Month at a Glance — April
The Indo-Pacific region experienced 151 IED events in April: 122 events in South Asia, 28 events in Southeast Asia, and one event in Northeast Asia. These events consisted of 262 devices. There were 82 IED detonation events, 31 IED found and cleared events, ten IED hoax events, and 28 IED cache events. There were 856 casualties in April: 260 civilians killed, 527 civilians wounded, 13 host nation forces killed, and 56 host nation forces wounded.

Icons depict events for April 2019; heat map depicts event density from April 2018 - April 2019

April IED Casualties

This document is intended for those personnel performing military, intelligence, law enforcement, or security duties in support of C-IED operations.
April Executive Summary

SOUTH ASIA

IED activity increased sharply in April from the previous month (122 events versus 88 events). This increase was primarily due to continuing IED activity in India related to the ongoing general election. Events in India increased by 28%, with the majority of events being IED detonations. There was also an increase in casualties in India from the previous month (46 casualties versus 21 casualties). In Sri Lanka, a mass-casualty, coordinated attack conducted by National Tawheed Jamath terrorists on 21 APR, marked the largest IED-related casualty count for a single country in INDO PACOM history (253 killed and 500 wounded). In Nepal, IED activity remained slightly elevated from the previous month (17 events versus 16 events) due to continued attacks by the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist. In the coming months, IED activity in South Asia will likely decrease as general elections in India conclude on 19 MAY.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Device Count</th>
<th>Detonation</th>
<th>Found/Cleared</th>
<th>Hoax</th>
<th>Cache</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Month</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>792</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1812</td>
<td>3274</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Count</th>
<th>Detonation</th>
<th>Found/Cleared</th>
<th>Hoax</th>
<th>Cache</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Month</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>950</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOUTHEAST ASIA

IED activity decreased in April from the previous month (28 events versus 47 events). This drop was primarily due to a decrease in IED attacks in both Thailand and Indonesia. In the Philippines, IED activity marginally decreased from March (17 events versus 18 events); however, New People’s Army attacks contributed to a substantial increase in IED-related casualties (38 casualties versus no casualties). Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, IED activity in Burma increased in April as Arakan Army militants carried out several attacks targeting Burmese security forces. In Thailand, IED-related casualties nearly doubled (13 casualties versus 7 casualties), despite a sharp decrease in IED activity (4 events versus 23 events).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Device Count</th>
<th>Detonation</th>
<th>Found/Cleared</th>
<th>Hoax</th>
<th>Cache</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Month</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>745</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Count</th>
<th>Detonation</th>
<th>Found/Cleared</th>
<th>Hoax</th>
<th>Cache</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Month</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>397</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NORTHEAST ASIA

There was one IED event in Northeast Asia this month; a 27 APR hoax device emplaced at the Gimpo International Airport in Seoul, Republic of Korea. This was the first IED event since June 2017.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Device Count</th>
<th>Detonation</th>
<th>Found/Cleared</th>
<th>Hoax</th>
<th>Cache</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Month</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from OPEN SOURCES are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations. Event refers to specific IED activity categories: IED Detonation, IED Found/Cleared, IED Hoax, IED Cache.
INDOPACOM IED Events - Past 12 Months

LEGEND
- Detonation
- Found/Cleared
- Hoax
- Cache

Icons depict events from April 2018 to April 2019; occasional overlap occurs

Past Year IED Event Casualty Count

Past Year IED events by Country

Past Year Casualties by Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Device Count</th>
<th>Detonation</th>
<th>Found/Cleared</th>
<th>Hoax</th>
<th>Cache</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Month</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>1004</td>
<td>802</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>2176</td>
<td>4030</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Count</th>
<th>Detonation</th>
<th>Found/Cleared</th>
<th>Hoax</th>
<th>Cache</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Month</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>1363</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: The APCFC Monthly IED report includes both event counts (detonation, found/cleared, hoax, and cache) and device counts. It is important to note that a singular IED event may include multiple devices. For instance, a single IED cache event may contain several devices.
IED Activity - Past 12 Months

Switch Type

Group Affiliation

Incident Highlight: Sri Lanka Easter Bombings

Between 0845 and 0905 local time on 21 APR, nine suicide bombers carried out coordinated attacks against six different targets throughout Sri Lanka, killing 253 and injuring 500. The six targets included St. Sebastian Catholic Church, St. Anthony’s Shrine, Zion Roman Catholic Church, Shangri La Hotel, Cinnamon Grand Hotel, and Kingsbury Hotel. Following the morning bombings, two more explosions took place in the afternoon, one at a small guesthouse near the national zoo and the other during a raid at a suspect’s apparent safe house. During the raid on the safehouse, the suspect’s wife detonated a suicide bomb to avoid detention, subsequently killing three police officers and her three children, in addition to herself. Sri Lankan authorities believe that the National Thowheeth Jama’ath (NTJ), a local Islamist group, in conjunction with the Jamathei Millathu Ibraheem (JMI), a relatively new and obscure terror organization, executed the attacks.

The motives for the attacks are not known; however, there are several key factors to consider. On 23 April the Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attacks. Nonetheless, ISIS has a history of opportunistically claiming responsibility for such events despite questionable involvement, such as the recent bombing incidents targeting religious institutions (e.g. the JAN 2019 Jolo Cathedral attack in the Philippines). Despite questions surrounding direct or indirect ISIS involvement, it is likely that the ISIS or a similar Islamist ideology heavily influenced the perpetrators, due to the choice of Christian churches as targets. Another possible factor is that a new or emerging VEO could possibly have used the attack to demonstrate their capabilities; an attack of this scale and sophistication will elicit significant international media attention and garner global publicity for the group.

The Easter bombings are a defining moment in Sri Lankan terrorism and Indo-Pacific violent extremism. This was not only the first major attack in Sri Lanka since the end of its civil war in 2009, but it was also the deadliest IED attack in the history of the Indo-Pacific region. Since the end of the civil war, Sri Lanka has enjoyed a period of relative tranquility. For instance, in the past year, only one IED detonation occurred. These attacks are indicative of a new type of threat that Sri Lanka must now confront. Although Sri Lanka has experience with counterterrorism stemming from the civil war, those events were driven by an ethnic-separatist conflict, unlike the Easter bombings which were ideologically motivated. Although it is unlikely that the two organizations involved in the attack possess sufficient strength to remain a threat in the near term, this event demonstrates the continued proliferation of distorted Islamist philosophies and ideologies into the region, as well as the strategic and tactical significance of suicide terrorism to violent extremist organizations.

Sources: BBC (4/21/19) MSN (4/23/19) CNN (4/25/19)
Ramadan and Militant Violence in the Indo-Pacific

From 5 MAY – 4 JUN 2019, an estimated 1.57 billion Muslims, or roughly a quarter of the world’s population, will celebrate the holy month of Ramadan. The observation of Ramadan calls for the Muslim community to fast, recite prayers, and to emphasize the values of charity, generosity, and spiritual growth. Unfortunately, despite the spirit of goodwill and religious fervor, there are those who seek to incite violence during a season that calls for prayer and peace. Indeed, leaders of both ISIS and al-Qaeda have repeatedly called for violence to commemorate Ramadan, and to initiate jihad and battle against apostates or “disbelievers.”

This study attempts to answer if there exists a correlation between the onset of Ramadan and an increase in terrorist activity. To address this question, the APCFC examined terrorist events from 2014 – 2018, which includes a period of 60 days prior to Ramadan and 60 days after to establish a non-Ramadan baseline of activity. As the period of Ramadan changes yearly according to the lunar calendar, this presented a challenge to analyze the data based upon a fixed month. As such, we examined the average number of terrorist events occurring during Ramadan within the five-year period and then compared these averages to the pre and post baselines. If the Ramadan average exceeded the pre and post baselines, then one could conclude that there is a positive correlation between the onset of Ramadan and terrorist activity.

The datasets analyzed include APCFC IED events and non-IED related events from the START Global Terrorism Database (e.g. assault, hijacking, arson, kidnapping, etc.). The locations considered in this study include the predominately Muslim areas of Jammu and Kashmir, India, Bangladesh, Indonesia, the four southern provinces in Thailand (Pattani, Narathiwat, Yala, and Songkhla), and the islands of Mindanao, Basilan, and Sulu in the southern Philippines. Though limited, an analysis of these datasets and locations may highlight an increase in the operational tempo of violent extremist organizations associated to the holy month of Ramadan.

Overall, the study showed that extremist violence in Bangladesh, Jammu and Kashmir, parts of India, and the southern Philippines did not increase during Ramadan. More specifically, the number of terrorist events that occurred during Ramadan did not exceed those of the baseline periods.

Thailand however, experienced 31% more IED events, 44% more IED casualties, and 37% more Global Terrorism Database events over the study period during Ramadan. Notwithstanding the fact that ethnic separatism rather than religious ideology is the underlying motivation for the Southern Thai Insurgency, observing this phenomenon is expected, particularly as the STI capitalizes on periods of religious and cultural significance to execute attacks. The rationale is quite simple – terrorist activity during these events elicits greater local and international media attention, which in turn spurs recruitment and garners global sympathy. For example, on the fourth day of Ramadan 2018, STI militants launched a wide-scale attack to bomb dozens of ATMs across all four southern provinces. Perhaps more importantly to note, the STI executes attacks during Ramadan to remind security forces of an atrocity that occurred during Ramadan 2004 – the Tak Bai Massacre. The Tak Bai incident, which started as a peaceful demonstration, resulted in the deaths of 85 Thai citizens. The STI continues to capitalize on the memory of this event as justification for the organization’s continued violence.
Ramadan and Militant Violence in the Indo-Pacific

Although the data for the other countries examined does not reveal an increase in activity during Ramadan, the absence of a spike in violent actions does not suggest that the local VEOs do not attempt to exploit this holy month for their information operations campaigns. For example, the five-month battle for the city of Marawi between ISIS-Philippines militants and the Armed Forces of the Philippines commenced just prior to the beginning of Ramadan 2017. According to captured ISIS-Philippine documents, the organization planned to seize Marawi City on 26 May, at the start of Ramadan; however, an operation by the Philippine police to capture a senior ISIS-Philippines leader on 23 May prompted the militants to assume an offensive posture and begin to take the city. Similarly, in Indonesia, there is a possibility that Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) intended to execute the May 2018 suicide bombings in Surabaya during the month of Ramadan; however, counterterror operations executed by Indonesian security forces may have prompted the group to accelerate their timeline.

One of the major limitations of this study is that it tracks the relationship between Ramadan and violence for only five years. Because the lunar calendar dictates the occurrence of Ramadan, it takes 33 years for the month to cycle through all seasons. This limited study period makes it difficult to isolate the effects of a myriad number of variables, to include political activity, seasonal weather, national days of significance, and other factors. However, a paper published last year by two university professors, Suat Cubukcu and Brad Bartholomew, isolated the effects of these variables and conducted a 33-year study of violence related to Ramadan. The authors found that on a global scale, there is some merit to the belief that violence increases during Ramadan. Their study concluded that the number of attacks worldwide from jihadist groups increased by 10% during Ramadan months.

It is reasonable to hypothesize that religiously based VEOs, particularly those that adhere to a violent interpretation of Islam, would exploit the religious fervor instilled during this holy month to increase their operational tempo. Contrary to expectations, the volume of attacks executed by VEOs in the Indo-Pacific does not necessarily escalate during Ramadan. Instead, with the exception of Thailand, this study revealed that VEO activity remained consistent, or even declined during this month. Despite this study’s conclusions, it is quite likely that VEOs will use the peaceful and religious atmosphere associated to Ramadan to conduct attacks. Moreover, plots and violence executed by individual terror cells or “lone wolf” attackers should not be discounted either.
Person of Interest / VEO of Interest

**POI: Moulvi Zahran Hasim**

**ALIAS:** Mohammed Zahran and Moulvi Hashim  
**ROLE:** Cleric, Recruiter, Leader, Suicide Bomber  
**AFFILIATION:** National Thowheed Jama’ath (NTJ), Jamathei Millathu Ibraheem (JMI), Al-Ghuraba Media  
**AREA OF OPERATIONS:** Kattankudy township and Colombo District, Sri Lanka  
**STATUS:** Deceased

Authorities in Sri Lanka identified Moulvi Zahran Hashim as the mastermind behind the 21 April 2019 Easter Sunday coordinated bombing attacks in Sri Lanka that killed 253 people (see incident highlight). Hashim, a “self-styled” cleric, gained recognition for his incendiary and hateful sermons rallying against all non-believers and declaring that “only Muslims are fit to rule.” Hashim is from a Muslim middle-class family and likely adopted an extremist ideology during his studies at seminary school in Kattankudy township, Eastern Sri Lanka. Hashim dropped out of school and began focusing on the radicalization of young people through Qur’an classes and social media postings. In 2014, Hashim formed the group National Thowheed Jama’ath (NTJ), which is one of the two groups authorities hold responsible for the attacks; however, the group has not officially claimed responsibility.

Those exposed to Hashim knew of his violent attitude and teachings prior to the bombings on Easter Sunday. For several years, the local Muslim community warned authorities that Hashim was a dangerous and violent figure. For instance, Hashim’s sermons justified the killing of “non-Muslims and people who do not accept Muslims [including] women and children.” Weeks prior to the attack, Indian intelligence services had warned of Hashim’s violent plans to attack churches and hotels. Despite these warnings, Hashim was able to recruit nine suicide bombers to carry out the deadliest bombing attacks in Sri Lankan and Indo-Pacific history.

It is unknown if Hashim had any bomb-making skills or contributed to the construction of the devices; however, investigators confirmed that he was one of the suicide bombers at the Shangri-La Hotel. Hashim’s plan may have been to inspire future attacks by becoming a martyr himself. A raid on a safe house (one that Hashim arranged for his family), resulted in the death of his father and two brothers. Hashim’s wife and daughter survived the raid. Authorities recovered three completed backpack/PBIEDs in the home, indicating that Hashim’s organization may have planned additional attacks.

**Sources:** CNN (4/28/19), The Washington Post (4/28/19), The Jakarta Post (4/24/19), ARAB News (4/29/19)

**VEO: National Thowheed Jama’ath (NTJ)**

**FOUNDED:** 2014  
**LEADERS:** Zahran Hashim (leader)  
**AREAS OF OPERATION:** Sri Lanka (mainly concentrated in Kattankudy prior to the Easter bombings)  
**STRENGTH:** 100-150 militants  
**AFFILIATION:** ISIS, Jamathei Millathu Ibraheem (JMI)  
**TTPs:** PBIEDs, VBIEDs, vandalism, and religious violence

The NTJ is a Salafist, Islamist organization that propagates a global jihadist ideology in Sri Lanka. The group likely originated by splintering off from the hardline political group, the Sri Lanka Thawheed Jamaat (SLTJ).

Investigators identified NTJ, in affiliation with JMI, as the organizations responsible for the Easter Sunday bombings (see incident highlight); however, the nature of the relationship between these groups is ambiguous. In a late April press conference to announce the banning of both organizations by presidential decree, Sri Lankan officials explained that JMI is an offshoot group of NTJ, whose leader was the same individual – Zahran Hashim (see POI). Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, a scholar of Islamic terrorism, explained the connection by claiming that Hashim quarreled with NTJ group members and left the group to form the JMI, which is the more radical of the two.

The Easter Sunday bombings mark the first major terrorist incident associated to the NTJ. Prior to the Easter bombings, authorities did not perceive the NTJ as a significant threat, particularly as the group only committed small scale violent acts such as the harassment of the Sufi population in Kattankudy (eastern Sri Lanka) and the vandalizing of Buddhist statues following anti-Muslim riots in Sri Lanka. The sudden escalation of a group previously known for low-level violence to their successful execution of an extremely devastating and complex terror plot is difficult to comprehend. Acquisition of the skills and capabilities required to carry out such an attack usually follow a gradual progression. The complexity and sophistication of the Easter Day attacks suggests that the organization received external support; however, the extent of this support remains unknown.

The paucity of information available on the NTJ makes it difficult to assess the group’s future trajectory. Nonetheless, the death of the group’s leader as a suicide bomber in the Easter attacks and the crackdown by Sri Lankan forces following the bombings has likely placed the organization in disarray. Over the long term, it remains unclear if NTJ will continue expanding its terror activities and capabilities or return to its role as an ideological vanguard.

**Sources:** The South African (4/22/19) Times Now News (4/22/19) Independent (4/28/19) BBC (4/28/19) News In Asia
South Asia: April Significant Activity

Bangladesh

On 25 APR, a pro-ISIS social media channel released a poster in Bengali, the predominant language in Bangladesh, threatening to stage attacks in Bangladesh or West Bengal, India “soon.” The poster’s message implied a reference to the Sri Lanka Easter bombings, which occurred days prior to this poster release. The poster says “Coming soon, God Willing” in Bengali and featured ISIS affiliate, Al-Mursalat’s logo. ISIS seemingly released this propaganda intentionally to coincide with its claim for the recent Sri Lanka Easter bombings. Al-Mursalat released its poster for the new Bengal emir in Bengali, Arabic, and Hindi, stating that, “the soldiers of Khilafa in Bengal and Hind [an old name for India]…are never to be silenced.” Other well-timed ISIS propaganda includes a new video that ISIS core leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (his first appearance in five years) released on 29 APR and ISIS’s claim of responsibility via its media outlet, Amaq Agency, for a 29 APR IED attack on Dhaka police. NewAgeBD.net (5/01/19) Khaleej Times (5/02/19)

On 27 APR, a Dhaka Special Tribunal sentenced three Rohingya persons from Rakine state, Burma to ten years imprisonment for possession and use of explosives. The three conducted an IED attack on the Sir Salimullah Muslim Orphanage in November 2014. Authorities also suspect that they are linked to IED manufacturing in Burdwan, Kolkata, where a premature IED detonation occurred in 2014. Indian authorities linked the IED manufacturing to Bangladeshi-based Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB). The court sentenced one Rohingya in absentia, as he is on the run after securing bail. Police arrested the three in 2014 on a tip that they conducted the IED attack on the orphanage in Lalbagh, Bangladesh. All three are known to be members of the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) and other militant outfits. Dhaka Tribune (4/28/19) Daily Star (04/28/19)

Daily Star (3/08/15) Irrawaddy (4/29/19)

On 30 APR, an ISIS affiliate group, Al-Mursalat, released a statement that it had named a new emir for “Bengal,” an area encompassing both Bangladesh and West Bengal, India. The new emir is Abu Muhammad al Bengali, who was reportedly killed in Bangladesh in March 2017 in a suicide bomb attack in front of Hazrat Shahjalal International Airport. In January 2019, reporting surfaced that Abu Mohammad al Bengali’s body remained at the Dhaka Medical College Hospital morgue, unclaimed. Police also knew him by his alias, Ayad Hossain of Mirpur area, Dhaka. Bangladesh refuted the claim of the extremist watchdog group, SITE Intelligence, that Ayad Hossain was actually Abu Mohammad al-Bengali, a known ISIS member. Whether the body in Dhaka is al-Bengali or someone else, Al-Mursalat is using his name recognition to incite fear and to call forth ISIS operations in Bangladesh and West Bengal. Both Indian and Bangladeshi authorities are closely monitoring developments considering this possibility. DailyAsianAge (1/19/19) Mumbai Mirror (5/01/19) Dhaka Tribune (3/24/17)

India

On 17 APR, the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) terrorist organization area commander, Mansoor Ahmed, issued a threat to “bomb” the five railway stations that comprise the Firozpur Division in India’s Punjab state. JeM specified 13 MAY as the date the attacks will occur. Punjab is a state bordering Pakistan and is the heart of India’s Sikh community. JeM is a Pakistan-based Islamist group active primarily in Jammu & Kashmir state. Their primary objective is to separate Kashmir from India and to merge it into Pakistan. The threat to blow up railway stations is reportedly to avenge the killing of JeM jihadists. JeM delivered the threat using social media and Indian security officials have taken it seriously. India’s Government Railway Police (GRP) and Railway Protection Force (RPF) reportedly heightened their security posture by carefully screening passengers and scanning trains for explosives. India Today (4/17/19)

On 23 APR, India’s National Investigation Agency (NIA) arrested Islamic State (IS) sympathizer Mohammad Faiz for conspiring to commit terrorist attacks in New Delhi and Uttar Pradesh. Faiz is reportedly the founder of the IS inspired, Harkat-UI-Harb-E-Islam terrorist organization in India and is active in recruitment and the procurement of weapons and ammunition to facilitate terrorist attacks in and around New Delhi. Additionally, NIA learned that Mufti Mohd (alias Suhai) is the current Amir of Harkat-UI-Har-E-Islam and is also active in procuring weapons and explosives to manufacture IEDs in the National Capital Territory of Delhi. Economic Times (4/23/19)

On 26 APR, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), claimed the group is fully prepared to protect the large Christian population in the region from Islamic State (IS) attacks. This pronouncement follows the 21 APR Easter Day attacks in Sri Lanka. Though there have been no apparent threats to Nagaland, NSCN senior leader, V Horam, stated the group’s army and intelligence apparatus is on alert to counter any threats. Nagaland has a population of almost 2 million, with an 88% Christian majority. Nagaland is one of three Christian-majority
South Asia: April Significant Activity

states in India, along with Meghalaya and Mizoram states. The main objective of NSCN is to establish a sovereign Naga state which would consist of all areas that the Naga people inhabit in Northeast India and Northwest Myanmar. Authorities accuse NSCN of kidnapping, assassination, forced conversion, and committing terrorist activities. Security officials in Nagaland are subsequently reviewing their preparedness posture considering the recent attacks on Christians in South Asia. News 18 (4/26/19)

Sri Lanka

Media reports that components of the Sri Lankan government failed to heed intelligence reports received from India indicating the planned attacks on 21 APR 2019. Indian security officials formally passed detailed intelligence to Sri Lanka about the suicide bombings on 4 APR, 20 APR, and on 21 APR, hours before the attacks occurred. In addition, according to two officials, the Australian government’s security services also alerted Sri Lanka about the possible attack. As a result, Sri Lanka’s President Maithripala Sirisena requested the resignation of both Defense Secretary Hemasiri Fernando and Police Chief Pujith Jayasundara. International Business Times (04/25/19), Bloomberg (04/26/19), Asia Times (04/28/19), OpIndia (05/1/19)
Bangladesh: April IED Events

There were four IED detonation events and one IED cache event.

On 27 APR, two farmers unintentionally detonated an IED when they struck it with a sickle in Shibganj, Chapainawabganj. They were digging in a field and did not see the IED hidden in a bag in the weeds. BDNews (4/27/19)

On 29 APR at about 0300, the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) conducted a raid on a house in Dhaka after receiving a tip that members of Jamaat ul-Mujahideen (JMB) were stockpiling explosives there. During the raid, two JMB perpetrators detonated two IEDs an hour apart; the second one of which set the house on fire and killed them. After containing the fire, the RAB sent in drones to ensure there were no more perpetrators or rigged explosives. They recovered an IED cache consisting of four additional IEDs. Dhaka Tribune (4/29/19) Dhaka Tribune (4/30/19)

On 29 APR, unknown perpetrators detonated an IED concealed in a pile of bricks near three police personnel on a street in Dhaka. The IED injured the three police and created a small crater, as well as damaging nearby trees. Police stated that the IED was not like other IEDs they typically see in Bangladesh and also speculated it did not completely operate as intended. Daily Star (4/29/19) The Independent (5/01/19)

The RAB raid on a JMB hideout occurred less than 24 hours before the IED detonation in Dhaka’s shopping district. These two events highlight both the scrutiny that Bangladeshi security forces put on tips about suspected extremist locations and the importance of conducting such active measures. Although JMB did not claim responsibility for the IED attack on police, they are the likely suspects. ISIS claimed responsibility immediately after the attack, but Bangladeshi authorities are skeptical of an actual ISIS presence or operations in Bangladesh. Rather, JMB, a declared pro-ISIS organization, is the typical suspect in Bangladesh IED events. Following the Easter Day bombing attacks in Sri Lanka, Bangladeshi authorities heightened security postures, particularly due to the publication of ISIS-affiliated propaganda that is seemingly targeting Bangladeshi audiences, possibly for recruitment and to inspire additional attacks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Device Count</th>
<th>Detonation</th>
<th>Found/Cleared</th>
<th>Hoax</th>
<th>Cache</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Month</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Year</strong></td>
<td>223</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event Count</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Month</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Year</strong></td>
<td>73</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.
India: April IED Events

There were 50 IED detonation events, 17 IED found and cleared events, four hoax event, and 15 IED cache events.

On 7 APR, Maoist insurgents detonated an RCIED, slightly injuring an Indo-Tibetan Border Patrol (ITBP) soldier on patrol in Chhattisgarh state. Maoist/Naxalite insurgents rarely use RCIEDs in Chhattisgarh, which suggests that Maoists may have improved their TTPs. Business Standard (4/7/19)

On 9 APR, Maoist insurgents detonated a large IED, killing an Indian Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) legislator and four of his security staff in remote Chhattisgarh state. Insurgents used a 40-meter command wire to detonate the roadside IED when the victim’s vehicle passed, which completely destroyed the target vehicle. Security forces exchanged small arms fire with the Maoists following the explosion. Times Now News (4/10/19), Hindustan Times (4/10/19)

On 17 APR, a police SWAT team recovered 200 detonators, 1200 gelatin sticks, and 200 kg of ammonium nitrate in a small village in Banda district, Uttar Pradesh. Police arrested two suspects. Prime Minister Modi was scheduled to be in Banda district during the time police discovered the cache. Republic World (4/17/19)

India began its multi-phase, weeks-long general elections on 11 APR that will determine the composition of the Lok Sabha, India's lower house of parliament, and the next prime minister. The remaining three phases of the election will conclude by 19 MAY, and vote counting will begin on 23 MAY. IED activity has increased dramatically over the past two months in response to the polling process. In the most prominent attack, a state legislator for India’s ruling Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) (Bhima Mandavi) and four others (the driver and three bodyguards) died in a roadside bomb attack that Maoist militants carried out on 9 APR. Chhattisgarh is a restive central state where Maoist/Naxalite rebels have been pursuing an armed insurgency for decades.

Maoist/Naxalite insurgents have been calling for a boycott of polls as part of their campaign against the Indian state, and have timed strikes to coincide with elections at polling stations throughout the country. Armed insurgencies exist in at least nine Indian states, from Kashmir in the north to the jungles in the country’s interior, creating risky conditions for party officials and their candidates during campaigning. Maoist groups are present in at least 20 Indian states, but they are most active in a forested section of the country dubbed the “red corridor,” which encompasses the states of Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Bihar, Jharkhand, and Maharashtra. Election related violence is likely to continue throughout the month of May, despite a robust response from Indian security forces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Device Count</th>
<th>Detonation</th>
<th>Found/Cleared</th>
<th>Hoax</th>
<th>Cache</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Month</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1480</td>
<td>2518</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Count</th>
<th>Detonation</th>
<th>Found/Cleared</th>
<th>Hoax</th>
<th>Cache</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Month</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>657</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.*

Return to first page
There were five IED detonation events, eight IED found and cleared events, three IED hoax events, and one IED cache events.

On 17 APR, suspected CPN-M militants detonated an IED in front of the Chaudhary Group of Industries located in Devchuli Municipality, Nawalparasi District, Lumbini Province. The IED explosion resulted in no casualties. **My Republica (4/17/19) Nepal Monitor (4/17/19)**

On 18 APR, suspected CPN-M militants detonated an IED (referred to locally as a "tyre bomb") in an office building in Ribdikot rural municipality, Palpa District, Lumbini Province. The explosion caused damage to the surrounding building and equipment in the office; however, no casualties occurred. **Nepal Monitor (4/18/19)**

On 18 APR, suspected CPN-M militants detonated two gas cylinder IED’s in Chitwan, Province 3. Police located a total of three cylinder IEDs in different areas of Chitwan. Two of the three IEDs detonated while the third failed to explode. The police later defused the third IED. The explosions resulted in no casualties. **Inheadline (4/18/19) Nepal Monitor (4/18/19)**

IED activity in Nepal remained consistent with last month. Netra Bikram Chand’s, CPN-M, perpetrated the majority of these events on the same day following the nationwide strike. Although the nationwide strike put innocent civilian lives at risk with IED attacks, the Nepal Army EOD and police forces successfully prevented most of the violence through a series of clearing operations. Nepal will likely see the same level of IED activity in the coming months if the government continues to uphold the recent ban on the CPN-M.

---

**LEGEND**

- Detonation
- Found/Cleared
- Hoax
- Cache

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Device Count</th>
<th>Detonation</th>
<th>Found/Cleared</th>
<th>Hoax</th>
<th>Cache</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Month</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Count</th>
<th>Detonation</th>
<th>Found/Cleared</th>
<th>Hoax</th>
<th>Cache</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Month</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Past Year IED Event Casualty Count**

**Past Year IED Events by Type**

**Past Year Devices**

*IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.*

Return to first page
There were ten IED detonation events, one IED found and cleared event, one IED hoax event, and two IED cache events.

On 21 APR, suspected National Thowheed Jamath (NTJ) militants conducted a sophisticated coordinated attack on three churches and three hotels on Easter Sunday. For more information on this event see incident highlight (pg. 4).

On 22 APR, police recovered an IED cache containing 87 detonators located at the main Colombo bus station. CNN (4/22/19) Reuters (4/22/19)

On 26 APR, Sri Lanka Security Forces recovered an IED cache located in Sainthamaruthu, Ampara District, Eastern Province. The cache contained 150 sticks of Gelignite, approximately 200,000 ball bearings, batteries, wires, a DJI Phantom 2 unmanned aerial system, and various items for manufacturing bombs, including urea and other chemicals. Prior to the recovery of items, Sri Lanka Security Forces conducted a raid on a suspected suicide vest factory in Sainthamaruthu, resulting in the exchange of small arms fire with an armed group. During the small arms exchange, several of the terror suspects detonated PBIED’s, which killed approximately 15 people. The suicide vest factory is reportedly the location where the NTJ leader, Moulvi Zahran Hashim, recorded the video footage of the suicide bombers pledging allegiance to ISIS. CNN (4/26/19) Colombo Page (4/26/19) Daily Mail (4/27/19)

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

The 21 April Easter bombings are perhaps the most significant IED events in Sri Lankan history. Sri Lanka will likely see a decrease in IED activity in the coming months as Sri Lankan officials increase their efforts to identify and interdict those individuals involved in the recent attacks. One interesting development to note is the recovery of a DJI Phantom 2 as part of an IED cache on 26 APR. Although the reasons for the drone’s presence in the cache is not clear, it is possible that it was used for its surveillance capabilities. On 25 APR, the Sri Lankan Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) issued a ban on all drone aircraft flights, potentially indicating authorities received intelligence regarding drone use by the Easter Day bombers.
Philippines
Within the first week of April, the Philippine government waged a protest against China due to the increasing presence of Chinese vessels spotted near the island of Thitu, or Pag-as-a (as referred to by the Philippines). Since the beginning of 2019, over 275 ships and boats have harassed local Filipino fisherman and conducted shows of force near the contested island. Both President Duterte and the Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs decreed the acts as illegal, and violations of “sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction.” Even though Taiwan, China, and Vietnam have also claimed rights to Thitu Island, Filipinos currently reside on the island. Amidst President Duterte’s outcry against the Chinese actions, he flew to Beijing on 24 APR to meet with President Xi Jinping to potentially ease tensions and to attend the opening ceremony of the second Belt and Road Forum. The Diplomat (4/8/19) CNN (4/1/19) Rappler (4/24/19)

Around 7,500 United States and Filipino troops conducted the 35th annual joint military training exercise BALIKATAN from 1 – 12 APR across multiple locations in the Philippines. The yearly exercise focuses on maritime security, amphibious operations, live-fire training, urban operations, aviation operations, and counter-terrorism responses. The U.S. Navy deployed the USS Wasp, an amphibious assault ship and the largest U.S. ship ever sent for this exercise, as a demonstration of both force and capability. Of note, the Wasp carried several F-35B aircraft. During the middle of the exercise, two Russian destroyers and a tanker docked in the Philippines for an unannounced “goodwill” visit to enhance peace, stability, and maritime cooperation between the two countries. This iteration of BALIKATAN proved particularly important in demonstrating a shared concern for security in the South China Sea. Inquirer (4/25/19) Manila Bulletin (4/5/19) CNN (4/8/19)

Thailand
On 6 APR, Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK) insurgents killed two Border Patrol officers in a mosque in Ban Mayo, Yala. Authorities identified two of the four insurgents; Apinan Stok and Abdulloh Taportor. Officials suspect the RKK’s motive was a response to the arrest of sympathizers. Bangkok Post (4/10/19)
On APR 28, rehearsals took place in Bangkok in preparation for King Maha Vajiralongkorn’s (King Rama X) coronation on 4 – 6 MAY; the first coronation in nearly seven decades. King Rama X became the constitutional monarch after the October 2016 death of his father, King Bhumibol Adulyadej, who served for 70 years as king. Reuter (4/28/19)

Burma
On 29 MAR, security forces arrested Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) member Osman Gawni Osama for suspicious behavior near Border Post No. 40, Maungtaw Township. A subsequent investigation revealed Osama’s involvement in the attack on the Taung Bazar Police Outpost on 25 AUG 17. ARSA recruited Osama and provided him with two months of terrorism training in 2018. MyanmarITV (4/8/18)
On 17 APR, the United Wa State Army (UWSA) celebrated its 30th anniversary in the Wa capital of Panghsang, Shan State. The military parade had 7,600 troops and more than 3,000 in attendance. Since its foundation, the group has grown into the largest ethnic armed group in Burma, with an estimated 30,000 troops and 10,000 auxiliary members. The UWSA serves as the chair of the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC) alliance, with some members currently serving in the Burmese military. The UWSA has not signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement. The Irrawaddy (4/17/19)

Indonesia
On 17 APR, Indonesia held its general elections to vote for President, Vice President, and members of the upper and lower houses of their legislative assembly. More than 80 percent of 190 million eligible voters went to the polls across the 17,000-island archipelago. In the presidential contest, second-time challenger Prabowo Subianto ran against the incumbent, Joko “Jokowi” Widodo. While vote counting is still ongoing, multiple news outlets are calling Jokowi the “likely winner,” given his 56% to 44% lead over Subianto. Over the course of President Jokowi’s 2014 – 2019 term, he has doubled the size of the country’s elite counterterrorism force, Densus 88, pushed the Indonesian Congress to pass a new counterterrorism law that gave authorities additional legal tools to combat militancy, and expanded the military’s counterterrorism role. Benar News (4/19/19)

Malaysia
In late April, the Inspector General of Police (IGP) of Malaysia announced at a press conference that ISIS is planning to make the Southern Philipines and Rakhine, Burma their next base of operations. The IGP believes
Southeast Asia: April Significant Activity

that ISIS has used, and continues to use, several coastal districts in Sabah, especially Tawau and Sandakan, as transit points before traveling to either location for their new base. The IGP shared that these assessments are a result of information exchanges with “friends and agencies from all over the world.” New Straits Times (4/25/19)
Philippines: April IED Events

There were seven IED detonation events, two IED found and cleared events, and eight IED cache events.

On 3 APR, an unidentified male emplaced and detonated an RCIED outside of Carlitos Chicken Restaurant in Kalawag I, Isulan, Sultan Kudarat, SOCCSKSARGEN, Mindanao. According to police, the perpetrators constructed the IED using homemade explosives. CCTV footage captured all the events that occurred prior to and after the IED detonation. The perpetrator intentionally left a white plastic bag that concealed the IED inside the restaurant, but a waiter returned the bag to its owner before he left the premise. The perpetrator then emplaced the IED between the wall of the restaurant and an air conditioner compressor where it detonated. Prior to the IED detonation, the owner of the restaurant received extortion text messages on 28 and 29 MAR, demanding PHP 50,000 for monthly protection. Isulan Municipal Police and the 12th Intelligence Support Unit linked the Daulah Islamiya Terrorist Group (DITG) to the extortion demands. The Armed Forces of the Philippines and Philippine National Police associated the type of common homemade explosive to both the DITG and Bangamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF); however, it is uncertain which group is responsible for this event.

Rappler 4/3/19

On 22 APR, an RCIED composed of an 81mm mortar shell detonated while police attempted to deactivate the device, which they discovered inside a backpack near the entrance to a Catholic church in Pimbalayan, Lambayong, Sultan Kudarat, SOCCSKSARGEN, Mindanao. Locals alerted police of the suspicious backpack and another IED observed inside the cathedral. The security forces successfully defused the second device located in the church. The perpetrators most likely intended to target Easter Sunday church attendees.

Inquirer 4/23/19

IED activity in April was lower than March, with the majority of events being detonations perpetrated by the NPA. The NPA continued small and large firefight attacks against various groups of government forces in Mindanao and the Visayas in celebration of the National Democratic Front’s anniversary on 24 APR, but were unsuccessful in executing any large scale IED events. Communities anticipate mild sporadic violent events during the first weeks of May in response to the Philippines general midterm elections scheduled for 13 MAY.

**Past Year IED Event Casualty Count**

**Past Year IED Events by Type**

**Past Year Devices**

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Return to first page
There were four IED detonation events.

On 12 APR, a 10kg RCIED attached to a motorcycle detonated when a police vehicle passed, resulting in the injuries of four police officers and one civilian in Khok Pho, Pattani. Bernama (4/12/19) Nation (4/12/19) Bangkok Post (4/12/19)

On 14 APR, an IED detonated while soldiers investigated a shooting incident in Ranget, Narathiwat. The blast injured five rangers. Free Malaysia Today (4/14/19)

Thailand’s IED activity returned to historical norms in April with an 82% decrease in IED events compared to March. The detonation events targeting security forces that occurred in Pattani and Narathiwat provinces are common Southern Thai Insurgency (STI) TTPs.

Despite Thai New Year celebrations observed 13 – 15 APR, the holiday passed without any increase in violence.

IED activity is anticipated to increase during the month of May. In Bangkok, preparations for the 4 – 6 MAY coronation of King Rama X have been taking place (See SEA SIGACTS). Such a high-profile event could attract violence, since inconclusive election outcomes did not resonate confidence with the public. The coronation could also influence the STI to increase their attacks to redirect attention to the South, as seen last month. With the approach of Muslim holiday of Ramadan, IED activity could likely increase, particularly in the southern provinces. For instance, in May 2018, insurgents conducted a large-scale attack during the fourth day of the observation of Ramadan. The complex coordinated attack involved approximately 20 detonations in several locations across Narathiwat, Yala, Songkhla, and Pattani targeting ATMs at various banks.

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.
Burma: April IED Events

There were two IED detonation events, three IED found and cleared events, and one IED cache event.

On 21 APR, Burmese military (Tatmadaw) officials uncovered a cache containing five IEDs and 10 bags of Urea during security operations after a clash with the Arakan Army (AA) in Buthidaung Township, Rakhine. This is the first known discovery of Urea discovered in an IED cache in all of Burma. Union Enterprise (4/23/19)

On 21 APR, Arakan Army member, Ko Kyaw Thein (26), detonated two roadside IEDs near a bridge in Maungtaw Township, Rakhine. Union Enterprise (4/23/19) BNI (4/24/19) DMG (4/24/19)

On 22 APR, ARSA insurgents carried out a complex attack on a police vehicle, wounding one officer police officer. After the attack, the Tatmadaw conducted a clearance operation in the area, uncovering a pipe bomb three feet in length with steel balls for fragmentation. The Irrawaddy (4/23/19) YouTube (4/22/19) GNLM (4/24/19) Radio Free Asia (4/23/19) Union Enterprise (4/23/19)

IED activity in Burma increased in April, where hostilities remain high in the Rakhine region with the Arakan Army (AA), Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), and the Burmese military (Tatmadaw) continue to clash. The 22 APR complex IED attack was ARSA’s first IED attack since January. ARSA’s IED activity has significantly diminished in the aftermath of the harsh military crackdown that triggered a massive refugee crisis on the Burma-Bangladesh border in 2017. However, these recent attacks indicate that ARSA has managed to maintain a foothold in Rakhine state and the targeting of military and police vehicles is an emerging trend for the insurgent group.

This month, the AA has accounted for 67% of the IED related events. While the AA has been operational for the last ten years, clashes between the insurgent group and the Tatmadaw have steadily increased since November 2018. The number of AA IED attacks has been on the rise since the beginning of the year and is anticipated to continue in the coming months, particularly if security forces continue their military operations in the region.
There was one hoax IED event.

On 13 APR, police recovered a hoax IED in front of a supermarket in Pematang Siantar, North Sumatra. The hoax device consisted of a black backpack which had two statements written on it: “Lailaha Illallah” (written in Arabic, meaning “There is no deity but God”); and “There’s a bomb, you die!” written in English. The backpack contained a flowerpot. The following day, police identified and arrested the perpetrator; a local high school student. The student told police that he was doing it just “for fun” and that he was not involved with any terror organizations. *The Jakarta Post (4/15/19)*

IED activity in Indonesia decreased this month, following numerous raids against Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) cells in the aftermath of the 13 MAR suicide bombing in Sumatra. The 17 APR general elections in Indonesia commenced without significant electoral violence. Incumbent President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, who is the apparent winner, was tough on counterterrorism in his first term, largely because he saw it as a threat to economic development. His emphasis on economic development and infrastructure suggests that his focus on counterterrorism will likely continue into his next term. One factor which is worthy of observation over Jokowi’s next five years is how he will respond to the growing popularity of pro-Islamist parties and ideology in Indonesia. While Jokowi won the more secular or mixed religious regions such as Bali, he lost the more conservative and Islamist regions such as South Sulawesi, Banten, Jambi, Riau, West Sumatra, and West Java, which went overwhelmingly to his opponent, Prabowo Subianto. It is not a coincidence that these regions have also been central to recruitment for Muslim militancy, whether by Jemaah Islamiyah or pro-Islamic State VEOs. If the populations from these conservative regions feel that they have been disenfranchised or had the election stolen from them – as Prabowo is claiming – recruitment for militant groups will likely increase.
China

In April 2019, Al Qaeda (AQ) issued a statement of solidarity with the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) and the Uighur people. This show of support was likely a public response to the TIP leader’s letter in March depicting the Uighur people’s oppression in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, China. In the March letter, TIP leader Abdul Haq al-Turkistani, asked AQ and Taliban leaders for ideological support for the Uighurs. The AQ response in April, posted on a social media platform, contains typical militant narratives regarding solidarity, brotherhood against “pagan nations,” and commonality of purpose. AQ calls on Muslims to support TIP financially, and praises TIP for its steadfastness in both China and Afghanistan. The Uighur plight, according to the March TIP letter, has not received enough attention from the jihadist community. Long War Journal (4/17/19)

On 1 MAY, China reversed its decade-long position and allowed the Jaish-e-Mohammad leader Azhar Masood to be added to the United Nations global terrorist list without objection. This was the fifth time in a decade that the UN Security Council pursued listing Masood. This is a diplomatic win for India and may be more a sign of the nature of geopolitics in Asia among China, Pakistan, and India. China’s years of refusal to list Masood was in keeping with China’s political goals in Pakistan, which is an important economic partner in the central Asian region. Pakistan is potentially now put in an awkward position to continue allowing Masood free rein in eastern Pakistan’s Punjab, where he has enjoyed a relatively free lifestyle for many years after being released from an Indian prison in a prisoner-for-hostage swap in 1999. The decision seemed to come after Chinese President Xi Jinping spoke on the sidelines of his Belt and Road Initiative Summit last week with Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan. Unless Pakistan takes an active role to restrict Masood, the UN listing and related sanctions (freezing of assets, travel restrictions, potential arrest) are more symbolic at this point. The Diplomat (5/02/19) MSN News/AFP (5/01/19)

Japan

On 8 APR, Tokyo Police charged a 16-year old with producing erythritol tetranitrate (ETN) and buying uranium online and then producing yellowcake – a uranium concentrate. The teen admitted to producing the explosive, stating that he was a chemistry student and wanted to learn how to produce ETN. He was an online acquaintance of the 19-year old college student in Nagoya, Japan, whom authorities arrested and charged last year with making ETN and Triacetone triperoxide (TATP). The two teens exchanged information online about how to produce ETN. At the time of last year’s arrest, this was the first instance of ETN discovered in Japan. The 16-year old purchased 99.9 percent pure uranium in January 2018 on an auction website that Japanese authorities were monitoring. The teen then concentrated the uranium into yellowcake and put it up for sale on the same auction site. In October 2018, the police raided his home and seized all the explosive and radioactive materials. Police are questioning several other people who also purchased uranium online. The Japanese court sentenced the 19-year old in March 2019 to three to five years in prison. Nippon (4/08/19) The Japan Times (4/10/19)

In April 2019, Tokyo Police, under National Police Agency guidance, made plans to deploy anti-drone jammers as a preventive measure against terrorism at public events in Japan. The jammers block radio signals between a drone and its operator, causing it to either return to base (the operator’s location), or to remain stuck in its current position. Privately-operated drones have recently become a menace in public areas in other parts of the world as well as in Japan. For instance, in 2015, a protestor’s drone landed on the roof of the prime minister’s office. Japan sought to obtain the jammer equipment and authority to use it in preparation for Emperor Akihito’s abdication ceremony (30 April), and Crown Prince Naruhito’s enthronement (12 May). Future events that will likely have the jammers deployed include the G-20 Summit in June in Osaka, the Rugby World Cup in late 2019, and the 2020 Summer Olympics in Tokyo. The Asahi Shimbun (4/15/19)
South Korea: April IED Events

There was one IED hoax event.

On 27 APR, an airport employee at the Gimpo International Airport in Seoul placed a hoax IED in a men’s restroom behind a toilet. The hoax IED consisted of a bag, dozens of alkaline batteries, wires, a basic-model cell phone, and over 30 software CDs. A janitor reported the bag to police, who removed it, verified it was a hoax, and then reviewed CCTV to find the perpetrator. Police arrested the man two days later. He admitted to placing the hoax IED in the restroom, but did not provide a motive. The Korea Times (04/28/19) Yonhap News Agency (04/29/19) Chosun Ilbo (04/29/19)

IEDs are uncommon in the Republic of Korea (ROK) and police quickly addressed this IED hoax event through the use CCTV footage. The last IED event in the ROK was a detonation which occurred in June 2017. The perpetrator of this event was a disgruntled student that placed an IED outside a laboratory to target his professor.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Device Count</th>
<th>Detonation</th>
<th>Found/Cleared</th>
<th>Hoax</th>
<th>Cache</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Month</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Count</th>
<th>Detonation</th>
<th>Found/Cleared</th>
<th>Hoax</th>
<th>Cache</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Month</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Past Year IED Events by Type

Detonation: 2  
Found/Cleared: 2  
Hoax: 1  
Cache: 1

Past Year Devices

Detonation: 1  
Found/Cleared: 0  
Hoax: 0  
Cache: 0

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not con-
**IED Calendar**

The IED calendar was established to help our audience maintain awareness of events, such as anniversaries of major attacks, or political, religious or cultural events that often coincide (or can potentially coincide) with a spike in IED events.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>W</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>S</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>April 2019</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>May 2019</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>IND</td>
<td>WW</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>IND</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>PHL</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>IND</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>IND</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>NEP</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>June 2019</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>WW</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>BUR</td>
<td>IND</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>IND</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>IND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*BUR – Burma
IND – India
INDO – Indonesia
NEP – Nepal
PHL – Philippines
THA – Thailand
WW – Worldwide*
Common Terms and Acronyms

AN – Ammonium Nitrate
ANFO – Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil
ARMM – Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
CIV – Civilian
CBRN – Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
COIN – Counter-insurgency
CWIED – Command Wire IED
DTMF – Dual-Tone Multi-Frequency
EFP – Explosively Formed Projectile
EOD – Explosive Ordnance Disposal
F/C – Found & Cleared
HME – Homemade Explosives
HN – Host Nation (Police, Military, Government)
IDF – Indirect Fire
IDP – Internally Displaced Persons
IED – Improvised Explosive Device
KFR – Kidnap for Ransom
KIA – Killed in Action
LOC – Line of Communication
LPG – Liquefied Petroleum Gas
MSR – Main Supply Routes
NFI – No Further Information
NSTR – Nothing Significant To Report
PBA – Post Blast Analysis
PBIED – Personnel Borne (Suicide Bomb) IED
PCB – Printed Circuit Board

Governments, Groups and Organizations

ASG – Abu Sayyaf Group
BIFF – Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters
BIPP – Barisan Islam Perberbasan Patani
BRN-C – Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate
BSF – Border Security Forces
BNP – Bangladesh National Party
BriMob – Mobile Brigade (Indonesia CT Forces)
CIPI – Communist Party of India (Maoist)
CPN-M – Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
CPP – Communist Party of the Philippines
CRPF – Central Reserve Police Force (India)
GMIP – Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Patani
HM – Hizb-ul-Mujahideen
HNLC – Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (India)
HJUJ-B – Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami Bangladesh
IB – India’s Intelligence Bureau
IM – Indian Mujahideen
IrW – Irregular Warfare
ISI – Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan)
ISIS – Islamic State of Iraq ash Sham
JAD – Jamaah Ansarut Daulah
JAT – Jemaah Ansharut Taurhid
JI – Jemaah Islamiya
JTMM – Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha
JIB – Jemaat-e-Islami Bangladesh

JeM – Jaish-e-Mohammed
JMB – Jama’at-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh
JMJB – Jama’atul Muslim Janta Bangladesh
JMI – Jamathei Millathu Ibraheem
KIA – Kachin Independence Army
KIO – Kachin Independence Organization
LeT – Lashkar-e Tayyiba
MLF – Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MLF-SOG – MILF-Special Operations Group
MNLF – Moro National Liberation Front
NPA – New People’s Army
NTJ – National Thowheed Jama’ath
PNP – Philippine National Police
POLRI – Indonesian National Police
PULO – Patani United Liberation Organization
RAB – Rapid Action Battalion (Bangladesh)
RKK – Runda Kumpulan Kecil
SJMM – Samyukta Jatiya Mukti Morcha
SJTM – Samyukta Jana Tantrik Terai Mukti Morcha
ULFA – United Liberation Front of Assam
UWSA – United Wa State Army
YCL – Youth Communist League