



Asia-Pacific Counter-IED Fusion Center

Monthly IED Activity Report



DOI: 31 July 2018

About the APCFC

The Asia-Pacific C-IED Fusion Center is the premier center for irregular warfare analysis in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. The center develops and synchronizes C-IED and EOD programs and regional engagements. The center resources USARAPC C-IED training to ensure U.S., Allied, and Partner Nations survivability.



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
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
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Executive Summary: In July, there were 91 IED events within the Indo-Pacific region, consisting of 37 detonation events, 21 found/cleared events, two hoax events, and 31 cache events. While IED rates were similar to last month, IED-related casualties decreased by 30%. July events included a total of 396 devices, compared to 172 in June. There was one IED event in Northeast Asia this month: an attempted IED attack outside of the U.S. Embassy in Beijing.

There were 91 IED events in the Indo-Pacific region in July 2018




Icons depict events for July 2018; heat map depicts event density from July 2017 - July 2018



Click on an entry to advance to the associated page.

This document is limited to those personnel performing military, intelligence, law enforcement, or security duties in support of C-IED operations.

July Asia-Pacific IED Events by Region



Executive Summary (Continued)

SOUTH ASIA

IED activity increased from 55 events in June to 59 in July. IED-related casualties also increased, from 12 casualties in June to 27 in July. In Bangladesh, there were seven IED events (a 30% decrease from June) and six IED-related casualties (compared to two in June) (see pg. 10). In India, there were 49 IED events (a 20% increase from June) and 21 IED-related casualties (compared to 48 in June) (see pg. 11). In Nepal, there were two IED events (compared to four in June) and no IED-related casualties (see pg. 12).

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	39	16	2	298	355
	Year	936	309	16	1509	2770
Event Count	Month	22	13	2	22	59
	Year	432	219	15	226	892




SOUTHEAST ASIA

IED activity decreased from 35 events in June to 31 in July. Despite this decrease, IED-related casualties increased from 19 casualties in June to 35 in July. In the Philippines, there were 21 IED events and 31 IED-related casualties (compared to 15 in June) (see pg. 15). In Thailand, there were four IED events (compared to seven in June) and three IED-related casualties (compared to six in June) (see pg. 16). Additionally, there was reported IED activity in Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Malaysia (see pgs. 17-20).

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	18	15	0	7	40
	Year	279	542	13	696	1530
Event Count	Month	14	8	0	9	31
	Year	288	76	7	155	446

NOTE: Starting in April 2018, the APCFC Monthly IED report will include both event counts (detonation, found/cleared, hoax, and cache) and device counts. It is important to note that a singular IED event may include multiple devices. For instance, a single IED cache event may contain several devices.

PACOM IED Events - Past 12 Months




		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	58	31	2	305	396
	Year	1226	851	29	2205	4311
Event Count	Month	37	21	2	31	91
	Year	642	295	22	381	1340


IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from OPEN SOURCES are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations. Event refers to specific IED activity categories: IED Detonation, IED Found/Cleared, IED Hoax, IED Cache.

IED Activity - Past 12 Months

Switch Type



Group Affiliation



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics are presumed to be approximations. Graphics represent known switch type and group affiliation.

Incident Highlight: Philippines VBIED Attack

On 31 JUL, ISIS militants detonated a vehicle-borne IED (VBIED) at a military checkpoint in Lamitan City on Basilan Island in the southern Philippines. The blast killed 11 people, including five government troops, and wounded seven others. Vehicle bombings are rare occurrences in the Philippines and this is perhaps the first known and recorded suicide attack in the country. Militants detonated the VBIED shortly after government militia stopped their white van near a security checkpoint. During the stop, security forces stated that the VBIED occupants could not speak the local dialect.

This is a significant event for several reasons. First, this could indicate a potential shift in militant TTPs. There are no recorded instances of definitive suicide attacks occurring in the Philippines and analysts assess that the Philippine culture rejects the concept of suicide-bombings. The use of a VBIED is also relatively uncommon in the southern Philippines, which averages approximately one to three vehicle related attacks per year.

Second, the location of the attack could indicate a shift in ISIS focus from Central Mindanao (Maute and Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters [BIFF] territory) to the Sulu Archipelago (Abu Sayyaf Group [ASG] territory). In recent months, ISIS media has frequently highlighted the Sulu Archipelago (including Basilan). Following the attack, ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack through its al-Amaq News Agency, calling it a "martyrdom operation." They also posted a photo of the bomber and identified him as Abu Kathir-al-Maghrebi, a foreign fighter from Morocco. It is likely that the ASG had direct involvement in the attack, as they are the dominant militant group on Basilan and have pledged allegiance to ISIS.



Image of the alleged Moroccan attacker Abu Kathir-al-Maghrebi released by ISIS

Third, this possible suicide attack could signal the ASG's rejection of recent government overtures to build peace in the southern Philippines. Interestingly, the attack came days after President Duterte stated that he was open to dialogue with the ASG to end extremism in the Philippines, and just a week after he signed the Bangsamoro Organic Law (formerly the BBL).

Finally, despite the attrition experienced by the various groups that comprise ISIS-Philippines during the Marawi Siege, this demonstrates their ability to execute a successful attack, which they likely designed to demonstrate that the organization is still both capable and relevant.

There are several doubts about the intent of this attack. Primarily, it is unknown if Abu Kathir's original intent was to detonate the device as a suicide attack. Additionally, there is a possibility that a "spotter" detonated the device remotely. Despite the doubt surrounding the intent of this event and the device's characteristics, it remains a concerning incident for several reasons. First, ISIS leadership has claimed responsibility for this event. Second, such an event could inspire imitation attacks. Finally, the use of possible SVBIEDs is a deadly tactic that proves difficult to counter.


Sources: Reuters (7/30/18) Long War Journal (7/31/18) Inquirer (7/31/18) Mindanao Examiner (7/31/18)

The Bangsamoro Organic Law: A Momentous Step on the Long Road to Peace

On 26 JUL, President Rodrigo Duterte signed the long-awaited Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL), marking a unique and historic moment in the 49-year Moro separatist conflict. For the first time in decades, a peace agreement is in place in the Southern Philippines, signed and ratified by all the main parties involved. From the United Nations to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), there is widespread optimism that the landmark legislation will usher in a new era of peace in Mindanao. However, though the BOL signifies a momentous step on the road to peace, it is just the beginning. The long road ahead is paved with pitfalls that threaten to derail this peace agreement.

The fundamental objective of the BOL is to address some of the root causes of the Moro conflict by crafting an arrangement that provides the future Bangsamoro Autonomous Region (BAR) with increased fiscal and political autonomy. Additionally, the BAR will soon replace the existing Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), a regional government that multiple parties perceive as corrupt and which former President Benigno Aquino described as “a failed experiment.” Corruption in the ARMM, a dearth of corporate investment resulting from decades of conflict and instability, and a historical neglect of the area from the national government have combined to make this Muslim majority region the poorest sector in the Philippines.

The BOL addresses the wealth disparity between the BAR and the rest of the Philippines through the wealth sharing provision. The provision will allow the BAR to keep 75% of national internal revenue collected within the region; a slight increase over the 70% previously authorized for the ARMM. The government will also issue the BAR an annual block grant, absent any spending conditions or directives. Ideally, with this injection of capital into the region, administrators will have the funds necessary for infrastructure development and to provide government services. However, endemic corruption, like that which plagued the ARMM, could challenge the BAR’s ability to manage the flow of funds appropriately.



August 2018—President Duterte and MILF Chairman Al-Hajj Murad Ebrahim at ceremonial BOL signing

The BOL’s provisions regarding the normalization, or the decommissioning of Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) fighters (estimated by MILF leaders to be between 30,000 to 40,000), will significantly contribute to stability in the region. The decommissioning will happen in a three-phase approach that starts with passing the BOL and ends with the BAR completing its period of transition, which should occur in 2022. Although the decommissioning will not have any immediate effect on violence in the southern Philippines (as part of the peace negotiations, the MILF has acceded to a ceasefire agreement for years), the MILF’s decision to fully commit to the BOL and to take ownership of the BAR, should yield positive, long-term effects. For example, following the initial approval of the law, the MILF engaged in unofficial talks with two of the three Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighter (BIFF) factions. These discussions aim to convince the BIFF factions to lay down their arms and to embrace the BAR concept.


International and domestic observers have praised the BOL as a necessary and positive step to further integrate the Philippines’ Muslim population into the government; however, several factors will challenge the long-term success of the law. Most concerning are the possible constitutional challenges of the BOL and the potential for militants to signal their rejection of the law through violence. These concerns have historical precedent in the MILF peace process. In 2008, the Philippine Supreme Court found the MILF peace agreement, known as the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD), unconstitutional. Within days of the Supreme Court announcement, the MILF retaliated, resulting in violence that left nearly 400 people dead and 750,000 displaced before the institution of a new ceasefire agreement. The Philippine Congress has taken extra precautions in drafting the BOL to avoid a constitutional challenge, but legal experts have observed that the BOL is still vulnerable to a court challenge. The MILF peace process also experienced a history of ceasefire violations. In the 2015 Mamasapano clash, an all-out battle between the Philippine National Police (PNP) Special Action Force (SAF) and Moro fighters erupted when the PNP-SAF attempted to arrest several highly wanted terrorists in an area near MILF basecamps. The attempted arrest resulted in the death of 44 PNP-SAF members and President Aquino was unable to pass the MILF peace agreement for the remainder of his term. The 31 JUL VBIED attack (**see Incident Highlight**), which occurred less than a week after Duterte signed the BOL, may likely be an attempt by ISIS-Philippines to foment resentment directed against the BOL and the peace process.

Another contentious issue that is likely to create opposition is the upcoming January 2019 referendum, which has the potential to reshape political power dynamics, as this election will determine which of the proposed

The Bangsamoro Organic Law: A Momentous Step on the Long Road to Peace

Bangsamoro territories will align under the BAR. While many expect current ARMM territories to vote overwhelmingly for inclusion into the BAR, other proposed areas that are currently not part of the ARMM are likely to experience highly contested voting. Like many areas across the Philippines, political dynasties control these areas (incumbents pass elected positions to family or clan members). The financial security associated to control of government positions (i.e. the ability to exert a direct influence over government spending), will likely prompt those dynasties that are at risk of losing their positions to the BAR, to seek to retain their power through the imposition of violence. Indeed, in cities such as Isabela and Cotabato, which have resisted joining the ARMM and are included in the upcoming referendum, the current family in power has resorted to bombings to intimidate their opponents and their adversaries have initiated reciprocal actions as well.

After decades of negotiations and violence, the BOL is a necessary step to counter violent extremism and separatist conflicts. However, multiple factors challenge the establishment of lasting peace in the Southern Philippines. Economic and political corruption will presumably linger, as the inflow of government funds and contests for political control will facilitate the emergence of competing factions. Additionally, despite the Philippine Congress' efforts to instill safeguards into the BOL, opposition can subject this legislation to legal challenges, particularly as it contains provisions that are without historical precedent. Moreover, there are those organizations that will completely reject the BOL and wage violent campaigns to undermine its implementation. Notwithstanding these obstacles, ratification of the BOL and its initial acceptance by the parties involved represents a significant success towards the objective of a peaceful and inclusive Southern Philippines.



Sources: The Diplomat (8/1/2018) Rappler (7/26/18) (7/24/18) Inquirer (7/30/18) DND PHL (7/27/18) Clingendael (7/18) CNN (7/24/18) VOA (7/27/18) Daily Tribune (7/31/18) Minda News (6/11/18) (7/30/18) ABS CBN (7/28/18) (7/19/18) PNA (7/26/18) Business Mirror (8/5/18) Manila Bulletin (8/8/18) ABS CBN (8/8/18) CNN Philippines (8/7/18) GMA News (7/28/18) Philippine Star (8/4/18)

Person of Interest / VEO of Interest

POI: Abdul Subhan Qureshi

ALIAS: Abdul Subhan Usman Qureshi; Abdus Subhan Qureshi; Kasim; Tauqeer; Bilal Tauqeer; Zakir; Qab **DOB:** 13 Nov 1971 **AFFILIATION:** Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI); Indian Mujahedeen (IM) **ROLE:** Bomb-maker; recruiter; trainer; fund raiser **AREA OF OPERATIONS:** India **STATUS:** Detained



Abdul Subhan Qureshi, dubbed "India's Osama bin Laden," was a senior leader within the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) in his youth and later co-founded the Indian Mujahedeen (IM) in 2003. A skilled information technology professional, Qureshi received diplomas in Industrial Electronics and Computer Engineering, and became a Microsoft Certified Professional. Officials assess Qureshi to be a skilled manipulator who can effectively motivate individuals into waging jihad. New Delhi's Police Special Cell arrested him on 22 JAN following a 10-year manhunt.

Qureshi's ability to influence and inspire individuals, along with his formal education in electronics, aided his efforts to orchestrate multiple, large-scale coordinated IED attacks; IM claimed responsibility for eight such attacks. Qureshi was also likely involved in four high-profile attacks, including the 2006 Mumbai train attack, and the 2008 Ahmedabad, the 2008 Jaipur, and the 2008 Delhi bombings. These IED attack operations resulted in 40 IED detonations, killing over 350 and wounding over 1,200 civilians. Qureshi's violence continued over time, with a 2010 IED attack on New Delhi and his alleged planning of the 2014 Bangalore blast.

In addition to planning coordinated IED attacks, Qureshi co-organized jihad-training camps to provide physical and psychological training to SIMI operatives wanting to wage jihad against India. Qureshi also worked as an English teacher in Nepal and lived in Saudi Arabia (2015-2017), where he attempted to raise funds for SIMI operations. Qureshi's return to India in 2017 possibly indicates his desires to revive IM. Qureshi's arrest will likely have a negative impact on the IM's and Lashkar-e Tayyiba's (LeT) ability to recruit and to conduct large-scale, coordinated IED attacks throughout India.

Sources: The Hindu (9/13/08) Idsa (2/3/09) India Today (9/17/08) Hindustantimes (1/22/18) NDTV (1/22/18) The Quint (1/23/18) DNA (1/23/18) FirstPost (1/23/18) India Express (1/23/18)

VEO: Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C)

AREA OF OPERATIONS: southern Thailand, northern Malaysia **LEADER:** Doonloh Wae-mano (alias Abdullah Wan Mat Noor) **AFFILIATIONS:** Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK)



The BRN-C, aka the National Revolutionary Front-Coordinate, is an ethno-separatist militant group based in Malaysia that primarily operates in the southern provinces of Thailand. The BRN-C is committed to establishing an independent Islamic republic of Pattani, comprised of Thailand's southern provinces.

The BRN-C draws influence from the Indonesian terrorist organization Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), as well as the separatist group known as Free Aceh Movement (GAM). The BRN-C seeks recognition as a legal political party and describes its ideology as Islamic socialism. The insurgency has a well-organized hierarchical military structure with training units, logistics, operations, intelligence, and recruitment. Over the years, the Thai government has arrested or killed numerous members of the BRN-C. Additionally, increasing pressure by the Thai government has prompted other organization members to abandon violence and to seek reconciliation. Many of the active members hold dual Thai-Malaysian citizenship, creating difficulties for security forces to track down suspects, as they flee to Malaysia to avoid capture and detainment.

The BRN-C's strategy is to gain attention and to apply pressure on the Thai government by undermining the public's confidence in the government by terrorizing the local populace and discrediting the efforts of security forces. Primary targets include security forces or individuals affiliated with the Thai government, religious leaders, teachers, infrastructure (e.g. ATMs, powerlines, etc.), and civilian population centers. The BRN-C raises funds through criminal activities (extortion, ransom, and kidnapping), as well as receiving money through public donations and via the collection of "revolutionary taxes," or protection money.

The BRN-C's IED TTPs are some of the most sophisticated in the Indo-Pacific region, due to their use of advanced RC switches. The BRN-C has conducted large-scale, coordinated attacks across multiple locations in southern Thailand, such as the 20 MAY attack targeting ATMs in Thailand's southern provinces. Coordinated attacks prove to be a highly effective tactic by the BRN-C to create public unrest and to maximize damage to infrastructure, and the group will likely continue to use this tactic due to its effectiveness.

Sources: Tracking Terrorism (2018) Benar News (5/21/18) Bangkok Post (5/29/18) Benar News (3/20/17) Handbook of Terrorism in the Pacific (2016) The Terrorist Threat from Thailand (2012)

South Asia: July Significant Activity

Bangladesh-Burma-India Border

Several events occurring in July highlight the issues facing the tri-border region of India, Bangladesh, and Burma. First, on 28 JUL, officials from the Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crimes (CTTC) unit of the Bangladeshi police released information related to the cross-border training between Bangladesh's Ansar al-Islam (formerly Ansarullah Bangla Team, ABT) and an armed ethnic group operating in India's northeast states and Burma's Chin state, known as the Kuki. Following his detainment on 17 JUL, Ansar al-Islam's Sheikh Abdullah admitted to sending group members to training with the Kuki insurgents at the behest of Syed Ziaul Haque, Ansar al-Islam's military coordinator.

Second, on 30 JUL, media released a statement by the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) Director General regarding the discovery that smugglers are using Mizoram, Meghalaya, and Assam, India to smuggle yaba (methamphetamines mixed with caffeine) into Bangladesh from Burma. Officials discovered the new route during a nationwide crackdown on illicit drug activities.

Lastly, at the end of July, Indian authorities released a list of approximately four million individuals in Assam who cannot prove they came to India prior to 1971; as a result, they could lose their legal status, and even face deportation to Bangladesh. Assam has a large, settled refugee population because of the 1971 Bangladeshi War of Independence, and it is this Bengali Muslim community that many activists fear is under attack by Hindu Nationalists and hardliners in Assam. Since the exodus of Rohingya from Burma in 2016-2017, many elements in the Indian government have resisted the resettlement of any refugees and have branded the Rohingya as criminals or terrorists. Furthermore, activists allege that Indian hardliners are using the Rohingya crisis as an excuse to discriminate against religious minorities residing in Assam, particularly as some hardliners have previously stated that migrants of Hindu descent should be allowed to remain in India. **Dhaka Tribune (7/28/18) Daily Star (7/30/18) BBC (7/30/18)**

Bangladesh

In July, Bangladeshi authorities arrested several al-Qa'ida-aligned Ansar al-Islam members, including Sheikh Abdullah (aliases: Abu Omayr, Zubair, Jayad, and Javed). Abdullah was involved in the murder of the Bangladeshi-American writer/blogger, Avjit Roy in September 2015 and several other liberal/secular writers and activists. Abdullah is also reportedly very close to Syed Ziaul Haque, a former Bangladeshi Army Major and the current military commander of Ansar al-Islam. Rapid Action Battalion operatives also recently arrested Mohammad Ishak Khan, the reported media wing coordinator of Ansar al-Islam. Khan employed print and online materials (including social media platforms) to recruit and radicalize individuals. **Dhaka Tribune (7/11/18) Daily Star (7/12/18) Dhaka Tribune (7/18/18) Daily Star (7/19/18)**

India

On 11 JUL, media reported that Indian security agencies successfully thwarted a terror attack by ISIS in New Delhi. An alleged ISIS operative, detained in September 2017, revealed during interrogation that he was planning to use explosives to target civilian locations in New Delhi. The Indian counter-intelligence operation leading to his arrest involved an Indian agent befriending and offering assistance to the ISIS operative, who was posing as an engineering student in Laipat, Nagar. The agent reportedly offered the ISIS operative explosives and accommodations. Potential targets included the New Delhi airport, the Ansel Plaza mall, a mall in Vasant Kunj, the South Extension Market, and other locations. The operative was allegedly in contact with handlers in Afghanistan. **Zee News (7/11/18)**

On 19 JUL, media reported that intelligence agencies received information suggesting that militants were planning a VBIED attack on the New Delhi Parliament. The suspects, identified as being part of the Khalistani militant movement, were allegedly planning to drive a sedan laden with explosives from the Nepal border area to New Delhi. **TOI (7/19/18)**


On 25 JUL, a joint team of the Uttar Pradesh Anti-terror Squad (ATS) and the West Bengal police detained two members of Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) from Greater Noida for planning an attack in the New Delhi region and for conducting fundraising activities. Police identified the suspects as Bangladeshi nationals, Musharraf (alias Musa) and Rubel Ahmed. The pair was reportedly leveraging a cross-border bike smuggling ring to raise funds to recruit members and to procure arms. Police received the names of the pair during the interrogation of Ansar al-Islam militant Abdullah (alias al-Mamun). Police arrested Abdullah for creating fake Indian citizenship documents. **First Post (7/24/18) India Today (7/28/18)**

South Asia: July Significant Activity

Sri Lanka

Fears of a resurgence of the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) were stoked over last month. In June, Sri Lanka sanctioned 14 members of the Tamil diaspora allegedly involved in LTTE financing, raising speculation that they were attempting to revitalize local LTTE sentiment in the northern part of the country. This raised speculations that some of the diaspora members may have even travelled to Sri Lanka with the intent of meeting with former LTTE members. Days later, local police discovered an explosives and ammunition cache and arrested several former LTTE members in Mullaitivu district. Police recovered the cache following a routine traffic stop of a tuktuk; two suspected LTTE members in the back of the tuktuk attempted to flee on foot, but police subsequently apprehended them. Officials suspect that one of the operatives is a LTTE bombmaker. The following week, the State Minister of Child Affairs, Vijayakala Maheswaran, made a speech that drew widespread condemnation, as it appeared she was attempting to call for the reorganization of the LTTE. She also criticized the government's development of northern Sri Lanka and questioned their protection of Tamil civil rights. She ultimately resigned from her post in the first week of July after the backlash from senior officials and the media. **Business Standard (6/23/18) Daily Mirror (6/30/18) Daily Mirror (7/2/18) Times Online (7/5/18)**

Bangladesh: July IED Events



There were six IED detonation events and one IED cache event.

On 10 JUL, suspected drug dealers on a motorbike attacked a Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) checkpoint in Mirpur, Dhaka. The attackers threw IEDs at the RAB officers, who returned fire with small arms and wounded one of the attackers. The other perpetrators crashed the motorbike in a nearby park and subsequently threw another IED at RAB forces while trying to escape on foot. One of the suspects escaped, but police captured the other, who was in possession of an IED cache containing possible components. The wounded suspect later died from his injuries. **Dhaka Tribune (7/10/18) Daily Star (7/10/18)**




On 17 JUL, attackers on a motorbike threw IEDs at a Bangladesh National Party (BNP) election rally in Sagarpara, Rajshahi, injuring five civilians. BNP leaders were quick to blame their political opponents, though the perpetrators of the attack were later discovered to be involved with BNP local leadership. Probable intentions for the attack include sowing discord and encouraging political violence between parties. **Daily Star (7/17/18) Dhaka Tribune (7/17/18) Bangla Tribune (7/17/18) Dhaka Tribune (7/22/18)**

On 25 JUL, attackers detonated a crude bomb in Mominkhala, Sylhet that injured one police officer. Police accused members of the BNP and the Jatiyatabadi Chhatra Dal of conducting the attack. BNP officials stated previously that local police were not creating an atmosphere conducive to open elections. **Daily Star (7/28/18)**

In July, IED events decreased slightly. One of July's events is attributable to the on-going anti-narcotics drive, which has claimed more than 200 lives since May. It is likely that IED events and other violent events related to drug crime will continue or even increase as continual pressure by security forces prompts retribution by drug dealers.


July's election violence incidents may indicate the potential for future violence as local elections continue and national elections approach later in the year. Historical precedent shows significant increases in overall violence, and IED violence specifically, surrounding elections. Intra- and inter-party conflicts, as well as attacks on journalists and security forces are common during elections in Bangladesh. The majority of violence occurring in July was associated with local elections in Sylhet and Rajshahi. Beyond IED violence, other acts of violence also occurred, such as the arson of offices and the assault of journalists and political opponents. Such events will likely continue, if not increase, for the remainder of 2018.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	11	0	0	0	11
	Year	62	15	1	195	273
Event Count	Month	6	0	0	1	7
	Year	31	8	1	44	84



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

India: July IED Events



There were 16 IED detonation events, 12 IED found and cleared events, two IED hoax events, and 19 IED cache events.

On 13 JUL, police recovered a Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA) cache comprised of weapons and IED materials near the Simsang River in Meghalaya. The cache contained nine IED remotes, 28 electronic detonators, over 3000 rounds of different types of ammunition, two AK-47 rifles, four pistols, weapon magazines, and 63 GNLA seals. **Business Standard (7/13/18)**

On 17 JUL, a joint force of Indian Army Rashtriya Rifles and Central Reserve Police Forces recovered an IED cache from a residence in Pulwama, Jammu and Kashmir. The cache contained cell phones, a key fob, detonators, clocks, wires, and multiple containers labeled for aluminum metal powder. **Times News Now (7/17/18) India TV News (7/17/18)**




On 29 JUL, security forces recovered a 20kg IED buried on the roadside near a concrete culvert by Maoists along the Manpur-Baseli road, Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh. The IED incorporated a red metal container and enhancements, such as stones and nails. **India Today (7/29/18) Zee News (7/29/18)**

Incidents of IED activity in July were higher than June due to an increase of activity throughout Jammu and Kashmir and the Red Corridor. Northeast India saw less IED activity in July, but there were several incidents of other activities reported along the India-Bangladesh-Burma border, such as the smuggling of illicit materials and operational coordination between violent extremist organizations. The 13 JUL cache event could highlight the smuggling and cross-border facilitation that security forces in India and Bangladesh have uncovered in recent months (see SA SIGACTS).

The Jammu and Kashmir region has seen an increase of IED events (detonations and found/cleared) over the last several months. The 17 JUL cache was interesting because it did not contain the usual conventional weapons, and it appears some of the cache items could be used to create explosives and to build RCIEDs. Continued increases in the frequency of IED use or in the sophistication of devices represent a worsening threat landscape in an already destabilized region.


Though IED events in the Red Corridor increased in July, it appears that the overall Maoist/Naxalite threat is declining. Surrendered militants cite poor leadership and a loss of "Maoist vision" as reasons for laying down their arms. Despite the decline, security forces continue to report IED and other types of militant activity. In one such incident, dismounted police officers walking in the tree line near a road, discovered spike traps that militants likely emplaced in an attempt to force security forces back on the road and into a small arms ambush and/or IED attack.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	28	14	2	295	339
	Year	699	182	8	1296	2185
Event Count	Month	16	12	2	19	49
	Year	257	109	9	166	541



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Nepal: July IED Events



There was one IED found and cleared event and one IED cache event.

On 5 JUL, local police recovered an IED cache from five suspects in Sankhuwasabha, Koshi. The cache contained explosive materials, a detonator, a remote control with an antenna, raw chemicals, ammunition, rifles, pistols, and one musket.




Kathmandu post (7/5/18) Reporters Nepal (7/5/18) Dainik Nepal (7/5/18)

On 17 JUL, Nepal Army EOD cleared two pressure cooker IEDs from an industrial site in Lamkichuha-1, Kailali, Seti. Employees discovered two IEDs near Megashree Industries. **Nepal Monitor (7/18/18) Online Khabar (7/18/18) Setopati (7/18/18)**

IED events in July dropped to the lowest level since October 2017. Recent events have targeted industrial sites or offices, including the 17 JUL pressure cooker devices left outside an industrial site. Officials have identified individuals or groups protesting the environmental impacts of industrial sites as the perpetrators of these events.

Police discovered the 5 JUL cache containing components that militants could use to construct an RCIED in the same district as the Arun III hydroelectric plant, which militants have targeted several times in the last six months. Individuals and groups protesting Indian investment in Nepal's infrastructure are the likely perpetrators of the Arun III attacks. Though authorities released few details about the 5 JUL perpetrators, it is possible that they were also planning an attack against Arun III. Attacks against infrastructure projects, offices, or industrial sites will likely continue as groups express their dissatisfaction with government regulation and foreign investment.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	0	2	0	1	3
	Year	175	112	7	16	310
Event Count	Month	0	1	0	1	2
	Year	144	102	5	12	263



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Sri Lanka: July IED Events



There was one IED cache event.

On 18 JUL, Sri Lankan security forces and police recovered an IED cache. The cache contained suspected war remnants, such as explosives, probable improvised devices, and ammunition.
Hiru News (7/19/18)

IED activity in Sri Lanka remains low since the end of the civil war. The 18 JUL event was the second war remnant cache recovered in Sri Lanka in the last two months. Despite concerns of a resurgence of militants, it is likely IED activity will continue to remain low.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	0	0	0	2	2
	Year	0	0	0	2	2
Event Count	Month	0	0	0	1	1
	Year	0	0	0	3	3

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Southeast Asia: July Significant Activity

Philippines

On 23 JUL, President Duterte delivered his third State of the Nation Address (SONA), which was said to be uncharacteristically brief, on-script, and sober-minded. The speech was delayed almost an hour after supporters of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo launched a legislative coup against the incumbent Speaker of the House, Pantaleon Alvarez. Duterte spoke about the illegal war on drugs, government corruption, the BOL, tax reform, and relations with China. **Asia Times (7/24/18) Rappler (7/25/18)**

On 24 JUL, the House of Representatives approved the BOL, which will create a new Muslim regional entity that will replace the current ARMM (**see Special Assessment**). The region will be composed of the current ARMM (Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Basilan, Maguindanao, and Lanao del Sur) and will include the six municipalities of Lanao del Norte, as well as the 39 barangays of Cotabato. The BOL should bring commerce, trade, industry development, and, most importantly, an increased level of government services to the communities in Mindanao. The chief of defense noted that the BOL and its corresponding initiatives would address the root causes of violent extremism and terrorism, such as poverty, lack of education, and social injustice. **Philippine Star (7/25/18) Rappler (7/27/18) PNA (7/28/18)**

Burma

Between 9 JUL and 23 JUL, clashes broke out between armed ethnic groups (AEGs) in northern Shan State, forcing the internal displacement of at least 2,800 civilians. In one village alone, 400 villagers left their homes to escape the fighting. Most of the internally displaced persons (IDPs) in northern Shan took refuge in Buddhist monasteries or Christian churches. Several AEGs are known or suspected to operate in northern Shan and include such organizations as the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the Shan State Progressive Party (SSPP), the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA).

Concurrent with the inter-AEG clashes, the Burmese military (Tatmadaw) clashed with the RCSS in Mong Kung, Shan State from 9-12 JUL. RCSS members seized military equipment from the Tatmadaw during the fighting, including mortars, an artillery shield, and a small drone. **Shan Herald Agency (7/27/18) Irrawaddy (7/16/18) Irrawaddy (7/13/18)**

A media report released on 10 JUL detailed an IED attack on a Tatmadaw resupply convoy that occurred on 9 JUN, wounding one soldier. The attack targeted 19 trucks containing rations that were parked in Nam Aun village, Hseni, Shan state. Soldiers in the trucks were sleeping when the device detonated. Officials described the IED as timed device with a remote. Following the detonation, Tatmadaw troops opened fire on a nearby village, wounding one civilian. **BNI (7/10/18)**

Thailand

On 18 JUL, EOD responded to a call to remove a M26 grenade discovered in a paper bag among trash along Patak Road in Soi Pluk Jae, Phuket. The grenade still had the pin inserted and the perpetrator restricted the handle with a green plastic band (see media for images). Local officials are reviewing CCTV footage to identify who left the device. **Phuket News (7/18/18)**

On 25 JUL, Muslim insurgents ambushed four Buddhists returning home from hunting near a mosque in Ban Kampong Buena. The assailants injured the hunters with small arms fire. The attackers fled following the ambush. **Thailand News (7/25/18)**

On 23 JUL, Thai officials from the Narcotics Suppression Bureau (NSB) announced that five drug seizures across the nation resulted in the arrest of 16 individuals in the last two weeks. Most notably, authorities identified links between the drug traffickers and the southern Thai insurgency. With these ties, traffickers and insurgents have been smuggling crystal methamphetamine and heroin across the border in Narathiwat. The drug raids illustrate the ongoing, joint efforts between Malaysia and Thailand to increase border security. **Benar News (7/24/18)**

Indonesia

In late July, Indonesia's Attorney General's Office indicted Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) for playing a significant role in recent terror attacks in the country and demanded the court name JAD a banned terror organization. The prosecutors indicted JAD for violating Article 17, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Terrorism Law, which could hold an institution, regardless of whether it is a legal entity registered with the government or not, responsible for terrorism. The aim of the government case is to empower stronger police action against JAD. If the court agrees and bans the organization, the government could seize JAD funds and property, as well as arrest the group's members. **The Jakarta Post (7/25/18) The NY Times (7/25/18)**

Philippines: July IED Events



There were eight IED detonation events, six IED found and cleared events, and seven IED cache events.

On 5 JUL, Philippine Army forces recovered an IED cache following a firefight with the New People’s Army (NPA) in Bansai, Santa Cruz, Jose Panganiban, Carmines Norte, Bicol, Luzon. The cache contained two IEDs, one M-16, one AK-47, M-14 rifles, and a grenade launcher. **PTV News (7/5/18)**




On 12 JUL, Philippine Army EOD cleared an IED from a bridge along the Cotabato-Insulan highway, Labu-Labu 2, Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao, ARMM, Mindanao. Militants packed the device with gunpowder, concrete nails, metal shards, and it contained a cellphone-trigger. The device’s construction resembles those techniques employed by the BIFF. **Philippine News Agency (7/12/18) Inquirer (7/12/18)**

On 28 JUL, NPA rebels detonated two IEDs against soldiers in a truck located in Camarag, Tambobang, Davao, Davao del Sur, Davao, Mindanao. The explosion injured two soldiers. Following the detonation, Philippine Army forces engaged in small arms fire with the rebels. Security forces recovered fragments from the two IEDs from the scene. **Inquirer (7/28/18) Sun Star (7/30/18)**

This month, IED activity increased from previous months due to an increase in militant activity from the NPA, BIFF, and ASG. The Philippine Army increased operations against NPA rebels following a series of attacks on security forces and the reported financial extortion of locals. Conflict with the NPA will not abate until each party agrees to a formalized process for peace.

The most significant event this month was the suicide VBIED attack in Basilan, claimed by ISIS (**see Incident Highlight**). The attack came days after President Duterte offered to open dialogue with the ASG and just a week after the Philippine government signed the BOL into law. It is possible that these types of attacks will increase in the coming months, particularly as the BIFF continues to conduct attacks in protest of the BOL (**see Special Assessment**).

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	9	13	0	5	27
	Year	89	471	0	279	839
Event Count	Month	8	6	0	7	21
	Year	82	41	0	106	229



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Thailand: July IED Events



There were three IED detonation events and one IED found and cleared event.




On 2 JUL, a 2kg VOIED hidden in a metal box at a rubber plantation detonated when a farmer stepped on the device in Krong Pinang, Yala. The blast injured the farmer, resulting in the loss of his foot. **Bangkok Post (7/3/18)**

On 3 JUL, authorities found and cleared a buried IED at a rubber plantation in Saba Yoi, Songkhla. This event was likely connected to a string of IED attacks targeting Buddhist-owned rubber plantations in southern Thailand, particularly in Yala. **Bangkok Post (7/3/18) Bangkok Post (7/2/18)**

On 5 JUL, a 1kg VOIED detonated when a rubber tapper dug up the device at a rubber plantation in Muang, Yala. A nylon cord attached to the device snapped, triggering the detonation, and caused injury to the victim. Investigators found metal, wires, and bomb materials scattered at the blast site. Officials suspect insurgents were responsible. **Relief Web (7/5/18) Bangkok Post (7/5/18)**

In July, IED activity remained relatively consistent compared to the previous month. A string of IED events in the beginning of July consistently incorporated the use of victim operated improvised devices. All the detonations occurred on rubber plantations and weighed approximately 1-2 kilograms. It is likely that Thai Buddhists were the targets of the attacks, due to the fact all the owners of the rubber plantations were known to be Buddhists. Terrorizing the civilian populace is becoming an increasingly common southern Thai insurgency method to create public unrest in the region.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	3	1	0	0	4
	Year	87	26	1	57	171
Event Count	Month	3	1	0	0	4
	Year	74	18	1	11	104



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Indonesia: July IED Events



There were two IED detonation events and one IED found and cleared event.


On 5 JUL, two IEDs prematurely detonated inside the home of a suspected JAD militant's home and a third IED detonated nearby in Pasuruan, East Java. Police believe former terror convict, Ahmad Abdul Robbani, was assembling IEDs when a device prematurely detonated and wounded his son. Five minutes later, another device prematurely detonated. Ahmad detonated a third device on a nearby street while police were in pursuit. Police reported that the suspect was assembling pressure cooker IEDs and pipe bombs that used low-grade explosives. **Times Indonesia (7/5/18) Tempo (7/6/18) Tempo (7/6/18)**

On 15 JUL, police found and cleared an IED at the Indramayu Police Headquarters following an encounter with a JAD militant couple in Indramayu, West Java. The encounter started when the couple attempted to rush through the gate of the Indramayu Police Headquarters on their small motorcycle. Police fired upon the couple, and one of the suspects either dropped a pressure cooker IED or threw it at the police. The device did not detonate. At that point, the motorcycle then reversed direction and the couple headed out of the police station. Police gave chase to the suspects and arrested them shortly afterward. When police examined the pressure cooker IED, they discovered that the main charge was gunpowder. **Netral News (7/15/18) Netral News (7/15/18) Jakarta Post (7/15/18)**


Following record IED activity in May, IED events in July returned to historical norms for the second straight month. The rapid return to normal is likely attributable to the coordinated actions of Indonesia's counter-terrorism apparatus, which has impressively degraded the JAD network. These actions include Detachment 88's unrelenting assault against JAD cells, (whose activities have resulted in the arrests of nearly 200 militants since the May attacks), a new counterterrorism law that provides police with broad and lengthy arrest powers, and a late July indictment brought by Indonesia's Attorney General's Office to declare JAD a banned terror group. While the combined effects of these actions are likely to degrade JAD's network, the intent focus on JAD is also likely to bolster its reputation in jihadist circles, and in turn indirectly contribute to the organization's recruitment efforts.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	3	1	0	0	4
	Year	16	8	2	243	269
Event Count	Month	2	1	0	0	3
	Year	11	3	2	14	30

Past Year IED Events by Type



Past Year Devices



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Malaysia: July IED Events




There was one IED detonation event.

On 19 JUL, three high school students threw a few timed IEDs into the discipline and counseling rooms at a high school in Kota Bharu, Kelantan. Six teachers were present in the rooms and although they felt shockwaves, they were uninjured. The blasts were strong enough to shatter the windows of the rooms, and officials assess that students constructed the devices from “ball-shaped firecrackers.” Police arrested the students and they admitted that they committed the act because they were dissatisfied with their disciplinary teacher. **The Star (7/21/18)**
Malaysian Digest (7/20/18)


IED activity in Malaysia is consistently low and typically related to criminal acts. Similar to the 19 JUL event, criminals construct most IEDs from repurposed fireworks. Fireworks are regulated items in Malaysia; however, authorities do not strongly enforce the laws associated to their sale and distribution.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	3	0	0	0	3
	Year	9	1	1	54	65
Event Count	Month	1	0	0	0	1
	Year	5	1	1	7	14

Past Year IED Events by Type




Past Year Devices



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Vietnam: July IED Events





There was one IED cache event.

On 14 JUL, police recovered an IED cache in Ky Anh, Ha Tinh when they stopped and searched a motorbike. Police had been monitoring the suspect prior to pulling him over. The cache contained 215 kilograms of bulk explosive, 1,000 detonators, and 49 meters of time fuse. The suspect told police that he was paid USD 64 (1.5 million Dong) to transport the cache from Song Danh Bridge, Ba Don, Quang Binh to Vung Ang, Ha Tinh. **Baomoi (7/14/18)**

Vietnam rarely experiences IED activity. The large size of this cache suggests that it was likely intended to be sold or used for mining operations (possibly illegal gold mining). Ha Tinh is home to nearly 100 legal mines scattered throughout the province and dozens of illegal gold mines.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	0	0	0	0	0
	Year	1	0	9	8	18
Event Count	Month	0	0	0	1	1
	Year	1	0	3	3	7



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Cambodia: July IED Events



There was one IED cache event.

On 10 JUL, police recovered an IED cache near a bridge in Pailin following a report received from locals. The cache contained two IEDs, 11 detonation caps, wires, fuses, an unidentified powder, scraps of paper, and a packet of cigarettes. **Cambodia Expats Online (7/12/18) Phnom Penh Post (7/13/18)**

Cambodia rarely experiences IED activity, but when it does, it is usually criminal in nature. For example, the last IED event in Cambodia occurred in December 2016; it involved devices designed to target illegal loggers. Photographs of the devices recovered on 10 JUL reveal that they were small and likely intended for blast fishing.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	0	0	0	2	2
	Year	0	0	0	2	2
Event Count	Month	0	0	0	1	1
	Year	0	0	0	1	1

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Northeast Asia: July Significant Activity

Japan


In July, Japanese authorities executed the 13 convicted Aum Shinrikyo members who had carried out the 1995 Sarin gas chemical attack in Tokyo. This attack was the most devastating terrorist attack on Japanese soil, killing 13 and injuring thousands more. The cult carried out several smaller attacks previously, including a 1994 Sarin attack that killed eight and injured 600. After the 1995 attack, cult members tried several times to release hydrogen cyanide in train stations before their capture. On 6 JUL, the Japanese government executed seven members by hanging, including cult leader Shoko Asahara, and put to death the remaining six members on death row on 26 JUL. After final appeals were completed in January 2018, the executions were carried out at a Tokyo detention house with no advance notice to the public and only hours' notice to those executed; a standard procedure in Japan. Aum Shinrikyo went underground after 1995, renamed itself as Aleph or Hikari no Wa, and continues operations in Japan and other countries. At its height, Aum Shinrikyo had tens of thousands of members. **BBC (7/26/18) BBC (7/6/18)**

China

On 12 JUL, a large explosion occurred in a new chemical production factory in Sichuan Province. The explosion, allegedly from methanol, occurred at approximately 1830 (at shift change) at the Hengda Science and Technology Company, killing nineteen and injuring a dozen more. Subsequent investigations by provincial-level authorities indicated that there were several unresolved safety violations that led to the disaster, which is the 24th reported factory explosion in China this year alone. Days after the explosion, police arrested several suspects and local government agencies were criticized for failing to adequately supervise this company. Local government officials responded to the criticism, stating they had cited the company for safety shortfalls, but the company owner had ignored their guidance to stop production. **China Daily (7/19/18) China Labour Bulletin (7/16/18) Xinhua (7/17/18) South China Morning Post (7/13/18)**

On 21 JUL, Hong Kong first responders conducted a large-scale counter-terrorism exercise, known as "Flyrocket," to test their capabilities to respond to a terrorist attack on the city's new rail station (West Kowloon Station). The station is due to open in September, serving the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong-Kong Express Rail. The complex scenario tested interagency coordinated responses to terrorist actions involving knives, firearms, bombs, and hostage-taking. **Ejinsight (7/23/18) Hong Kong News (7/21/18)**

China: July IED Events



There was one IED detonation event.

On 26 JUL, a 26-year old male from Inner Mongolia threw an IED at the southeast gate of the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, approximately one hundred yards from the exterior of the visa application queue. The detonation slightly injured the perpetrator, who police arrested at the scene. There were no other injuries and only minor damage. Embassy staff quickly swept away glass and cleaned up the blood from the scene and the embassy reopened within two hours after the incident. Police and U.S. Embassy staff used different wording to report the incident, with local police calling the IED a “firecracker explosive” and the embassy referring to the device as a bomb. Witnesses attested to hearing, smelling, and seeing the blast, with one witness stating that it smelled like fireworks and another saying that the ground shook. Two hours before the IED incident, police arrested a woman in front of the U.S. Embassy after she doused herself with gasoline in an apparent attempt at self-immolation. It is not clear if these two events are related. Police stated that the IED detonation is under investigation and that the perpetrator has a history of mental health issues and a paranoid personality disorder. **South China Morning Post (7/26/18) Reuters (7/27/18)**

This single IED event is notable for its intended target. Reports in many media sources have increased in recent weeks addressing the rising tensions between the U.S. and China over trade and other matters. Social control measures occurring in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, such as the recent social media coverage of purported Chinese government personnel forcibly cutting the tunics and long dresses of Uyghur women, are receiving increasing press attention as well. Although the motive for the IED detonation remains unclear, the target was certainly the U.S. Embassy, either the compound itself or perhaps the civilians in its vicinity. The high-profile nature of the U.S. Embassy in Beijing makes it an ideal venue for protests, terrorist attacks, or other activities to elicit international media coverage.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	1	0	0	0	1
	Year	2	0	0	0	2
Event Count	Month	1	0	0	0	1
	Year	2	0	0	0	2

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

IED Calendar

The IED calendar was established to help our audience maintain awareness of events, such as anniversaries of major attacks, or political, religious or cultural events that often coincide (or can potentially coincide) with a spike in IED events.

	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
July 2018	1 BNG	2	3	4	5	6	7
	8	9	10	11	12	13 INDO	14
	15	16	17	18	19	20	21
	22	23	24	25	26	27	28 IND
	29 IND	30 IND	31 IND	1 IND	2 IND	3 IND	4
	August 2018	5	6	7	8 BUR	9	10
12		13	14 IND	15 IND	16	17	18
19		20	21	22	23 IND	24	25
26		27	28	29	30	31 MAL THA	1 BUR
September 2018		2	3	4	5	6	7
	9 INDO	10	11 WW	12 WW	13 WW	14 WW	15 WW
	16 WW	17 WW	18 WW	19 WW	20 WW	21 WW	22 WW
	23 WW	24 WW	25 IND WW	26 WW	27 WW	28 WW	29 WW
	30 WW	31 WW	1 WW	2 WW	3 WW	4 WW	5 WW

BNG – Bangladesh
 IND – India
 INDO – Indonesia
 MAL – Malaysia
 THA – Thailand
 BUR – Burma
 WW – Worldwide

Common Terms and Acronyms

AN – Ammonium Nitrate	PCB – Printed Circuit Board
ANFO – Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil	PN – Partner Nation
ARMM – Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao	PPIED – Pressure Plate IED
CIV – Civilian	QRF – Quick Response Force
CBRN – Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear	RCIED – Radio Controlled IED
COIN – Counter-insurgency	RCP – Route Clearance Patrols
CWIED – Command Wire IED	RPG – Rocket Propelled Grenade
DTMF – Dual-Tone Multi-Frequency	SA – South Asia
EFP – Explosively Formed Projectile	SAF – Small Arms Fire
EOD – Explosive Ordnance Disposal	SEA – Southeast Asia
F/C – Found & Cleared	SVBIED – Suicide Vehicle Borne IED
HME – Homemade Explosives	TATP – Triacetone Triperoxide
HN – Host Nation (Police, Military, Government)	TNT – Trinitrotoluene (C ₇ H ₅ N ₃ O ₆)
IDF – Indirect Fire	TTP – Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
IDP – Internally Displaced Persons	UXO – Unexploded Ordnance
IED – Improvised Explosive Device	VBIED – Vehicle Borne IED
KFR – Kidnap for Ransom	VEO – Violent Extremist Organization
KIA – Killed in Action	VOIED – Victim Operated IED
LOC – Line of Communication	WIA – Wounded in Action
LPG – Liquefied Petroleum Gas	
MSR – Main Supply Routes	
NFI – No Further Information	
NSTR – Nothing Significant To Report	
PBA – Post Blast Analysis	
PBIED – Personnel Borne (Suicide Bomb) IED	

Governments, Groups and Organizations

ASG – Abu Sayyaf Group	JMB – Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh
BIFF – Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters	JMJB – Jama'atul Muslim Janta Bangladesh
BIPP – Barisan Islam Perberbasan Patani	KIA – Kachin Independence Army
BRN-C – Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate	KIM – Khalifa Islamiya Mindanao
BSF – Border Security Forces	KIO – Kachin Independence Organization
BNP – Bangladesh National Party	LeT – Lashkar-e Tayyiba
BriMob – Mobile Brigade (Indonesia CT Forces)	MILF – Moro Islamic Liberation Front
CPI-M – Communist Party of India (Maoist)	MILF-SOG – MILF-Special Operations Group
CPN-M – Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)	MNLF – Moro National Liberation Front
CPP – Communist Party of the Philippines	NPA – New People's Army
CRPF – Central Reserve Police Force (India)	PNP – Philippine National Police
GMIP – Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Patani	POLRI – Indonesian National Police
HM – Hizb-ul-Mujahideen	PULO – Patani United Liberation Organization
HNLC – Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (India)	RAB – Rapid Action Battalion (Bangladesh)
HUJI-B – Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami Bangladesh	RKK – Runda Kumpulan Kecil
IB – India's Intelligence Bureau	SJMM – Samyukta Jatiya Mukti Morcha
IM – Indian Mujahideen	SJTMM – Samyukta Jana Tantrik Terai Mukti Morcha
IrW – Irregular Warfare	ULFA – United Liberation Front of Assam
ISI – Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan)	UWSA – United Wa State Army
ISIS – Islamic State of Iraq ash Sham	YCL – Youth Communist League
JAT – Jemaah Ansharout Tauhid	
Jl – Jemaah Islamiya	
JTMM – Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha	
JIB – Jemaat-e-Islami Bangladesh	
JeM – Jaish-e-Mohammed	