The government has not yet indicated whether it intends to extend martial law due to ongoing assessments determining the necessity of security forces to remain in Mindanao, which leaves December 2018 as the current deadline. An immediate departure of troops without a phased downgrade approach could create a power vacuum to be exploited by known VEOs, resulting in an increase of IED events and instability throughout the island.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	4	4	1	9	18
	Year	83	475	3	9	570
Event Count	Month	3	4	1	7	15
	Year	76	49	3	93	221


Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



Past Year IED Events by Type



Past Year Devices



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Thailand: October IED Events






There was one IED detonation event.

On 23 OCT, an RCIED detonated at Seesan Max Tyre Center in Tambon Sateng, Muang, Yala. Two men on a motorbike emplaced the device, causing damage to the store and merchandise. The device incorporated a pipe placed in a metal box detonated by radio. Officials are unsure of the motive, stating it could have been insurgents or a business conflict. **Bangkok Post (10/23/18)**
The Nation (10/24/18)

October IED activity remained low for the fifth consecutive month in Thailand. Historically, October has averaged approximately 15 IED events, likely due to the commemoration of the 2004 Tak Bai incident; however, as of 2016 the number of IED events have fallen below five. The overall downward trend of IED activity in the Deep South is likely attributable to multiple factors over the last two years, including recurring monsoon conditions and off-season flooding, the death of King Bhumibol, and the recent Bangkok summit on 24 OCT. Thailand's monsoon season is mid-May through October, and causes rainfall throughout the country, aggravating the ability of insurgents to execute attacks. Though there are occasional spikes that involve coordinated attacks, overall, the rainy season passes with fewer IED events. Historic off-season flooding in 2017 impacted much of the country and likely contributed to a drop in IED events during the dry season.

The yearlong mourning of the late King Bhumibol and the royal cremation ceremonies ended in October 2017 without any political turmoil to fuel violence in the south. As mentioned by the BRN spokesman in October (**see SEA SIGACTs**), it is possible that the declining trend of IED activity and overall violence may indicate that the STI is striving for a diplomatic approach. Alternatively, if the peace talks continue to stall or if the Thai government attempts to force insurgents to comply with a process they reject, the STI could respond with increased violence.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	1	0	0	0	1
	Year	61	23	1	57	142
Event Count	Month	1	0	0	0	1
	Year	52	16	1	11	80



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Burma: October IED Events






There was one IED detonation event.

On 8 OCT, a timed IED detonated near Ner Moon and Ner Kyein, Hsipaw, Shan. Clashes often break out between the Tatmadaw and ethnic armed groups in this region. **BNI (10/11/18)**


October IED activity remained low, following the overall trend since March 2018. Though IED activity has been low for the last several months, overall violence between the Tatmadaw and ethnic armed organizations in northern Shan remained elevated. During these clashes, both sides commonly use landmines to target each other. Civilians, however, often become the victims of landmine detonations. In October, landmines injured seven civilians in Shan State alone (see **SEA SIGACTs**).

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	1	0	0	0	1
	Year	17	18	0	54	89
Event Count	Month	1	0	0	0	1
	Year	12	6	0	4	22



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Indonesia: October IED Events






There was one IED cache event.

On 18 OCT, Indonesian police recovered an IED cache during the raid of a suspected Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) militant's residence in Tanjung Balai, North Sumatra. The cache contained three suicide vests, seven pipe bombs, seven containers of unknown bulk explosive, nails, and buckshot. Police killed two JAD militants attempting to evade arrest at the residence by engaging the police in a firefight. A police investigation uncovered that the two militants had plans to conduct suicide attacks against Buddhist temples, police stations, and other vital installations in the area within days of their raid. Police also believe that a third unidentified co-conspirator may still be at large based on the number of suicide vests recovered from the scene. **The Jakarta Post (10/19/18) CNN Indonesia (10/22/18)**

IED activity in Indonesia is generally low, with only six events since the May coordinated attacks. In response to the May church and police station bombings in Surabaya, the Indonesian government has waged a coordinated and focused campaign to dismantle JAD that includes the passage of a tougher counterterrorism law and the arrest of 325 JAD militants (as of mid-October). Despite these efforts, this group continues to demonstrate resiliency, as it plans and coordinates operational activities.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	7	0	0	0	7
	Year	13	8	1	242	264
Event Count	Month	0	0	0	1	1
	Year	9	3	1	10	23



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Malaysia: October IED Events





There was one IED detonation event.

On 15 OCT, an IED detonated near maritime police along the coast of Kukup Island, Johor, wounding one police officer. A police patrol boat was in the area when it observed a speedboat and three Indonesian crewmembers attempting to enter the country illegally. After the police began a pursuit, one of the culprits threw the IED at the police. Police eventually apprehended the three crewmembers after a short chase. **The Star (10/16/18)**


Most IED related activity in Malaysia is of a criminal nature, to include this most recent event. Although this event is not remarkable on its own, it highlights the border enforcement challenges with which Indonesia and Malaysia contend, particularly between the state of Sumatra and in Peninsular Malaysia. Between these two areas, there are numerous, lawful sea crossings that smugglers use to conceal their unlawful movement. Often, the smugglers are trafficking drugs or humans. In this particular case, it was cigarettes. However, there have been a handful of cases between the two countries over the past several years in which maritime police have interdicted dozens to hundreds of tons of ammonium nitrate. From these interdictions, police often learn that the smugglers intend to sell the common fertilizer to fishermen who are seeking to construct IEDs for the illegal practice of blast fishing.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	1	0	0	0	1
	Year	9	0	1	54	64
Event Count	Month	1	0	0	0	1
	Year	5	0	1	5	11



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Vietnam: October IED Events




There was one IED found and cleared event.

On 13 OCT, police found and cleared 10 IEDs from an ATM booth in Uong Bi, Quang Ninh. A bank employee discovered the IEDs when he came to refill cash in the ATM. The IEDs reportedly contained two kilos of dynamite in total. Police believe that the perpetrators intended to destroy property and hurt people rather than steal money. **VN Express (10/14/18)**


Vietnam rarely experiences IED activity. Although this latest IED event appears to be criminal in nature, Vietnam has experienced an increase in IED-related violence from pro-democracy activist groups in recent years. These events include the April 2017 botched bombing of the country's largest airport in Ho Chi Minh City and the bombing of a police station in June 2018. Although the pro-democracy groups have rebuffed accusations of violent activity, Vietnam continues to crack down and dismantle these groups, some of which the government has designated as terror organizations.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	0	10	0	0	10
	Year	1	10	1	8	20
Event Count	Month	0	1	0	0	1
	Year	1	1	1	2	5

Past Year IED Events by Type



Past Year Devices



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Northeast Asia: October Significant Activity

China


In October 2018, new details emerged on Chinese re-education camps in the autonomous region of Xinjiang in northwestern China. Human rights groups have long argued that these camps resemble concentration camps and have very little to do with “free” education and job training designed to counter religious extremism among Xinjiang residents, most of whom are Uighur Muslims. Agence France-Presse journalists reviewed publically-available Chinese government documents which revealed purchases of large amounts of police batons (2768), electric cattle prods (550), handcuffs (1,367), and 2800 cans of pepper spray, all made by governmental agencies overseeing the education centers. In the wake of national and international outrage, China no longer denies the existence of these camps. Human rights watch groups estimate that the government imprisoned one to three million Uighurs in these camps – between one-quarter and one-third of the total Uighur population of 11 million.

The state-sponsored repression and torture have caught the attention of the U.S. Congress. The Congressional Executive Committee on China proposed the Xinjiang Uyghur Human Rights Act of 2018 in October and the U.S. is also weighing sanctions against China, according to a U.S. State Department spokesman. Meanwhile, according to one Chinese businessman who lives in Xinjiang, “entire [Uighur] villages have been emptied of young and middle-aged people – all rounded up into re-education classes. Only the old and very docile are left in the villages.” **VOX (10/24/18)**

Japan

On 23 OCT, Japanese government officials confirmed the release of Japanese freelance journalist Jumpei Yasuda from three years of captivity in Syria. In 2015, the al-Qaeda branch known as the Nursa Front took Yasuda captive and demanded a USD 10 million ransom. Japan has denied paying ransom. The Japanese government worked with both Turkey and Qatar for his release. Yasuda, reportedly in good health, was brought to a Turkish immigration center and is awaiting forward movement to Japan. Yasuda went to Syria in 2015 to report on his colleague, Kenji Goto, whom ISIS had captured that year; ISIS later beheaded Goto. Japanese freelance journalists working in the Middle East are a topic of controversy in Japan, where critics see their role in reporting on the conflicts as undermining or complicating Japanese foreign policy. **MyTwinTiers (10/24/18) NPR (10/24/18)**

China: October IED Events





There was one IED cache event.

On 25 OCT, Hong Kong police recovered an IED cache and detained one suspect during one of three coordinated raids at a suspected organized crime syndicate site in Sai Kung district, Hong Kong. The cache contained two IED detonators, one fuse, 19 firearms, and 2,000 pieces of ammunition. Two other raids yielded ammunition and firearm parts. **South China Morning Post (10/28/18)**

IED events are not common in China and the last IED event occurred in July 2018. The 25 OCT cache was part of a broader series of raids at locations associated with the Chinese Triad, an old secret society dating back to the 18th Century in China that has morphed into an organized crime syndicate. The Triad engages in various criminal activities, such as selling drugs, prostitution, illegal gambling, money laundering, and extortion. After the communists took over in mainland China in 1949, many Triad members fled to Hong Kong and other locations; Hong Kong soon became the de facto Triad “capital.” In December 2017, Hong Kong Police raided a Triad initiation ceremony; it was the first time in more than a decade that police had detected such an event. Initiation ceremonies had been thought to have stopped in China and Hong Kong, although they are still widespread in Malaysia, which has a significant Chinese population. The Organized Crime and Triad Bureau estimates that there are as many as 100,000 Triad members in Hong Kong today.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	0	0	0	0	0
	Year	2	0	0	0	2
Event Count	Month	0	0	0	1	1
	Year	2	0	0	1	3



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

IED Calendar

The IED calendar was established to help our audience maintain awareness of events, such as anniversaries of major attacks, or political, religious or cultural events that often coincide (or can potentially coincide) with a spike in IED events.

11 SEP-9 OCT (WW): al-Hijrah Islamic New Year

1 OCT 2005 (INDO): Bali attack anniversary

23 OCT 2017 (PHL): Marawi City re-taken by Armed Forces of the Philippines from ISIS-P

24 OCT 2002 (THA): Tak Bai Incident

21 NOV 2006 (NEP): Signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord ending the civil war

23 NOV 2009 (PHL): Maguindanao Massacre

26 NOV 2008 (IND): Mumbai attack

6 DEC 1992 (IND): Babri Masjid Mosque Destruction

14 DEC (IND): ULFA Revenge Day

16 DEC (BNG): Victory Day

22 DEC (IND): CPI-M Military Wing Anniversary

25 DEC (IND): Christmas Attack Anniversary

30 DEC 2018 (BNG): National Elections

IND – India
INDO – Indonesia
PHL – Philippines
THA – Thailand
BUR – Burma
NEP – Nepal
WW – Worldwide

	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
October 2018	30	1 WW INDO	2 WW	3 WW	4 WW	5 WW	6 WW
	7 WW	8 WW	9 WW	10	11	12	13
	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
	21	22	23 PHL	24 THA	25	26	27
	28	29	30	31	1	2	3
November 2018	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
	18	19	20	21 NEP	22	23 PHL	24
	25	26 PHL	27	28	29	30	1
	December 2018	2	3	4	5	6 IND	7
9		10	11	12	13	14 IND	15
16 BNG		17	18	19	20	21	22 IND
23		24	25 IND	26	27	28	29
30 BNG		31	1	2	3	4	5

Common Terms and Acronyms

AN – Ammonium Nitrate	PN – Partner Nation
ANFO – Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil	PPIED – Pressure Plate IED
ARMM – Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao	QRF – Quick Response Force
CIV – Civilian	RCIED – Radio Controlled IED
CBRN – Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear	RCP – Route Clearance Patrols
COIN – Counter-insurgency	RPG – Rocket Propelled Grenade
CWIED – Command Wire IED	SA – South Asia
DTMF – Dual-Tone Multi-Frequency	SAF – Small Arms Fire
EFP – Explosively Formed Projectile	SEA – Southeast Asia
EOD – Explosive Ordnance Disposal	SVBIED – Suicide Vehicle Borne IED
F/C – Found & Cleared	TATP – Triacetone Triperoxide
HME – Homemade Explosives	TNT – Trinitrotoluene (C ₇ H ₅ N ₃ O ₆)
HN – Host Nation (Police, Military, Government)	TTP – Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
IDF – Indirect Fire	UXO – Unexploded Ordnance
IDP – Internally Displaced Persons	VBIED – Vehicle Borne IED
IED – Improvised Explosive Device	VEO – Violent Extremist Organization
KFR – Kidnap for Ransom	VOIED – Victim Operated IED
KIA – Killed in Action	WIA – Wounded in Action
LOC – Line of Communication	
LPG – Liquefied Petroleum Gas	
MSR – Main Supply Routes	
NFI – No Further Information	
NSTR – Nothing Significant To Report	
PBA – Post Blast Analysis	
PBIED – Personnel Borne (Suicide Bomb) IED	
PCB – Printed Circuit Board	

Governments, Groups and Organizations

ASG – Abu Sayyaf Group	JMB – Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh
BIFF – Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters	JMJB – Jama'atul Muslim Janta Bangladesh
BIPP – Barisan Islam Perberbasan Patani	KIA – Kachin Independence Army
BRN-C – Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate	KIM – Khalifa Islamiya Mindanao
BSF – Border Security Forces	KIO – Kachin Independence Organization
BNP – Bangladesh National Party	LeT – Lashkar-e Tayyiba
BriMob – Mobile Brigade (Indonesia CT Forces)	MILF – Moro Islamic Liberation Front
CPI-M – Communist Party of India (Maoist)	MILF-SOG – MILF-Special Operations Group
CPN-M – Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)	MNLF – Moro National Liberation Front
CPP – Communist Party of the Philippines	NPA – New People's Army
CRPF – Central Reserve Police Force (India)	PNP – Philippine National Police
GMIP – Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Patani	POLRI – Indonesian National Police
HM – Hizb-ul-Mujahideen	PULO – Patani United Liberation Organization
HNLC – Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (India)	RAB – Rapid Action Battalion (Bangladesh)
HUJI-B – Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami Bangladesh	RKK – Runda Kumpulan Kecil
IB – India's Intelligence Bureau	SJMM – Samyukta Jatiya Mukti Morcha
IM – Indian Mujahideen	SJTMM – Samyukta Jana Tantrik Terai Mukti Morcha
IrW – Irregular Warfare	ULFA – United Liberation Front of Assam
ISI – Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan)	UWSA – United Wa State Army
ISIS – Islamic State of Iraq ash Sham	YCL – Youth Communist League
JAT – Jemaah Ansharout Tauhid	
JI – Jemaah Islamiya	
JTMM – Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha	
JIB – Jemaat-e-Islami Bangladesh	
JeM – Jaish-e-Mohammed	