



Asia-Pacific Counter-IED Fusion Center

Monthly IED Activity Report



DOI: 30 April 2018

About the APCFC

The Asia-Pacific C-IED Fusion Center is the premier center for irregular warfare analysis in the U.S. Pacific Command. The center develops and synchronizes C-IED and EOD programs and regional engagements. The center resources USARAPC C-IED training to ensure U.S., Allied, and Partner Nations survivability.



[Click above to open the APCFC website](#)

Contents

Past Year Activity
Executive Summary pg. 1-2
By Region pg. 2

April Activity
Switch Types pg. 3
Group Affiliation pg. 3
Incident Highlight pg. 3
Special Assessment pg. 5-6
Person of Interest pg. 7
VEO of Interest pg. 7

South Asia
Significant Activity pg. 8
Bangladesh pg. 9
India pg. 10
Nepal pg. 11


Southeast Asia
Significant Activity pg. 12-13
Philippines pg. 14
Thailand pg. 15
Indonesia pg. 16
Malaysia pg. 17

Northeast Asia
Significant Activity pg. 18
Calendar pg. 19
Glossary pg. 20


Click on an entry to advance to the associated page.

Executive Summary: In April, there were 100 IED events within the Asia-Pacific region, consisting of 47 detonation events, 19 found/cleared events, two hoax events, and 32 cache events. Compared to last month, there was a 52% increase in IED events and a 4% increase in IED-related casualties. April events included a total of 362 devices, compared to 433 in March. There were no reported IED events in Northeast Asia for the 10th straight month.

There were 100 IED events in the Asia-Pacific region in April 2018




Icons depict events for April 2018; heat map depicts event density from April 2017 - April 2018



This document is limited to those personnel performing military, intelligence, law enforcement, or security duties in support of C-IED operations.

April Asia-Pacific IED Events by Region



Executive Summary (Continued)

SOUTH ASIA

In South Asia, IED activity increased from 47 events in March to 73 events in April. Despite this increase, IED-related casualties decreased by 20% from March. In Bangladesh, IED activity slightly increased from last month while IED-related casualties slightly decreased (see pg. 9). In India, IED activity increased by 53% compared to March and IED-related casualty rates marginally decreased (see pg. 10). Devices decreased to 325 in April, from 379 in March.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	121	35	1	168	325
	Year	929	371	29	2105	3434
Event Count	Month	37	14	1	21	73
	Year	432	267	22	342	1063


SOUTHEAST ASIA

In Southeast Asia, IED activity increased from 19 events in March to 27 events in April. Additionally, IED-related casualties were three times higher this month compared to the previous month. In the Philippines, IED activity slightly increased in April, although, IED-related casualties remained low (see pg. 14). In Thailand, there was a small uptick in IED events from March, and a coordinated VBIED attack in Sungai Kolok resulted in a noticeable increase in IED-related casualties (see pg. 15).


		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	10	6	1	20	37
	Year	324	527	16	550	1417
Event Count	Month	10	5	1	11	27
	Year	219	62	10	154	445

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from OPEN SOURCES are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations. Event refers to specific IED activity categories: IED Detonation, IED Found/Cleared, IED Hoax, IED Cache.


PACOM IED Events - Past 12 Months



Past Year IED events by Country



Past Year Device Count by Country




		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	131	41	2	188	362
	Year	1255	898	47	2655	4855
Event Count	Month	47	19	2	32	100
	Year	653	329	34	387	1403


NOTE: Starting in April 2018, the APCFC Monthly IED report will include both event counts (detonation, found/cleared, hoax, and cache) and device counts. It is important to note that a singular IED event may include multiple devices. For instance, a single IED cache event may contain several devices.

IED Activity - Past 12 Months

Switch Type



Group Affiliation



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics are presumed to be approximations. Graphics represent known switch type and group affiliation.

Incident Highlight: Maoist Improvised Projectiles Spreading

On 23 APR, Indian Border Security Force (BSF) personnel discovered a cache of explosives following a Naxal ambush near Mahala BSF camp in Kanker District, Chhattisgarh. The cache included 24 IEDs, 40 explosive-tipped arrows, a rocket launcher, and other improvised explosives. The BSF patrol may have disrupted Naxal preparations, as police strongly believe that the Naxals intended to use the cache for a large ambush. This event is notable for two reasons. First, the cache includes the first clear media images of Naxal makeshift mortars and rockets, demonstrating the Naxals' definitive manufacture and use of improvised armaments. While observers have assessed that the Naxals were likely already using improvised munitions, most devices discovered previously were severely rusted and the quality of earlier images was insufficient to conduct a comprehensive visual assessment. The new images posted on a BSF website clearly show hand-welding and other signs of improvised manufacturing. Though Indian authorities assess that Naxals steal weapons and materials, evidence of the group's increasing weapons manufacturing dates back to 2012. This cache provides some insight into the organization's weapons manufacture capabilities.



Improvised projectiles recovered from Maoists

Second, the BSF recovered the cache over 150 miles from the area of Sukma District, where Indian security forces reported identical explosive-tipped arrows events. The location of this cache suggests the technology may be proliferating to other areas. The first observed use of explosive-tipped arrows occurred in March 2017 in Kottacheru Village, Sukma District, Chhattisgarh, where Naxal fighters used them to drive Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) into the kill zone of an ambush (the ambush resulted in the deaths of 12 CRPF personnel). Subsequently, Indian security forces discovered explosive-tipped arrows sporadically in caches near the area. The location of the 23 APR cache, however, is a new outer limit of the area where these arrows typically appear. This distance suggests the possibility that a separate Naxal cell may be using explosive-tipped arrows. Comparing the BSF and CRPF photos, the construction appears to be quite comparable and reporting indicates that the Naxals may have intended to employ these devices in a similar manner.

Sources: DNA India (4/2/2012) The Hindu (7/21/12) FirstPost (3/11/17) FirstPost (7/24/17) Financial Express (8/24/17) Business Standard (4/23/18) BSF Facebook (4/23/18) FirstPost (4/25/18)

Special Assessment: Extremism and Social Media in the Asia-Pacific

The proliferation of telecommunications technologies and the corresponding growth of social media has allowed individuals and groups alike a means to connect globally to an extensive array of various social networks. Moreover, social media empowers individuals to share information in the virtual realm instantaneously. This condition has altered the dynamics of the relationship between governments and their citizens, as states no longer possess a monopoly on information control and dissemination. For instance, social media served as an accelerant for individual and group activity during the 2011 “Arab Spring” protest across the Middle East. The continuous transmission of texts, emails, postings to various sites, and video and photo sharing galvanized local and international support for the dissidents, which demonstrates the ability of social media to influence public opinion and to serve as a means of coordination and communication.

The Arab Spring highlights how social media enables individuals and groups to stimulate social and political change. Consequently, violent extremist organizations (VEOs) have wielded the same tool to communicate and to expand their influence. In the Asia-Pacific, social media has played a key role in the development of VEOs, allowing once-disparate entities to engage in unprecedented communication and collaboration. The use of social media by Asia-Pacific based VEOs is a complex facet of their functioning; nonetheless, there are three, primary methods of social media employment: recruitment, radicalization, and operational support.

For many in the Asia-Pacific, where cellular services have far eclipsed older forms of communication (such as landline telephones), the Internet and social media platforms have enabled extremist organizations with the ability to distribute their radical philosophies and share their militant practices globally. Moreover, social media changed the VEO radicalization and recruitment process, as it allows for the rampant distribution of propaganda and media to an international audience.

The use of social media by VEOs altered the radicalization and recruitment processes in two fundamental ways. First, the radicalization-to-attack progression has become more efficient, allowing extremists to target, recruit, radicalize, and train individuals remotely. Second, the broad reach of social media allowed VEOs to attract new would-be members. For instance, ISIS’ distribution of slick propaganda, portraying the glamorous image of the group, likely served as a mobilizing factor for Asia-Pacific militants to travel to Iraq and Syria to fight on behalf of the caliphate.




Image courtesy of Yale University (10/4/17)

Recruitment

ISIS and other VEOs appear to recognize the potential and power of social media to facilitate their recruiting efforts. Convincing an individual to leave his home, family, and friends, to travel a circuitous route to the battlefields of Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere, and to fight against government and international forces is a difficult prospect for VEO recruiters. To accomplish such a feat requires a communications strategy and a credible narrative that highlights the inevitable success of the group, while simultaneously moderating any opposing accounts. Using social media and other communications platforms, prospective recruits can communicate directly with fighters to learn what battlefield life is like, which facilitates a personal connection between the recruit and the seasoned fighter. Once a recruit is ready to enter the jihadist lifestyle, a facilitator provides direction on how to join the fight abroad. Though this is a notional process and it is difficult to calculate conclusively the number of fighters recruited by VEOs via social media, it is quite reasonable to assume that social media has served as a means for ISIS and other VEOs to inspire and enlist recruits from across the globe.

Governments in the Asia-Pacific have become increasingly aware of the power of social media and online platforms to propagate extremist ideologies and recruit individuals. For instance, in March, Malaysian authorities detained 249 individuals involved in recruiting activities via three international social media platforms. In response, Malaysia’s Counter Messaging Center is currently monitoring over 3,900 social media accounts for extremist activity and have blocked nearly 900 others.

Radicalization

Radicalization via social media, like recruitment, does not necessarily require local attendance at a religious institution (e.g. madrasa) or direct communication with a religious official. A recent study of online Islamic radicalization in the United States showed online radicalization increased from 12% in 2005 to 90% in 2015; similar studies conducted in Europe also showed that online means have eclipsed in-person radicalization. For instance, ISIS’ professional online recruiters used appealing narratives and easily relatable talking points to inspire jihad, using perceived injustices or existing social issues to mobilize potential recruits. The group’s efforts to capitalize on the social and religious isolation of Indonesian maids living in Hong Kong exemplifies this practice. ISIS targeted the maids for recruitment because they are a vulnerable population; isolated from family and community, and often exposed to discomforting or humiliating situations through their employment (such as handling pork). The path towards radicalization did not start in Indonesia; a study conducted by the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) reported that most of the maids were radicalized via social media after living in their host country for

Special Assessment: Extremism and Social Media in the Asia-Pacific

some time, and that the radicalization process occurred rapidly once it started. Some reports indicate that prior to authorities discovering the radicalized network, other maids travelled to the Middle East, returned home to Indonesia, or went to work in other Southeast Asian countries. Indonesian authorities arrested two such women, who returned from working in Singapore and Hong Kong, for planning suicide bombings in Jakarta and Bali in 2016.

Another phenomenon leading to increased attacks worldwide is self-radicalization, which is a process not requiring direct contact or support from recruiters or handlers. In this process, individuals access extremist materials online, which includes books, videos, sermons, games, and pre-recorded narratives promoting jihad or extremist ideologies. In Bangladesh, one such website associated with the al-Qaeda-linked Ansar al-Islam (formerly Ansarullah Bangla Team) had 24 jihadi books available for download in addition to recorded sermons by the jailed leader of the group. In Indonesia, a radicalized teenager that attempted to detonate IEDs and attacked a priest with an axe at a Catholic mass in August 2016, accessed online videos about bomb production and stated that ISIS propaganda depicting similar attacks inspired his actions. Moreover, media content produced by Islamist VEOs and distributed via online platforms has acted as a means to exploit current, perceived injustices against predominately-Muslim populations. Organizations such as ISIS design this propaganda to evoke sympathy and to convince others to employ violence against the identified aggressors. For example, in an interview with the emir of Bangladesh, Tamim Chowdhury, published in *Dabiq* issue number 14, he highlights the atrocities committed against Rohingya (Muslim) civilians by Burmese Buddhists and security forces and subsequently calls upon fellow Muslims to wage jihad as a form of vengeance.

Operational Support

While ISIS initially emphasized travel to the Middle East as the best way to engage in jihad, messaging via social media shifted to encourage would-be jihadists to stay in their home countries and to engage in local attacks. For instance, the groups responsible for some of the more notable attacks in the Asia-Pacific over the last two years, including the Holey Artisan Bakery Attack in Bangladesh and the Battle of Marawi in the Philippines, possess linkages to ISIS-Core. Though the exact extent of operational connections is unknown, it is likely that ISIS-Core participated or contributed in some degree in the planning of these events and delegated tactical decision-making to the regional emirs in the Philippines and Bangladesh.

The decentralized nature of ISIS' command and control structure allowed for local leaders, such as Chowdhury in Bangladesh and Hapilon in the Philippines, to use local knowledge and resources to conduct impactful attacks under the banner of ISIS. Following his return from the Middle East in 2013, Chowdhury began recruiting for and planning a large-scale terrorist attack in Dhaka, serving as a link between ISIS-Core and local jihadists, such as Marjan (one of the masterminds of the Holey Artisan Bakery Attack). During the attack on the bakery, Chowdhury's team used the victims' cell phones to call in status reports and sent pictures from the scene to Chowdhury and Marjan, which then posted them to ISIS' social media accounts. Ironically, officials later identified the attackers through their personal social media accounts.

In Marawi, elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines discovered that ISIS-Core, using encrypted messaging applications, was responsible for the direct provision of funding to ISIS-Philippines. Likewise, the Philippine militants used these same applications extensively throughout the battle to relay operational information and to provide status reports. ISIS's al-Amaq media agency disseminated this information further through postings on social media and, when necessary, translated these accounts into other languages to ensure a vast understanding by its audience.

Conclusion

In a 2016 statement to the Senate, the FBI confirmed the important role that social media and other online platforms play in the recruitment and radicalization of a new generation of jihadists. Violent extremist organizations, most notably ISIS, use social media as a powerful tool to communicate their narratives through the distribution of powerful propaganda, to disseminate their militant ideologies, and to convince recruits to fight on their behalf. These organizations recognize the inherent power of social media and have thus, developed sophisticated social media strategies to achieve their goals. In the Asia-Pacific, jihadist attacks in the last few years have proven the power of these capabilities and highlight the importance of developing countermeasures and strategies to combat their potency.

Sources: NDU (5/24/16) FBI (7/6/16) Washington Post (7/16/16) Dhaka Tribune (8/27/16) Australian (8/30/16) NYT (10/5/16) RSIS (11/9/16) Dhaka Tribune (1/6/17) NYT (1/6/17) Daily Beast (3/25/17) Columbia (4/1/17) NYT (7/18/17) SCMP (8/6/17) Straits Times (8/29/17) IPAC (7/21/17) CFR (11/28/17) Diplomat (1/29/18) Dhaka Tribune (1/14/18) Straits Times (3/14/18)

Person of Interest / VEO of Interest

POI: Furuji Indama



ALIAS: Puriji, Purodi, Boy Sopek, Idaras, Amirin, Abu Dujana, Abu Faidz **DOB:** 1980
POB: Philippines **LANGUAGE:** Tagalog, Yakan **AREA OF OPERATIONS:** Basilan, Philippines **LOCATION:** Basilan, Philippines **AFFILIATIONS:** Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), ISIS-Philippines

Furuji Indama is a veteran Sub-Commander of Basilan-based ASG. Indama rose to ASG prominence by planning, directing, and executing more than a decade of IED attacks, gun battles with the Armed Force of the Philippines (AFP), kidnapping for ransom (KFR) and extortion operations, and beheadings. The 2007 death of ASG Commander, Abu Sulaiman, and other key ASG leaders during combined US-Philippines operations under the auspices of Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines (OEF-P) also contributed to Indama's elevation to a senior leadership position in the organization. Because of the pressure placed upon the group (see VOI), ASG devolved into a primarily criminal enterprise, in which Indama was able to distinguish himself quickly. His youth, charisma, and commitment helped him to establish credibility with legacy ASG icons, to include Saudi-trained Cleric Khair Mundos and the future ISIS-Philippines Emir Isnilon Hapilon.

Indama's ASG résumé led to the organization naming him a candidate to replace Hapilon after the Battle of Marawi, particularly after the death of senior ASG Malaysian militant, Dr. Mahmud Ahmad. According to National War College Professor Zachary Abuza, the "initial plan was [to] have Indama named Hapilon's successor while [Ahmad] acted as the brains behind the group." Another factor that could alter Indama's role is the March 2018 surrender of his longtime peer and fellow commander, Nurhassan Jamiri, which deepens the leadership vacuum on Basilan and provides openings for Indama to consolidate power. It remains unclear, however, if Indama's future role will change significantly.

Indama was responsible for establishing the Sabah-Sulu smuggling routes as a facilitation corridor for illicit materials (such as IED components) and militants from throughout the region. As such, regardless of whether Indama assumes Hapilon's former role of emir, Indama's proving ground in Basilan likely inspired many of the jihadist/criminal-entrepreneur, hybrid operating models in the Philippines and throughout Southeast Asia.

Sources: Banjarmasin Post (4/12/16) Channel News Asia (10/17/17) Reuters (3/24/18) IPAC (10/25/16) Channel News Asia (2/21/18)

VEO: Abu Sayyaf Group

AREA OF OPERATIONS: Zamboanga City and Sulu Archipelago (Philippines), Costal Sabah (Malaysia), Sulu Sea
TTPs: KFR, bombings, contract killings, extortion **Estimated Size:** 300 to 400 fighters

In 1991, Islamic scholar Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani split from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) to form the ASG as the MNLF opted to conduct peace negotiations with the Government of the Philippines. Janjalani had studied in Libya and the Middle East, fought with the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, and ultimately declared allegiance to Osama bin Laden. Upon his return to the Philippines, Janjalani recruited disillusioned members of the MNLF with the ultimate aim of establishing an Islamic state in Mindanao and Basilan with the backing of al-Qa'ida.

The ASG's ideological spirit diminished with the death of Janjalani when police killed him in shootout in 1998. In the absence of their ideologue, the ASG, under the leadership of his younger brother Khadaffy, vacillated between ideological and criminal motivations. Years of aggressive targeting, including the neutralization of Khadaffy in 2006, ultimately fractured the group, decentralized their power, and reduced their ability to conduct large-scale attacks. For instance, the splintering of the organization created geographically and operationally independent factions on the island of Basilan and Sulu.

In recent years, the divergence of ASG factions on Basilan and Sulu has become more visible. Cells on Sulu focused on KFR activities with a large number of kidnappings off the coast of Eastern Malaysia or from ships transiting the Sulu Sea. In contrast, ASG in Basilan became more ideologically focused following the 2014 pledge (*bayah*) to ISIS by long-time Basilan commander, Isnilon Hapilon. The 2017 Battle of Marawi signaled a significant turning point in the operational capacity of Basilan ASG. Hapilon (elevated to status of ISIS-P emir) and the Maute Group planned to capture and hold of the city of Marawi in an attempt to establish a permanent base of operations in the region. Following five months of fighting, the AFP expelled ISIS-P from Marawi and killed over 900 Maute and ASG extremists, including Hapilon. Despite the group's status as operationally degraded following the Marawi Siege, the ASG continues to operate.

Though the future operational approach (i.e. ideological versus criminal) of the group is unclear, the ASG has demonstrated organizational resiliency and a capability of responding positively to setbacks. There are underlying socioeconomic factors in the provinces of Basilan and Jolo, making it likely that their degraded state following Marawi will prove to be temporary.

Sources: CEP (Sahiron) CEP (ASG) Time (10/1/09) Stanford (7/20/15) BBC (6/14/16) DW (4/29/17) National Post (9/1/17) Diplomat (11/23/17) Sun Star (3/28/18)

South Asia: April Significant Activity

South Asia

On 23-26 APR, buses carrying delegates for the Bangladesh-India-Nepal bus route travelled overland, marking a significant step towards establishing permanent bus service between the countries. Officials expect the route to open to the public in two to three months. While this will no doubt increase mobility for civilians in the area, it does raise potential security concerns about the cross-border transit of people and goods. **Dhaka Tribune (4/23/18)**

Bangladesh

On 23 APR, a Bangladeshi Special Tribunal sentenced 15 members of Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) to imprisonment and fined them Tk 20,000 (USD 241) for their role in the 17 AUG 2005 IED attacks that killed three people. The IED attacks occurred across 63 districts, with the militants targeting courts and other facilities. **UNB (4/23/18)**

India

On 8 APR, Indian press reported the ministry of home affairs is set to sanction the National Security Guard (NSG) to take part in anti-militancy operations in Jammu and Kashmir alongside the army's counterinsurgency force (Rashtriya Rifles) and the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF). Deploying the NSG as a component of counterinsurgency operations in Kashmir is likely a move by the Indian government to prepare the NSG to combat insurgencies in other portions of the country. The NSG is a specialized force that focuses primarily on counterterrorism activities. **Greater Kashmir (4/2/18)**

On 9 APR, Indian press reported that an audit of airport security found only six of the 59 airports guarded by the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) are equipped to defuse and dispose of explosives, raising concerns about aviation security and passenger safety. Bomb detection and disposal squads are operational at the airports in Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai, Kolkata, Cochin, and Hyderabad. Airports require 28 pieces of equipment including explosive vapor detectors, bomb disposal suits, and remote-operated vehicles for making explosive detection and disposal squads operational, according to rules specified by the Bureau for Civil Aviation Security (BCAS). **Hindustan Times (4/9/18)**

On 5 APR, Kashmir's Inspector-General of Police (IGP), Swayam Prakash Pani, disputed the assertion that there has been a rise in recruitment of local youth by militant organizations, stating that there has actually been a decrease in recruiting since the death of local militant leader Burhan Wani in July 2016. According to official estimates, in the preceding two years, more than 214 Kashmiri youths joined militant outfits such as Hizbul Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Toiba, and Jaish-e-Mohammad. Pani further stated that in the first quarter of 2018, only 23 youths had joined militant ranks. **Kashmir Reader (4/5/18)**

On 18 APR, the Chief Minister of Chhattisgarh, Raman Singh, expressed interest in conducting peace talks with Maoist/Naxalite militants, but only if their senior leadership is engaged. Inviting top Maoist leaders for talks, Singh urged them to join the mainstream by involving themselves in development work. **Business Standard (4/18/18)**


Maldives

On 10 APR, Maldives' Ministry of Islamic Affairs published a policy paper outlining new guidelines regarding apostasy, speaking against Islam, going to war in the name of Islam, and murdering in the name of Islam. The guidelines dictate that apostates and others can be forcefully expelled from Maldivian society, forced to pay fines, or imprisoned. The guidelines highlight concerns over conflict arising internally between secularists and hardliners as a threat to internal stability, calling for both sides to be punished. Some human rights advocates have condemned the guidelines, citing restriction of religious freedoms and the freedom of speech. Conservative policy makers, such as the Minister of Defense Adam Shareef, also reacted negatively to the guidelines, stating that there was no place for religious freedom in the Maldives. **Maldives Independent (4/11/18)** **Maldives Independent (4/15/18)**

On 17 APR, media reported on a Maldivian militant that returned from Syria to Malé who authorities did not detain upon his return. The failure of authorities to detain this individual has raised concerns that jihadists and former fighters might be able to re-establish themselves without consequences. The Ministry of Defense has flatly stated that the government will detain and charge returnees under the Terrorism Act. While there have been reports of the government charging returnees, they are not typically convicted. **Mihaaru (4/17/18)**

On 30 APR, media reported that extremist websites and jihadist material is still available online; over four months after the Maldivian Defense Ministry said it would be blocked. The websites are in the Maldivian language and material includes profiles of and speeches by international jihadist leaders and icons, information about Maldivians fighting in Syria, publications from jihadist groups, and other materials that could be used to radicalize and recruit individuals. **Maldives Independent (4/30/18)**

Bangladesh: April IED Events



There was one IED detonation event, one IED found and cleared event, and seven IED cache events.

On 26 APR, Dhaka Metropolitan Police's Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crimes (CTTC) unit recovered an IED cache from three suspected Neo-JMB militants at the Genetic Plaza, Mohammadpur, Dhaka; three suspects arrested. The cache contained bomb making materials, 100 detonators, one dagger, and one mobile phone. The three suspects admitted to meeting with Neo-JMB leader Ayub Bachchu and were involved in training, recruiting, and bomb-making. **Dhaka Tribune (4/27/18) Daily Star (4/27/18)**

On 26 APR, RAB-10 recovered an IED cache from the residence of a Neo-JMB militants in Sector-12, Uttara, Dhaka; one militant arrested. The militant was one of 15 involved in an IED cell that was allegedly planning to target a government facility near the Dhaka Cantonment. The cache contained wires, electronic components, explosive materials, remote detonators, and circuit diagrams. **Daily Star (4/27/18) Dhaka Tribune (4/27/18)**

On 27 APR, Gazipur Police recovered an IED cache from suspected militants at Shopno Chura Picnic Park, Gazipur; 45 suspects detained, including local Jamat-e-Islami Bangladesh leader SM Sanullah. The cache contained 15 petrol bombs, four crude bombs, and 18 jihadi books. Authorities suspect they may have been planning to use the devices to disrupt upcoming local elections. **Dhaka Tribune (4/27/18)**

In April, IED activity remained low, continuing the trend established throughout much of the last year. IED activity revolved mainly around the arrests of several individuals involved in potential election violence and jihadist militant activity (Neo-JMB). RAB and Dhaka Metropolitan Police recovered several large caches associated with Neo-JMB in continued drives against the militants, which have resulted in the prevention of major offensive action over the last year.


Protracted counter-terrorism operations have likely prevented Neo-JMB from regaining or maintaining operational capabilities seen prior to March 2017; additionally, the steady neutralization of Neo-JMB leadership has likely reduced the group's operational effectiveness (e.g. planning capability, access to funding, etc.). While Neo-JMB is still operating in the country (as evidenced by continued raids and cache recoveries), it is likely that their degraded operational capacity will prevent them from conducting large-scale attacks in the near future.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	1	2	0	17	20
	Year	45	10	2	231	288
Event Count	Month	1	1	0	7	9
	Year	24	7	2	55	88


Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



Past Year IED Events by Type




Past Year Devices



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

India: April IED Events



There were 27 IED detonation events, nine IED found and cleared events, and 13 IED cache events.

On 4 APR, police recovered an IED cache following the arrest of an alleged Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) recruit in Mohali, Punjab. Allegedly, the ISI recruited him online and provided him instructions and directions on how to conduct lone wolf attacks. Police claimed that the recruit confessed to learning how to make IED's from "do it yourself" kits after the Pakistan ISI contacted him via social media two years ago. **Hindustan Times (4/6/18) India.com (4/6/18) Times Now News (4/6/18)**

On 25 APR, Maoists detonated IEDs to destroy a concrete road in Charla, Uttar Pradesh as part of a protest against the recent Supreme Court order on the Scheduled Castes and Tribes Atrocities (Prevention) Act. Maoists also left behind pamphlets opposing the Supreme Court Order. A few days prior to the protest, local police apprehended two Maoists with weapons and explosives along the Bradrachalm-Charla Road. **The Hans India (4/21/18) Telangana Today (4/25/18) The Hindu (4/26/18)**


On 29 APR, security forces sized a cache of weapons and explosives in the East Garo Hills Region. The cache allegedly belonged to a former Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA) commander, who was killed on 24 FEB. Following his death, security forces managed to identify and seize GNLA resources on multiple occasions. **Business Standard (4/29/18)**

Overall IED activity in India remained consistent with the previous month's activity in the Red Corridor and Northeast Region; however, IED activity remained low for the second consecutive month in the Jammu and Kashmir Region. In the Red Corridor, Maoist IED activity was not particularly high but some events were notable due to their possible relationship between the development of infrastructure and tribal/ethnic issues. For example, sixty Maoists who were frustrated with anti-development and anti-tribal ideology, surrendered to Chhattisgarh police. Maoists have been targeting infrastructure development projects for months in an attempt to restrict movement and discredit the government.


In the Northeast, the future of the GNLA remains uncertain following the death of their leader in February. Retention in extremist organizations appears to be declining, which could be attributed to the success of the Indian Government's ability to provide infrastructure and security to its people in rural areas. Reporting on significant infrastructure accomplishments in India, such as the transmission of power to the final rural village this month, will likely discredit extremist's narratives organizations over time.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	111	27	0	151	289
	Year	682	187	9	1842	2720
Event Count	Month	27	9	0	13	49
	Year	238	100	10	147	495


Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



Past Year IED Events by Type




Past Year Devices



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Nepal: April IED Events



There were nine IED detonation events, four IED found and cleared events, one IED hoax event, and one IED cache event.


On 15 APR, Nepal Army EOD found and cleared three pressure cooker IEDs emplaced by Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) militants outside a rock crusher business in Chaukidanda, Namobuddha, Kavrepalanchok, Bagmati. **Nepal Monitor (4/15/18) Twitter (4/16/18)**

On 16 APR, CPN-M militants detonated an IED at the Indian Consulate Office in Biratnagar, Monrang, Kosi. The group has been active in the area enforcing a strike. **Nepal Monitor (4/17/18) Himalayan Times (4/17/18)**

On 20 APR, police recovered a CPN-M cache from two suspected student leaders in Hariharpurgadhi-6, Sindhuli, Janakpur. Security forces have been increasing operations in the area, as it is possible CPN-M is using the area for combat training. The cache contained 57 gelatin sticks, three detonators, two digital multi-meters, two meters of det cord, a pair of scissors, documents, and a motorcycle. **Kathmandu Post (4/22/18)**

IED activity remained relatively low in April, with CPN-M involved with several incidents. There were two IED attacks and other non-IED attacks on rock crusher businesses, which police suspect were perpetrated by CPN-M militants. There was also an IED attack on a hydropower plant office perpetrated by CPN-M militants. Both of these target types have been protested for their negative environmental impacts. All of the IED events in April also occurred in the southeast of Nepal, where agitating groups have been active. In the coming month, expect low-level IED violence and civil disturbances to continue.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	9	6	1	0	16
	Year	202	173	18	29	422
Event Count	Month	9	4	1	1	15
	Year	170	159	10	24	363



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Southeast Asia: April Significant Activity

Philippines

On 8 APR, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) activated the AFP Special Operations Command (AFP-SOCom) which combines the special operation units from each of the major services under one command. Officers and personnel from special operation units from the major services will compose the core of the AFP-SOCom. It will take command and supervision of the Special Operations Wing of the Air Force; the Naval Special Operations Group from the Navy; the Scout Ranger Regiment, Special Forces Regiment, and Light Reaction Regiment of the Army; and the Joint Special Operations Group of the General Headquarters. The AFP Chief of Staff says the activation of the AFP-SOCom was the result of lessons learned from the Zamboanga City attack in 2013 and the Marawi siege in 2017. Both of these events witnessed heavy urban warfare that warranted the deployment of special operation commandos. **Tempo (4/9/18) Inquirer (4/9/18)**

President Duterte is seeking to revive peace talks with the National Democratic Front (NDF). He is urging Joma Sison to come home for the negotiations. Sison expressed an inclination to return if there is significant progress in talks with the government and he expressed that the government must ensure his security. The government peace panel is holding backchannel negotiations with the NDF to begin formal peace negotiations. These backchannel talks will help in enabling the government peace panel to comply with the President's directive to produce a peace agreement with the communist rebels within 60 days. Prior to the start of these formal talks, the peace panel will seek an interim peace agreement with the NDF, which will also be coordinated with a unilateral ceasefire. **Philippine Star (4/25/18) The Manila Times (4/24/18)**

President Duterte has stated he would step down from office if Congress fails to pass the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) by the end of May. He said the passage of the BBL should be a priority and he was getting tired of trying to solve the long-standing conflict in Mindanao. Duterte promised to declare Mindanao a land reform area and to provide livelihood to the Moros. He stated further that the BBL is not about monopolizing the Moro lands, but rather giving a voice to the Moros and addressing their concerns. **Philippine Star (4/27/18) Manila Bulletin (4/26/18)**

Burma

Since January 2018, conflict has worsened between the Burmese Army (Tatmadaw) and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) (**see March 2018 VOI**), forcing ethnic Kachin people to flee Shan state into China. According to the UN, there are approximately 120,000 Kachin people displaced, with 10,000 of those fleeing in the last four months. The UN has raised concerns that the Tatmadaw may be violating international and human rights laws in respect to the treatment of ethnic peoples in several areas of the country to include Shan, Kachin, and Rakhine States. There are reports from those that have fled of extrajudicial killings, torture, rape, arbitrary arrest, and the confiscation of property. Violent clashes between the Tatmadaw and KIA typically involve conventional means such as landmines; however, the KIA has used IEDs as well. Of note, accurate reports of IED and casualty events in Burma are difficult to ascertain. The Burmese government censors media sources thus creating difficulties when attempting to determine if an IED event occurred and to identify any amplifying information associated to an event. **Frontier Myanmar (4/24/18) The Virginian-Pilot (4/25/18)**

Thailand

On 11 APR, insurgents ambushed a police patrol in Khao Toom, Pattani. During the ensuing exchange of small arms fire, the insurgents wounded three police officers. The internal Security Operations Command confirmed that police shot and killed two insurgents during the attack. Sobueri Jehe (36), a top member of the Runda Kum-pulan Kecil (RKK) and Yusoh Jehlong (32), both had multiple warrants out for their arrest. **Pattaya Mail (4/11/18) Bangkok Post (4/12/18)**

On 18 APR, Deputy Prime Minister Prawit Wongsuwon stated that Thai officials detained two of the four members of a suspected ISIS cell. The arrest came shortly after an announcement on 16 APR by Malaysia's Police Chief regarding officials' continued search for the remaining suspects after detaining six others in the alleged cell. Officials identified the subjects as Muhamad Faizal Muhamad Hanafi and Muhamad Hanafi Yah (both from Kelantan State, Malaysia); Nor Farkhan Mohd Isa (from southern Johor); and Awae Wae-Eya (a Thai national from Narathiwat). The suspects are wanted for planning attacks on non-Muslims places of worship and plotting to kidnap and murder police officers. Malaysian security officials believe Awae Wae-Eya to be the mastermind of the group; however, Thailand's Internal Security Operations Command assert that the suspect is not associated to ISIS. Deputy PM Prawit did acknowledge potential attempts by ISIS militants to come to Thailand and to establish a foothold; however, the government stated it would prevent this from happening. **The Straits Times (4/16/18) Bangkok Post (4/19/18) The Nation (4/18/18)**

Southeast Asia: April Significant Activity

Malaysia

On 21 APR, unidentified assailants killed Dr. Fadi Mohammad al-Batsh, a Hamas electrical engineer and university lecturer on the streets of Kuala Lumpur. The circumstances of Fadi's death, and the nature of his work, has led Palestinian officials to accuse Israel's Mossad of assassinating him. Fadi's apparent assassination came in the form of a drive-by shooting from two gunmen on a motorcycle, described by Malaysia's Deputy Prime Minister as, "Europeans with links to a foreign intelligence agency." Additionally, the Gaza-born scientist was an expert on rocket and drone accuracy. He recently published material on drone development and on transmitters for controlling drones. It appears that Israel is likely focusing on preventing advanced technologies from reaching Hamas. **Memri (5/1/18) Times of Israel (4/21/18) Al Jazeera (4/22/18) Newsweek (4/23/18) NY Times (4/25/18)**

Cambodia

On 10 APR, the Cambodian Prime Minister announced in a speech that the government foiled a bomb plot by the Khmer National Liberation Front (KNLF). The day following the Prime Minister's announcement, U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh issued a security alert to warn U.S. citizens that an activist group might try to emplace an IED near Wat Phnom, a Buddhist temple in Phnom Penh and in Siem Reap. The plot was reportedly set to unfold on 12 APR, two days ahead of the Khmer New Year. Shortly after the Prime Minister's announcement, Cambodian state news released an audio tape and dossier that implicated the following individuals of inciting a subversive conspiracy to overthrow the Cambodian government: Sam Serey, the leader of the KNLF; Sam Rainsy, leader of the political opposition party; and Yen Rotanaksotheavy, a controversial Cambodian religious figure with a history of anti-government activism. All three individuals have denied involvement in such a plot or of even being substantially acquainted with each other. Moreover, neutral observers, such as Sidney Jones, the director of a prominent Asia-focused extremist think tank, have expressed skepticism over the terror accusations. Human Rights Watch's Asia Division suggested that the terror accusation was likely made with ulterior motives in mind. In late April, Thailand security agents arrested Serey at an immigration center in Thailand while trying to get his Thai visa extended. The Cambodian government has reached out to Thai authorities to seek his extradition. **Reuters (4/25/18) Phnom Penh Post (4/26/18) (4/25/18) (4/13/18) (4/11/18) U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh (4/11/18)**

Philippines: April IED Events



There were four IED detonation events, four IED found and cleared events, and nine IED cache events.




On 6 APR, authorities found and cleared an IED from a ticket booth from a Barangay Peacekeeping Action Team (BPAT) outpost, Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao, Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), Mindanao; two detained. Four Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) emplaced the device, which was composed of a hand grenade and 60-mm mortar. **Mindanao Examiner (4/6/18)**

On 26 APR, a joint police and military raid recovered an IED cache from Cabuyao and Santa Rosa, Laguna, Calabarzon, Luzon; two detained. The cache contained two IEDs with accessories, two fragmentation hand grenades, assorted weapons, ammunition, and two alleged ISIS black flags. The two detained individuals are members of the Suyuful Khilafa Fil Luzon, which may be part of the local terrorist group, Rajah Solayman Movement. The Rajah Solayman Movement has openly expressed allegiance to ISIS. **Inquirer (4/27/18) The Standard (4/28/18)**

On 29 APR, an IED detonated near the entrance of the Christ the King Cathedral on Rizal Avenue, Koronadal City, South Cotabato, SOCCSKSARGEN, Mindanao; two injured. The device was placed near a parked tricycle and composed of nails and powder used for fireworks. EOD found and cleared two other IEDs near the detonation site. Police assess that the BIFF is responsible due to the continued military operation against the group. **Inquirer Mindanao (4/29/18) The Manila Times (4/30/18) Minda News (4/29/18)**

This month, the NPA and BIFF were responsible for the majority of IED events in the Philippines, which is likely in response to the pressure placed on each group due to continued and intensified military operations. The number of NPA IED cache recoveries has increased, while the number of NPA fighters continues to decline due to continued surrenders. These offensives could potentially cease once formalized peace talks resume and a unilateral ceasefire is declared. The BIFF have been conducting retaliatory moves against government troops after suffering losses from these offensives and are allegedly linked to the event in Koronadal City in which one IED detonated and two additional IEDs were recovered and defused. These retaliations will likely continue.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	4	4	0	20	28
	Year	93	457	0	289	839
Event Count	Month	4	4	0	9	17
	Year	86	32	0	112	230



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Thailand: April IED Events



There were five IED detonation events, one IED found and cleared event, and one IED cache event.




On 9 APR, three timed VBIEDs detonated in a coordinated attack in Sungai Kolok, Naratiwat. The first VBIED detonated in front of a temple Wat Thep Wimon on Jalan Pracharat, causing one casualty. Simultaneously, a second explosion occurred behind the Plaza Hotel, injuring six. The third timed VBIED detonated at Lorong Raman, a Thai-Chinese restaurant on Prachawiwat Road resulting in another six injured. The intent of the coordinated attack was likely to disrupt the public gathering during the Sungai Golok Annual Food Festival. **ABC News (4/10/18) Malaysian Digest (4/10/18) Daily Star (4/9/18) The Nation (4/10/18) Channel News Asia (4/10/18) CH3 Thailand (4/10/18)**

On 18 APR, an IED detonated when two men were hunting in Phu Huak Forest behind Ban Nong Hua Chang School in Tambon Nong Paen; two casualties reported. After responding to the scene, local police found a cache of homemade bottle bombs along with the men's hunting equipment. **The Nation (4/18/18)**

On 29 APR, Authorities discovered a cache of bomb making materials after raiding a residence in Phuket. The cache was found in dense vegetation in the corner of the property. The cache contained several gallons of ammonium nitrate in four separate containers, eight bundles of non-electric detonators with wiring and several bags of soil. **Phuket News (5/1/18)**


Thailand's IED activity in April was slightly elevated compared to the previous month. The coordinated attack on 9 APR during the Sungai Kolok Food Festival contributed to the increase of detonations this month. This attack is part of a growing trend of IED activity occurring in public areas that contain dense concentrations of civilian activity. Although coordinated attacks regularly occur in this region, the targeting of civilians instead of defense volunteers and teacher escorts is an uncommon tactic. Several civilian attacks occurred between January and March, to include the Yala Marketplace bombing, Super 4 department store incendiary bombing, and the employment of bicycle-borne water bottle IEDs. Insurgents have employed the water bottle IED TTP on several instances, likely because of the ease associated to the emplacement of such a device. In the coming months, it is likely that IED activity will remain steady following the overall trend this year, though there may be a rise in targeting civilian population centers and public establishments.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	5	2	0	0	7
	Year	129	31	3	37	839
Event Count	Month	5	1	0	1	7
	Year	85	14	3	1	103



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Indonesia: April IED Events





There was one IED cache event.

On 26 APR, Selayar Island and Water Police recovered an IED cache from a Malaysian-flagged ship in the southern waters of Selayar. The boat contained 2,400 sacks (approximately 50 tons) of ammonium nitrate in the ship's cargo hold. Police believe the ammonium nitrate would have been used to build IEDs for blast fishing. **Maritime News (4/26/18)**

IED activity in Indonesia remains low. The IED cache event in Indonesia this month is not a unique event. Malaysian-flagged ships have been known to smuggle ammonium nitrate into Indonesia for the purposes of blast fishing; a fishing technique that fisherman use illegally throughout Southeast Asia. The Selayar Islands are a known transit point for ammonium nitrate smugglers. There have been several ammonium nitrate interdiction events in the area, such as the 2016 incident that included 30 tons a 2010 event that intercepted 12 tons.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	0	0	0	0	0
	Year	6	1	1	102	11
Event Count	Month	0	0	0	1	1
	Year	6	1	1	10	18



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Malaysia: April IED Events



There was one IED detonation event and one IED hoax event.



On 15 APR, a premature IED detonation wounded two fishermen in Jeli, Kelantan. The fishermen were handling the device, which they likely intended to use for blast fishing in a nearby river, when the device prematurely detonated. Police are investigating the incident. **Malay Mail Online (4/16/18) My Metro (4/15/18)**

On 20 APR, Sarawak Police responded to an IED hoax at the Metro City commercial center in Matang, Perak after an employee reported it to the police. Police described the hoax device as a plastic container containing “a bomb-like wire.” The hoax device did not include any explosives. The Sarawak Police bomb squad used a robot to retrieve the device, move it to a safe distance, and then to render it safe. **I Love KCH (4/20/18) New Sarawak Tribune (4/20/18)**

IED activity in Malaysia remains consistently low. The IED events this month reflect the IED environment in Malaysia, where most IED events are associated with criminal activity. While the nature of Malaysian IED activity is unlikely to change in the near to mid-term, extremist elements in Malaysia still operate within the country.

In April, Thai authorities arrested two members of a Malaysia-Thai ISIS-inspired cell, further disrupting the group's activities. Two of the assessed original ten members remain. Authorities believe that the cell planned to attack non-Muslim places of worship.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	1	0	1	0	2
	Year	7	1	2	56	66
Event Count	Month	1	0	1	0	2
	Year	5	1	2	7	15



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Northeast Asia: April Significant Activity

China

On 1 APR, Afghanistan media reports surfaced that the Afghan Army killed two Chinese militants and five Taliban on 30 MAR in an Afghan National Army operation that took place in the Badakhshan region (the 76km border between Afghanistan and Xinjiang, China). The Afghan government claims there are as many as 21 militant groups operating in Afghanistan, including the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a separatist organization formed by Uighurs. The Afghan Army identified one of the dead Chinese fighters as man named Mustafa, who is purportedly the deputy leader of a Chinese militant group (the sources declined to call the group ETIM). A Taliban representative refuted the Afghan Army assertion that Chinese nationals were among those killed. China is concerned that Badakhshan could become a base for ETIM and cause more unrest in Xinjiang. **South China Morning Post (4/11/18) The Frontier Post (4/1/18)**

On 11 APR, Maj-Gen Tun Myat Naing, leader of the Arakan Army (AA) stated in a press interview that efforts by China to warn the AA (one of several armed ethnic separatist groups in Northern Burma) and other Northern Alliance member groups not to work with the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) were unwarranted. Naing dismissed Chinese claims that his group has ties to ARSA. The AA leader speculated that parties interested in causing trouble with the peace process (i.e., the Burmese government and military) may have sought to mislead China with incorrect information about associations between AA or other Northern Alliance members and ARSA. Naing stated that AA is "an ethnic armed organization fighting for national demands; none of us [ethnic groups in the Northern Alliance] would support jihadists who fight for religious causes." In other words, the AA leader opined that the Chinese do not have to worry about AA and other Northern Alliance groups dealing with ARSA – they are fundamentally different groups with different goals. These reassurances are helpful to continue good relations with China (a desire of the AA), which seeks to benefit from modernization efforts in Burma because of the Chinese Belt Road Initiative. **Irrawaddy (4/11/18)**

IED Calendar

The IED calendar was established to help our audience maintain awareness of events, such as anniversaries of major attacks, or political, religious or cultural events that often coincide (or can potentially coincide) with a spike in IED events.

	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
7 APR (IND): ULFA Raising Day 13-15 APR (THA): Thai New Year (Songkran) 28 APR (THA): Anniversary of 2004 Krue Se Mosque Incident 5 MAY (IND): Pooram Day 16 MAY (WW): Ramadan begins 28 MAY (IND): Anniversary of 2002 Kaluchak Attack 29 MAY (NEP): National Day 9 JUN (BUR): Anniversary of Ceasefire of KIA 9-15 JUN (IND): Jan Pituri Week 14 JUN (WW): Ramadan Ends	1	2	3	4	5	6	7 IND
	8	9	10	11	12	13 THA	14 THA
	15 THA	16	17	18	19	20	21
	22	23	24	25	26	27	28 THA
	29	30	1	2	3	4	5 IND
	May 2018	6	7	8	9	10	11
13		14	15 WW	16 WW	17 WW	18 WW	19 WW
20 WW		21 WW	22 WW	23 WW	24 WW	25 WW	26 WW
27 WW		28 IND WW	29 NEP WW	30 WW	31 WW	1 WW	2 WW
June 2018	3 WW	4 WW	5 WW	6 WW	7 WW	8 WW	9 IND BUR WW
	10 IND WW	11 IND WW	12 IND WW	13 IND WW	14 IND WW	15 IND	16
	17	18	19	20	21	22	23
	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

IND – India
THA – Thailand
NEP – Nepal
BUR – Burma
WW – Worldwide

Common Terms and Acronyms

AN – Ammonium Nitrate	PCB – Printed Circuit Board
ANFO – Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil	PN – Partner Nation
ARMM – Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao	PPIED – Pressure Plate IED
CIV – Civilian	QRF – Quick Response Force
CBRN – Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear	RCIED – Radio Controlled IED
COIN – Counter-insurgency	RCP – Route Clearance Patrols
CWIED – Command Wire IED	RPG – Rocket Propelled Grenade
DTMF – Dual-Tone Multi-Frequency	SA – South Asia
EFP – Explosively Formed Projectile	SAF – Small Arms Fire
EOD – Explosive Ordnance Disposal	SEA – Southeast Asia
F/C – Found & Cleared	SVBIED – Suicide Vehicle Borne IED
HME – Homemade Explosives	TATP – Triacetone Triperoxide
HN – Host Nation (Police, Military, Government)	TNT – Trinitrotoluene (C ₇ H ₅ N ₃ O ₆)
IDF – Indirect Fire	TTP – Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
IDP – Internally Displaced Persons	UXO – Unexploded Ordnance
IED – Improvised Explosive Device	VBIED – Vehicle Borne IED
KFR – Kidnap for Ransom	VEO – Violent Extremist Organization
KIA – Killed in Action	VOIED – Victim Operated IED
LOC – Line of Communication	WIA – Wounded in Action
LPG – Liquefied Petroleum Gas	
MSR – Main Supply Routes	
NFI – No Further Information	
NSTR – Nothing Significant To Report	
PBA – Post Blast Analysis	
PBIED – Personnel Borne (Suicide Bomb) IED	

Governments, Groups and Organizations

ASG – Abu Sayyaf Group	JMB – Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh
BIFF – Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters	JMJB – Jama'atul Muslim Janta Bangladesh
BIPP – Barisan Islam Perberbasan Patani	KIA – Kachin Independence Army
BRN-C – Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate	KIM – Khalifa Islamiya Mindanao
BSF – Border Security Forces	KIO – Kachin Independence Organization
BNP – Bangladesh National Party	LeT – Lashkar-e Tayyiba
BriMob – Mobile Brigade (Indonesia CT Forces)	MILF – Moro Islamic Liberation Front
CPI-M – Communist Party of India (Maoist)	MILF-SOG – MILF-Special Operations Group
CPN-M – Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)	MNLF – Moro National Liberation Front
CPP – Communist Party of the Philippines	NPA – New People's Army
CRPF – Central Reserve Police Force (India)	PNP – Philippine National Police
GMIP – Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Patani	POLRI – Indonesian National Police
HM – Hizb-ul-Mujahideen	PULO – Patani United Liberation Organization
HNLC – Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (India)	RAB – Rapid Action Battalion (Bangladesh)
HUJI-B – Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami Bangladesh	RKK – Runda Kumpulan Kecil
IB – India's Intelligence Bureau	SJMM – Samyukta Jatiya Mukti Morcha
IM – Indian Mujahideen	SJTMM – Samyukta Jana Tantrik Terai Mukti Morcha
IrW – Irregular Warfare	ULFA – United Liberation Front of Assam
ISI – Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan)	UWSA – United Wa State Army
ISIS – Islamic State of Iraq ash Sham	YCL – Youth Communist League
JAT – Jemaah Ansharout Tauhid	
Ji – Jemaah Islamiya	
JTMM – Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha	
JIB – Jemaat-e-Islami Bangladesh	
JeM – Jaish-e-Mohammed	