



Asia-Pacific Counter-IED Fusion Center

Monthly IED Activity Report



DOI: 31 March 2018

About the APCFC

The Asia-Pacific C-IED Fusion Center is the premier center for irregular warfare analysis in the U.S. Pacific Command. The center develops and synchronizes C-IED and EOD programs and regional engagements. The center resources USARAPC C-IED training to ensure U.S., Allied, and Partner Nations survivability.



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
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
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Executive Summary: In March, there were 65 IED events within the Asia-Pacific region, consisting of 28 detonation, 14 found/cleared, and 23 cache events. Compared to February, there were 43% fewer IED events and roughly half the number of IED-related casualties this month. This drop in activity is attributed to a decrease in violent extremist IED attacks in both South and Southeast Asia. Additionally, there were no reported IED events in Northeast Asia in March.

There were 65 IED events in the Asia-Pacific region in March 2018




Icons depict events for March 2018; heat map depicts event density from March 2017 - March 2018



This document is limited to those personnel performing military, intelligence, law enforcement, or security duties in support of C-IED operations.

March Asia-Pacific IED Events by Region



Executive Summary (Continued)

SOUTH ASIA


In South Asia, IED activity decreased from 76 events in February to 46 events in March. Despite this drop, there was a 16% increase in IED-related casualties. In Bangladesh, IED events remained the same as last month (six IED events), although, IED-related casualties dropped by 69% in March (**see pg. 9**). In India, IED activity decreased by 37% from February, however, IED-related casualties increased by 63% in March (**see pg. 10**). In Nepal, despite a 57% drop in IED events this month, IED-related casualties were twice as high compared to February (**see pg. 11**).

SOUTHEAST ASIA



In Southeast Asia, IED activity decreased from 38 events in February to 19 events in March. IED-related casualties also decreased, down 91% from last month. In the Philippines, IED events dropped by 12% from the previous month (15 total IED events) and there was a 64% decrease in IED-related casualties in March (**see pg. 13**). In Thailand, there were two IED events and two IED-related casualties this month, compared to 11 IED events and 22 casualties in February (**see pg. 14**). In Burma, there were 2 IED events (a 75% drop from February) and no IED-related casualties (**see pg. 15**).

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from OPEN SOURCES are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations. Event refers to specific IED activity categories: IED Detonation, IED Found/Cleared, IED Hoax, IED Cache.

PACOM IED Events - Past 12 Months



Icons depict events from March 2017 to March 2018; occasional overlap occurs




Legend for Casualty Count: CIV KIA (purple), CIV WIA (orange), HN KIA (light blue), HN WIA (yellow)

South Asia witnesses the highest level of IED events in the region, primarily due to India's high activity. IED activity across the region is often centered around periods of political unrest or contested elections. Devices thrown or emplaced during those outbreaks of violence vary widely in complexity (e.g. basic, command-wire to radio-controlled) and lethality.


Southeast Asia sees approximately half the activity of South Asia, with the Philippines and Thailand as the primary contributors to the number of events. While Thailand's IED activity is primarily attributable to Muslim-Malay insurgents in the south, the Philippines faces communist, jihadist, and Moro separatist threats. By comparison, attacks in Indonesia and Malaysia are far less frequent.

Northeast Asia sees relatively few IED attacks and they can often be attributed to an individual's act of protest against an employer, the government, or retaliation against an acquaintance. Disaffected groups, such as the Uyghurs in China, occasionally incorporate IEDs in their attacks. Press reporting from the region is limited and generally unreliable, therefore actual events are likely higher than shown here.

Past Year IED events by Country




Past Year Device Count by Country




IED Activity - Past 12 Months

Switch Type



Group Affiliation



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics are presumed to be approximations. Graphics represent known switch type and group affiliation.

Incident Highlight: Emerging Trends in Burma RCIEDs

On 24 FEB, three IEDs detonated in the Rakhine State capital of Sittwe, in western Burma. The coordinated IED attack targeted three separate local government sites. Burmese Security Forces investigating the IED attacks reported that they found three additional RCIEDs incorporating directional fragmentation charges (DFC), utilizing fragmentation plates fashioned out of ball bearings and scrap metal (pictured, top-right).



24 FEB - DFC RCIED, with small black switch highlighted in red and marked "573"

The emergence of the TTPs used in the Sittwe IEDs are evidence of an evolving IED threat landscape in Rakhine State. Over the last year, RCIED technology has been observed several times in Rakhine, but it has always been relatively rudimentary; the Sittwe IEDs appear more sophisticated than previous examples. The integration of fragmentation (generally) and DFC (specifically) is most effective as an anti-personnel IED TTP; targeting of civilians is unusual in Burma, though TTPs use in the attack seem to indicate civilians were the intended targets. The sophistication of these emerging TTPs reinforce government claims that the Rakhine Buddhist nationalist, Arakan National Council (ANC) (not the Muslim ARSA) was likely behind the recent attacks in Sittwe; several suspects in the ANC were arrested in March.

Prior to these recent TTP developments in Rakhine, extremely similar RCIED TTPs were being observed in Kachin State (going back to at least 2016); this raises the possibility that the Sittwe IEDs show evidence of TTP migration, as the ANC is allied with organizations in the Northern Alliance (specifically the Arakan Army) operating in Kachin State. Escalating Buddhist extremist operations against the local government in Rakhine illustrate how complex the ethno-militant ecosystem remains in Rakhine, though it remains unknown what is driving these emerging TTPs. It is clear, however, that increased TTP sharing between Buddhist-nationalist groups is occurring and these linkages could have a significant impact on the overall threat environment.



December 2016 - RCIEDs recovered in Kachin State (left); September 2017, similar RC switches recovered in Sittwe, Rakhine State (right)

Sources: Terrogence (3/18/18) The Irrawaddy (7/10/17) Janes (3/2/18) MIPS (3/18) The Diplomat (3/7/18) Irrawaddy (3/28/18) Dhaka Tribune (3/30/18)

Special Assessment: The Subterranean Battlespace

Introduction: Subterranean Usage in Warfare

Since the age of the Roman Empire, armies and insurgents have employed subterranean warfare as a means to gain a tactical advantage in battle. From the siege of Constantinople, to the U.S. Civil War, to both World Wars and the Vietnam War, to the modern day conflict zones of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria, the subterranean battlespace has proven to be a critical operational environment. Although the specific motivations for forces to build and use subterranean systems (see Figure 1) continues to evolve, they are likely to remain a key dimension of the battlespace going forward.

Violent extremist organizations and state actors in the Asia-Pacific region have historically and continue to employ and plan for subterranean warfare activities. In the Asia Pacific, violent extremist organizations (VEOs) on the Indian-Pakistan border, western Burma, and the southern Philippines have recently been observed using subterranean systems that are either a part of existing civil works or, these groups have constructed their own tunnel and cave systems.

In India's Jammu and Kashmir, India has accused Pakistani terrorists of building tunnels to infiltrate the Line of Control (LoC) between India and Pakistan. Over the last ten years, Indian security forces have discovered at least four suspected infiltration tunnels on the Indian side of the LoC (Indian forces discovered the most recent tunnel in September 2017). In 2012, Indian security forces uncovered a sophisticated tunnel that penetrated the LoC by 400 meters and incorporated ventilation pipes. Recent discoveries revealed tunnels of a diminutive size (approximately 2.5 x 2.5 feet); however, they ended in India less than 20 meters from the LoC.



India—infiltration tunnel entrance

In Burma, security forces claimed in November 2017 to have found several artificial cave complexes built by suspected Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) insurgents in Rakhine State. These caves appeared to have served as concealed bunkers. The one pictured on the right had a tunnel entrance of 4 feet high by 3 feet wide. About 30 feet from the tunnel's entrance, the tunnel split into two tunnels, each 40 feet long and with 2 feet wide of human living space along each side of the tunnel. However, the right tunnel had a 5 x 5 feet empty space at the end that seemed to have served as a living space while the left tunnel led to an exit to the outside. Burmese security forces estimated that this cave could have accommodated between 20 – 25 persons.



Burma—tunnel living space

In the Philippines, ISIS Philippines (ISIS-PHL) used subterranean systems to move throughout Marawi during the five-month siege of the city. As the conflict progressed and the Philippine military advanced on ISIS-PHL, militants leveraged pre-existing civil subterranean structures (i.e. sewers) and dug tunnels to enable movement from one building to another. This often required the digging of tunnels through concrete floors, sometimes up to eight inches thick. These tunnels, which were approximately 5 feet deep, would then be connected to the city's sewer system, allowing them to conceal their movement into another nearby building.

A more pressing concern in the Asia-Pacific for the U.S. and allies are the Underground Facilities (UGFs) built and used by nation states, primarily the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and China. These networks conceal military activities, which ultimately presents a range of complex and difficult challenges in both peacetime and war. One example of a subterranean system that could be difficult to defeat is the "Underground Great Wall of China," which is the informal name for the vast system of tunnels used to store and transport mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Estimates approximate the tunnels to stretch over 3,000 miles, which provides China with its credible second-strike capability.

The DPRK has steadily constructed UGFs and tunnels since the 1960s. The use of subterranean systems suits the North Korean self-imposed philosophy of a creating a fortress nation, as well as DPRK's expressed intent to invade South Korea again for the purpose of peninsula reunification. The DPRK has constructed a vast array of subterranean systems that include the following: simple tunnels under the demilitarized zone (DMZ), hardened artillery sites, command and control (C2) facilities, underground airstrips and hangars, military storage facilities, munitions sites, and nuclear testing sites. By emplacing key components of its government C2 and materiel within UGFs, the DPRK can plan for both a prolonged defensive siege and for a rapid offensive strike into South Korea via tunnels with supporting artillery fires.

CATEGORIES	Category 1. TUNNELS, NATURAL CAVITIES, AND CAVES		Category 2. URBAN SUBSURFACE SYSTEMS		Category 3. UNDERGROUND FACILITIES (Military Purposed)	
	Rudimentary	Sophisticated	Substructures	Civil Works	Shallow	Deep
Subcategories Description	Lack of Shoring.	Shoring; Basic Amenities.	Basements, Sewers, Parking Garages.	Subways, Sewers, Aqueducts.	Silos, Bunkers (<20m)	Military Bases (>20m)
Functions	Civil: Commercial Operations, Transportation, Storage. Enemy: C2, Operations, Storage, Production, Protection.				C2, Operations, Storage, Production, Protection.	
Supporting Amenities/Infrastructure	Power Cords, Small Generators, Lights, Ventilation Shafts, Small Pumps		Electrical Power, Transportation Corridors, Life Support systems, Environmental Controls, Communications Lines. <i>*Internal Redundancies May Exist Allowing The Facility To Operate For Extended Periods Independent From External Support</i>			
Common Threats	Personnel, Improvised Explosive Devices, Traps, Direct Fire methods.				Military Offensive and Defensive Measures.	
Common Hazards	Environmental (Poor Air Quality, Dangerous Gases, Wildlife), Materiel (Munitions, Fuels), Structural Integrity.					

Figure 1: Subterranean Environmental Categories from U.S. Army Subterranean Operations, 2018.

Special Assessment: The Subterranean Battlespace

Challenges for Future Intelligence and Operations in the Subterranean Environment: Planning for Subterranean as a Dimension of Battlespace

While nation state subterranean systems can be incredibly complex, it is important to note that the most challenging subterranean facilities are not necessarily the most complex. Small tunnels connecting to vast networks can be as problematic and lethal to U.S. and allied forces at the tactical level as more complex UGFs. Soldiers, insurgents, and terrorists can hide, raid, and harry U.S. and allied forces from simple tunnel systems. Finding and clearing these tunnels is time and resource-intensive and requires special equipment and trained personnel to be done relatively safely and quickly. At the operational and strategic levels, complex underground headquarters, C2, and weapons of mass destruction facilities in places like the DPRK are the most high-value targets and would need to be secured in any conflict scenario.




Figure 2: Tactical tunnel system in the jungle

Detecting the existence of tunnels and more complex UGFs requires multiple intelligence disciplines, and thorough terrain analysis to find evidence of construction and usage. U.S. Army FM 3-06, Urban Operations, describes the complexities of missions in urban areas, including subterranean, and the inclusion of the “vertical” into any battlespace visualization. Making a subsurface area overlay can facilitate this analysis and mission planning. Geospatial Intelligence can be used to detect roads (that seem to lead nowhere), paths, foot/vehicle traffic, and utility lines leading to UGFs. Evidence of construction may be detected on imagery in the form of extra dirt piled up, dirt colored differently than surrounding soil, tracks from carts hauling dirt away, etc. Buildings that seem too small for the amount of vehicles parked outside them, or with unusual heat signatures are also possibly entries to UGFs.




Figure 3: Tactical tunnel system in an urban environment

Hazards of reconnoitering UGFs are extensive and include: booby traps, lack of ambient light for older night vision goggles, presence of poisonous wildlife (the Viet Cong placed snakes in tunnels, for example), loss of breathable air, presence of noxious chemicals, threat of collapse, entrapment by the enemy, and the psychological effects of operating in close spaces.

In recent conflicts, U.S. forces have developed TTPs for clearing subterranean spaces in populated areas, including the use of robotics, dogs, cordon-and-search, and working with local populace for intelligence gathering. These TTPs, combined with older clearing methods of Vietnam-era Tunnel Rats and World War Two-era use of incendiary devices are a response to continuous adaptation to the use of sub-

terranean facilities by enemy forces. While the modern response to defeating military subterranean systems is likely to be aerial bombardment, this tactic may not always be effective in the case of hardened and deeply buried targets (HDBTs) and could incur larger amounts of collateral damage in urban environments, chemical contamination, and loss of valuable intelligence.

Conclusion

Subterranean warfare is as relevant today as ever in human history, and many of the lessons from previous conflicts can help mission planners prepare for military operations in complex urban and dispersed tunnel network battlespaces. The use of the subterranean environment for war-support activities like storage, sanctuary, and materiel production as well as for assault and defense is very likely to increase as technologically inferior forces like insurgents, terrorists, and antiquated militaries challenge the U.S. and its allies in future conflicts.

Sources: Washington Post (11/29/11) NPGS (12/13) CTC (9/14) USMC Reference Publication 12-10B.1 (5/16) Indian Express (2/14/17) NDTV (9/30/17) GMA (11/4/17) National Interest (11/6/17) Mizzima (11/7/17) US Army ATP 3-06/MCTP 12-10B (12/17) US Army ATP 3-21.51 (2/18)

Person of Interest / VEO of Interest

POI: Jose Maria Canlas Sison



ALIAS: Joma Sison; Jose Canlas Sison; Armando Liwanag; Amado Guerrero
DOB: 08 Feb 1939 **AREA OF OPERATIONS:** Philippines; Netherlands
CURRENT LOCATION: Netherlands **AFFILIATIONS:** Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP); New People's Army (NPA); National Democratic Front (NDF)

Jose Sison is the founder of the CPP and an important figurehead for the NPA. He graduated from the University of the Philippines in 1959 and later studied in Indonesia. Returning to the Philippines as a literature and political science professor, Sison advocated for socialism throughout the 1960s. He formed the CPP on 26 DEC 1968 and co-founded the NPA military wing the following year. Since 1988, Sison has been living in self-imposed exile in the Netherlands. A recent declaration by Philippine President Duterte may force the Dutch Parliament to call Sison's status in the Netherlands into question.

At the start of President Rodrigo Duterte's term in May 2016, there was renewed energy and enthusiasm for peace talks with the CPP. This renewed energy stemmed in part from the warm relationship Sison once shared with Duterte, who studied under the former professor at the University of the Philippines. However, peace talks soured over the past year as the NPA engaged in numerous cease-fire violations. On 5 DEC 2017, President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 374, designating the CPP, the NPA, and Sison as terrorists – a move that will likely reduce the efficacy of peace negotiations between Manila and the CPP/NPA, which have been stalled since July 2017.

Sison's influence over CPP/NPA decision making and strategy and operations remains uncertain. Rarely is there an NPA attack that does not at least attempt to invoke Sison as the CPP/NPA's revolutionary leader. However, as recently as 2017, Sison claimed that "he does not exercise control over the [CPP's] armed component [NPA]." Despite currently stalled talks, as Manila moves from negotiating with regional CPP/NPA rebel components to negotiating with national CPP/NPA institutions, Sison's role will likely continue to be indirect. Sison's influence continues to gravitate towards historical relationships with the CPP, which could influence the political calculus of NPA attack operations moving forward.

Sources: New York Times (1989) CCTN TV (11/27/17) Official Gazette (12/5/17) Stanford University (8/24/15) Insights-Philippines (2004) Geni (10/22/26) Rappler (3/9/18) Tempo (5/10/17) BannetThought.net (7/30/70) Manilla Times (2/8/18) PhilStar (3/28/18)

VEO: The Northern Alliance

The Northern Alliance (NA) is a coalition of four ethnic insurgent groups operating primarily in Kachin, Shan, Karen, and Rakhine States. The groups included in the coalition are the Arakan Army (AA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). Of the four groups, the KIA is the largest and oldest (see January 2018 VEO of Interest). The four groups have an approximate combined strength of over 20,000 fighters, who employ both regular and irregular means to fight against the Burmese Army (Tatmadaw).



According to the NA, their primary goals are to create a federal democratic union and to secure, through armed means, the rights of ethnic minority peoples from the Burmese government. The NA has also stated that they must protect the ethnic minority groups in Burma from the Tatmadaw to prevent human rights violations and extra-judicial killings. Likewise, they cite the on-going ground attacks and air strikes conducted by the Tatmadaw, in addition to widespread reports of gang rape and other rights violations, as reasons why they refuse to lay down arms. Groups in the NA use conventional military tactics and equipment, as well as IEDs and guerilla tactics to primarily target Tatmadaw, though recent attacks highlight the possibility that the attacks may also target civilian and government institutions or individuals. Though unconfirmed, it is possible that groups within the NA were responsible for the IED detonation at a bank in Lashio, Shan State and several other attacks in Rakhine State (see Device Highlight).

Starting in January 2016, the Burmese government has been engaged in brokering peace deals with several armed ethnic groups, ultimately convening the 21st Century Panglong Conference in August 2016. One of the requirements for groups to participate in the peace process is the adoption of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), which mandates disarmament. This has been the primary sticking point for the peace process with the NA and its allies. The NA has requested mediation by Chinese officials through their ally, the United Wa State Army (UWSA); the government has been receptive, but only if the NA disarms and signs the NCA.

At this point, it is unclear if the NA will be able or willing to lay down arms, as violence has been on the rise following the killing of seven demonstrators in Mrauk U, Rakhine State. The demonstrators were commemorating the 233rd anniversary of the fall of the Arakan Kingdom to the ethnic Burmese; several ethnic Arakanese individuals attempted to take control of a local government office and security forces fired into a crowd. With violent incidents, such as the firing on civilians and the detonation of IEDs, continuing to occur it seems unlikely that a peaceful solution will be reached without external mediation.

Sources: BurmaLink Northern Alliance Myanmar Peace Monitor (2016) Irrawaddy (9/6/16) Diplomat (9/9/16) RFA (1/24/17) Diplomat (3/4/17) Diplomat (5/15/17) Frontier Myanmar (5/25/17) Diplomat (5/31/17) Diplomat (1/8/18) NYT (2/21/18) Diplomat (3/7/18) Irrawaddy (3/19/18) Irrawaddy (3/29/18)

South Asia: March Significant Activity

Bangladesh

On 21 MAR, Bangladeshi authorities arrested two suspected Neo-Jamaat-ul Mujahideen (Neo-JMB) militants from Shibganj, Bogra; immediately after arrest, the militants were transferred to the custody of the Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crimes (CTTC) unit. The militants, identified as Hadisur Rahman Sagor and Akram Hossain Niloy were reportedly involved in some of the most significant Neo-JMB activities over the last two years. Sagor allegedly supplied weapons and explosives for the Holey Artisan Bakery attack in July 2016, and Niloy allegedly financed the Mourning Day procession bombing plot in August 2017. **Benar News (3/22/18)**

India

In the first eleven days of March, 10 Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA) militants surrendered to Indian authorities following the death of their commander, Sohan D Shira, following a small arms encounter with police on 25 FEB. On 1 MAR, the first militant surrendered, later revealing that only 10 personnel had been protecting Shira on the night of his death. There were rumors that the United Liberation Front of Assam – Independent (ULFA-I) would take control of Shira's outfit, since one of their experienced commanders had been working with the group. By 11 MAR, the remaining GNLA members had surrendered, saying that Dristi Rajkhowa—the ULFA-I commander and explosives expert—was disturbed by Shira's death, reportedly blaming poor sentry duty, and slipped away one night without telling the rest of the GNLA group. **Shillong Times (2/25/18) (3/1/18) (3/11/18) (3/12/18)**

On 12 MAR, Indian press reported on the revival on Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) in Jammu and Kashmir, estimating there were currently over 70 active JeM militants conducting various high-profile attacks. Security experts said the hanging of Afzal Guru—a famed Kashmiri militant who attacked the Indian parliament in 2001—led to the creation of JeM's notorious "Afzal Guru" squad, which in turn fueled its growth. Combined with the deaths of many Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen leaders, JeM was able to achieve quick growth, particularly after being considered inoperative for the last several years. Experts anticipate as 2018 progresses, JeM may resort to kidnappings to raise funds, along with continuing the fidayeen and IED attacks. **Economic Times (3/12/18)**

On 25 MAR, press reported on a Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) request to the central government for technical surveillance powers to be used in counter-insurgency. As a paramilitary force, the CRPF is now allowed to tap phones or conduct surveillance through the Internet or social media. Though some state police forces have best-in-class surveillance facilities, the CRPF wanted similar authorities to have independent, real-time intelligence collection. The issue has reportedly been raised before, and may have been raised again in response to the recent deaths of CRPF personnel traveling in an MPV that was targeted by a large IED. Senior officials said approval remained unlikely, questioning the effectiveness of such collection in preventing Maoist activity due to their hesitancy to use modern communication platforms. **Times of India (3/25/18)**

Maldives

In the first week of March, Maldivian authorities arrested a civilian, Abdullah Fahmy, who was attempting to conduct trade with a North Korea-flagged vessel in the waters off Gaafu Dhaalu atoll. Fahmy has been charged with several offenses, including attempting to overthrow the government, terrorism, bribery, and the forging of official documents. In late February, Japanese authorities reported seeing Fahmy's Maldives-flagged vessel, *Xin Yuan 18*, alongside the North Korea-flagged tanker, *Chon Ma San*, in the East China Sea. It is suspected they were conducting illegal trade in direct violation of UN sanctions. **Mihaaru (3/10/18)**


On 16 MAR, the largest opposition rally in almost two years erupted in Malé over recent government actions, to include refusal to uphold the decision of the Supreme Court, the restriction of freedom of speech, and the forceful removal/arrest of opposition lawmakers. Though an exact number of protesters arrested is unknown, police detained at least 141 civilians after using teargas to break up the rally. **Mihaaru (3/17/18)**

On 22 MAR, President Yameen lifted the 45-day State of Emergency. The government had declared the State of Emergency after the Supreme Court ruled to pardon and release of political prisoners (primarily opposition law makers) in February; President Yameen quickly labelled this an attempted coup. In response, police arrested former President Gayoom and several members of the Judicial Branch for their role in the alleged coup plot. Gayoom has been charged with bribery, and 10 other lawmakers have been charged with various offenses including terrorism and bribery. **MI (3/20/18) Mihaaru (3/26/18)**

Sri Lanka

On 6 MAR, the Sri Lankan government declared a State of Emergency due to Buddhist-Muslim clashes following the death of a Buddhist truck driver allegedly attacked by Muslims. Days of riots and protests involved destruction of property and violent attacks on civilians. Despite the State of Emergency, attacks on members of the Muslim community continued, with some reports indicating that members of the police may have been aiding the attacks. A CCTV video released to media outlets reportedly showed members of an elite unit assaulting Muslim religious leaders in Kandy district. The Minister of Law and Order accused the hardline group Podujana Peramuna for the violence. **Dhaka Tribune (3/6/18) al-Jazeera (3/26/18)**

Bangladesh: March IED Events



There were three IED detonation events, one IED found and cleared event, and two IED cache events.

On 5 MAR, Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) operatives recovered an IED cache following a firefight with Hasan Bahini gang members in Padma, Patharghata, Barguna, Barisal. The cache contained two single-barrel guns, four pipe guns, 39 bullets, explosives, and bladed weapons. **Dhaka Tribune (3/5/18) Prothom Alo (3/5/18)**


On 7 MAR, Dhaka Bomb Disposal responded to a premature IED detonation at a residence in Burichong, Comila, Chittagong; two possible bomb makers were injured in the blast, and later detained by police. **Daily Star (3/10/18)**

On 13 MAR, police recovered an IED cache during a raid of a suspected Neo-JMB hideout in Dighapatia, Natore, Rajshahi; four suspects were detained. The cache contained five hand bombs, five "cocktail bombs" (Molotov cocktails), 28 Electric crackers, 3 liters of petrol, 100g of granulated sulfur, one machete, two daggers, one laptop, one unregistered motorcycle, four Jihadi books, and other unspecified items. **Dhaka Tribune (3/13/18) UNB News (3/13/18)**

On 19 MAR, Dhaka Metropolitan Police EOD found and cleared two IEDs from a shopping mall in Tanha Plaza, Gulshan-Badda road, Badda, Dhaka. An individual had reportedly left the bag outside a shop. **BDNews24 (3/19/18) Daily Star (3/19/18)**


On 28 MAR, an IED detonated after two children stepped on it in New Jhautala, Chittagong; two children were injured. Police described the IED as a crude bomb wrapped in red tape. **Daily Star (3/29/18) Daily Star (3/29/18)**

Past Year IED Events by Type



During the month of March, most IED activity in Bangladesh was not militant related. There was only one militant-related IED event this month: an IED cache that was discovered during a raid of a Neo-JMB hideout. Militant-initiated IED activity in Bangladesh appears to be on the downtrend; though there have been reports of IEDs and suicide vests being recovered or detonated defensively during raids, the last reported offensive IED attack by Neo-JMB occurred on 24 MAR 17.


Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



In addition to the IED caches recovered nearly every month, this downtrend is likely a result of a series of high-profile counterterrorism arrests by Bangladesh security forces (see **SA SIGACTs**). Going forward, one factor that may upend the security gains Bangladesh has made is the ongoing Rohingya crisis they have inherited. Since 25 AUG 17, Bangladesh has received an influx of 700,000 Rohingya refugees from Burma. With no end to the crisis in sight, many of these refugees live in destitute conditions and are at risk of being co-opted by transnational terror VEOs.

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

India: March IED Events



There were 18 IED detonation events, two IED found and cleared events, and 11 IED cache events.


On 2 MAR, a cache of explosives and other materials were seized during an anti-Maoist operation conducted by a joint team of security forces in Pujari Kanker, Bijapur, Chhattisgarh. Security forces engaged a Maoist camp with small arms fire and recovered a cache of weapons, explosives, and other Maoist materials. At least 10 Maoists, (including 6 women) were killed in the operation. **India.com (3/3/18)**

On 6 MAR, multiple IED detonations occurred throughout the border area of India-Myanmar, Manipur. Sources reported that the United Liberation Front (UNLF) claimed responsibility for one of the three detonations, but due to the proximity and timing, the possibility of the events being related is considerably high. **The New Indian Express (3/7/18) News18 (3/7/18)**

On 13 MAR, a 50kg IED detonated against a 212th Battalion Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) patrol by Maoists along the Kistaram-Palodi road of Sukma, Chhattisgarh. At least nine CRPF personnel were killed and two injured while travelling in a Mine Protected Vehicle (MPV). Although CRPF already created countermeasures to the Maoist tactic of targeting vehicles along main roads, there were reports that the patrol ignored standard operating procedures and intelligence of activity in the area. **Business Standard (3/13/18) First Post (3/13/18)**


On 25 MAR, the 199th CRPF and local police found and cleared a 5kg IED near Keshtul, Bijapur, Chhattisgarh. The IED incorporated a tiffin lunchbox and was buried by Maoists under a road. **India Today (3/25/18)**

Past Year IED Events by Type



Overall IED activity has decreased in relation to previous months and has returned to a near baseline state. The decrease is primarily due to the elections ending in the northeast and reduced attacks in the Jammu and Kashmir region, but activity in the Red Corridor remains steady and unceasing.

Past Year IED Event Casualty Count




The attack against the 212th CRPF MPV where nine CRPF members were killed and two injured is significant but not uncommon for this region. Typical Maoist TTPs include burying IEDs in locations used or defended by security forces for road construction crews. Although the CRPF has seen much scrutiny over the use of the MPV in Naxal-influenced areas, the CRPF will more than likely take their time to re-evaluate their standard procedures and the current threat picture. This does not represent a change in Maoist TTPs and it is likely that this attack will prompt the CRPF review their SOPs.


The majority of events that occurred in the northeast were attributed to activity from the UNLF and GNLA groups. GNLA activity has reportedly been on the decline for the past month, as reports of both multiple surrenders and low personnel counts surface. Rumors of remaining GNLA members being absorbed into the UNLF appear unsupported but not ruled out given the history of GNLA being formed from other disbanded groups.

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Nepal: March IED Events



Past Year IED Events by Type



There were two IED detonation events, and seven IED found and cleared events.

On 6 MAR, Nepal Army EOD found and cleared an IED from an irrigation canal in Chaurjahari-10 town, Rukum district, Rapti zone. Authorities suspect it was a war remnant. **Nepal Monitor (3/6/18)**

On 13 MAR, a joint EOD squad found and cleared a pressure cooker IED from underneath a vehicle parked in front of an elected official's residence in Kushma-1 town, Parbat district, Dhawalagiri zone. **Nepal Monitor (3/13/18)**

On 23 MAR, an IED detonated in a gold shop in Lahan town, Siraha district, Sagarmatha zone; six civilians were injured. The shop owner stated that the IED was left in the shop by an unknown rebel. **Nepal Monitor (3/23/18)**

On 25 MAR, a coordinated IED attack occurred that incorporated a roadside IED detonation and three IEDs found and cleared across various locations in Morang, Koshi. The detonation occurred near the vehicle carrying a Provincial Minister near Pathari-Sanischare town; two men on a motorcycle left the IED (concealed in a bag) on the road and fled the scene. Nepal Army EOD found and cleared three IEDs from Sunjhoda village in Urlabari-3, Hariyali Forest in Pathari-Sanischare-2, and Pathari-Sanischare-1. One suspect has been detained in the attack, and police are searching for other possible perpetrators; Netra Bikram Chand's CPN-M is suspected of planting the devices to enforce a travel ban. **Nepal Monitor (3/25/18)**

On 25 MAR, Nepal Army EOD found and cleared a roadside IED in Bhanuchowk market, Dharan town, Sunsari district, Koshi zone. Netra Bikram Chand's CPN-M is suspected of planting the device to enforce a travel ban. **Nepal Monitor (3/25/18)**

On 28 MAR, Nepal Army EOD found and cleared an IED on the premises of the District Court in Phungling town, Taplejung district, Mechi zone. Authorities suspect it may have been a war remnant. **Nepal Monitor (3/28/18)**

In March, IED events dropped from the previous month, though remained elevated compared to historical norms. The coordinated attack committed by suspected members of Netra Bikram Chand's CPN-M is very uncommon and increases concerns over improved operational planning and capabilities by the group. The events were meant to intimidate civilians during a travel strike (bandh), which has been called largely ineffective by the media. While violence has greatly reduced over the last three months, it is highly likely that low-level IED activity will continue due to political unrest and agitating by extremist groups, such as the CPN-M.

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Southeast Asia: March Significant Activity

Philippines

In the first two months of 2018, the New People's Army (NPA) continued to lose assets due to the latest operation by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) against the group. The military seized over 200 high-powered firearms and 155 IEDs from the rebels. Eastern Mindanao Command (Eastmincom) recorded the majority are confiscations from the NPA: a total of 165 firearms and 131 IEDs. The AFP will continue to conduct operations to weaken the armed capability of the terrorists and boost the Community Support Program to empower local government units to provide basic services and encourage more rebels to surrender. **Update Philippines (3/8/18)**

On 13 MAR, the United States gave six Boeing Insitu ScanEagle drones to the Philippines in a ceremony held at the Philippines Air Force Headquarters. The ScanEagle acquisition represents a boost for the Philippine military's capabilities. The Philippine military has a need for improving intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. This urgency was reinforced during the Marawi siege last year. The drones reinforce the importance of the U.S.-Philippine defense ties and this is a step to strengthen defense cooperation from both sides. **The Diplomat (3/13/18)**

On 19 MAR, President Duterte directed the Department of Environment and Natural Resource (DENR) to revoke the licenses and permits of mining companies violating explosive handling rules or reported to be supplying explosives to terrorist groups. He also ordered military or police personnel found violating rules on explosives to "face automatic expulsion." In the past, the President has threatened to shut mining companies "financing" of the NPA by paying revolutionary tax. **Rappler (3/20/18)**

Malaysia

In late March, Malaysian officials announced a series of arrests made from late-February through mid-March that led to the disruption of a Malaysian terror cell and the capture of an Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) mid-level leader. Members of the terror cell, which included two men working as janitors in Singapore, were planning to kidnap and kill policemen and attack non-Muslim houses of worship. In the first round of arrests on 27 FEB, three men were detained, with the main suspect being a 37-year-old technician who masterminded the plans to attack places of worship in the capital of Johor. He was also actively recruiting new, local militants. The second suspect, a 49-year-old security guard, was the cell's advisor, responsible for keeping the cell and its plans secret. He had also threatened to kill those who leaked secrets. The third suspect, a 30-year-old security guard, was tasked with acquiring firearms from a neighboring country (unidentified) and scouting for non-Muslim houses of worship to target. On 28 FEB, the fourth suspect, a 25-year-old waiter, was arrested. The fourth suspect reportedly had been ordered by the mastermind to kidnap and kill policemen. Finally, the fifth and sixth suspects, aged 23 and 22 were arrested on 1 MAR and worked as janitors in Singapore. One of them acted as the intermediary in the purchase of firearms for the cell. On 15 MAR, Malaysian police made an unrelated terror arrest in Sabah. The unidentified 31-year-old Filipino man who was arrested is reportedly a "trusted lieutenant" to Furuji Indama, the ASG's leader of Basilan, and may have also had ties to the late ISIS-PHL leader Dr. Mahmud Ahmad. He also was involved in kidnap-for-ransom activities and bomb making; he reportedly had planned to attack several locations in Sabah. **Straits Times (3/24/18)**

Burma

During a meeting on 23-26 MAR, Chinese representatives were said to warn members of the Northern Alliance not to cooperate or ally themselves with the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), purportedly because ARSA allies itself with Uyghur extremists. Though no sub-organizations were specifically mentioned, speculation arose that recent IED activity in Rakhine by the AA may have spurred the conversation. **Irrawaddy (4/2/18)**

On 27 MAR, youth across the border in Bangladesh received recruitment letters written in Burmese from the AA in Rakhine State. Members of the Bangladeshi government and security forces conducted a meeting to discuss the letters, assuring local youth not to panic. Some youth have already joined the cause, which is reportedly conducting 15 days of training in Rakhine starting on 31 MAR. The letters specifically targeted former members of the organization, also requesting they increase recruitment. **Dhaka Tribute (3/30/18)**

Thailand

In an effort to stop drugs, terrorists, and traffickers, Thailand and Malaysia plan to build an 11km wall along the 640km border in Dan Nok-Dan Sadao, Songkhla. Defense Minister Prawit Wongsuwon stated that at a recent General Border Committee meeting, along with the agreement to build a wall, officials are also preparing to handle the ongoing dual citizenship issue. Concerns about dual citizenship arose due to individuals suspected of carrying out attacks in southern Thailand and using Malaysia as a safe haven. Thailand and Malaysia have agreed to work together to mitigate terrorist threats in the region by planning to establish development projects to promote economic growth along the border, to increase border security by expanding joint operations, and to engage in information sharing. **Bangkok Post (3/16/18) Malaysian Insight (3/17/18)**

On 19 MAR, Thailand's Crime Suppression Division arrested a suspected bombmaker at Hat Yai train station in Songkhla. Muhamad Sagariya Damung (21) was arrested while heading from Bangkok to Pattani. Muhammad Sagariya is suspected of conspiring with four other individuals to conduct a coordinated IED attack in Bangkok and surrounding provinces in October of 2016. Officials also suspect he has been involved in other bombings in the southern province of Narathiwat. In total, 17 warrants have been issued for individuals tied to the case; 14 have been detained. Authorities are still searching for three other suspects: Usman Jaengor, the leader, Wae-arong Jaema, and Abdunase Awae. **Bangkok Post (3/20/18) Bangkok Post (3/19/18)**

Philippines: March IED Events



There were three IED detonation events, two IED found and cleared events, and 10 IED cache events.

On 1 MAR, security forces recovered an IED cache from two suspected NPA rebels in Lumbo, Valenica, Bukidnon, Northern Mindanao, Mindanao. The cache contained 21 improvised hand grenades, five improvised anti-personnel clamor mines, three PVC pipes, a 52-meter long electrical wire, 3kg soluble fertilizer, 200 grams of sulfur, 1kg ANFO (ammonium nitrite, fuel oil), four pieces dynamite, 60 pieces improvised electric blasting caps, 240 kilograms steel cut fragments (round bars), and a 370-meter safety fuse. **Manila Bulletin (3/3/18) Philippine Daily Inquirer (3/1/18)**


On 5 MAR, the Philippine Army recovered an IED cache in Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur, Davao, Mindanao following a small arms clash with NPA rebels. The firefight between 50 rebels and troops lasted 45-minutes and resulted in one soldier injured. The cache recovered contained one IED, one detonating cord, one backpack, and subversive documents with high intelligence value. The rebels were reportedly holding a mass gathering as part of their upcoming anniversary on 29 MAR. **Sun Star (3/6/18)**

On 21 MAR, authorities recovered an IED in front of a warehouse in Aguada, Isabela City, Basilan, Zamboanga, Basilan. The warehouse is owned by the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) District Engineer. The device was powered by a nine-volt dry cell battery with a rocker switch. Authorities recovered a cellular phone-triggered ammonium nitrate fuel oil (ANFO) pipe bomb, rigged with several one-inch concrete and common nails as shrapnel. On 1 FEB, an IED detonated at Undug's residence in barangay San Rafael, Isabela City. The ARMM Governor blamed the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) for this incident and said extortion was the motive. **Manila Bulletin (3/23/18)**


On 31 MAR, the Philippine Army recovered an IED cache following a small arms fire with ASG bandits in Taung, Patikul, Sulu, ARMM, Jolo, resulting in one detained. The cache contained one 7.62-mm FN-G1 rifle, some magazines and ammunition, suspected IEDs, and two hand grenades. A brief clash occurred between ASG and security forces who were on a search and rescue operation before the bandits fled leaving their leader behind who was injured from a previous clash. **Inquirer Mindanao (4/1/18)**

On 31 MAR, an IED detonated by NPA rebels against a Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit (CAFGU) night patrol in San Andres, Lopez, Quezon, Calabarzon, Luzon; two NPA were killed by the detonation. Prior to the detonation, the rebels opened fire on the unit resulting in one CAFGU injured. The encounter was designed to divert the attention of government forces who were busy securing the area for Catholic devotees observing Holy Week. **ABS-CBN News (4/1/18)**

Past Year IED Events by Type



Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



In March, IED activity remained steady from the previous month, as NPA rebels have continued their offensive against security forces. The majority of the NPA events were cache finds following small arms fire between security forces and rebels, with only two events involving detonations. The NPA marked their 50th anniversary late this month, which is a historically violent event; however, this year witnessed a reduced amount of violence, possibly because it fell during Holy Week.

The AFP announced this month that they plan to do their best eliminate the ASG by the end of the year. This comes as more ASG members continue to turn themselves in; over 200 members have surrendered to security forces since the start of the year. In the coming month it is likely that IED activity will remain steady, as the AFP engages both the NPA and Islamic extremist groups.

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Thailand: March IED Events




There was one IED detonation event, and one IED found and cleared event.

On 3 MAR, EOD rendered safe a timed IED after security officers found a suspicious bicycle on a road between Taluban and Wasukri beaches, Pattani. The device incorporated a timer and a water bottle attached to the bicycle. **Bangkok Post (3/4/18)**


On 12 MAR, a RCIED buried near a guard post detonated in Panare, Pattani; two defense volunteers were injured. Officials stated that insurgents recently distributed leaflets in the local area targeting defense volunteers with death threats. **Bangkok Post (3/12/18)**

Thailand's IED activity in March remained consistently low, continuing the overall trend this year. This month also experienced another event involving the use of an IED in a water bottle, a method observed in February. These devices have been utilized because they are easy to conceal and are emplaced quickly given an opportune moment. The recent arrest of a bomb maker on 19 MAR demonstrates officials' continued progress in identifying and exploiting threat networks in the region.

Past Year IED Events by Type



Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Burma: March IED Events




There was one IED detonation event and one IED found and cleared event.

On 12 MAR, an IED detonated outside Phu Pwint Way Sar Dormitory in Htityaing, Sagaing. The device was attached to a teacher’s motorcycle parked outside the dormitory. During search operations, officials found and cleared a further seven to nine IEDs. The devices incorporated glass bottles containing metal pipes and ball bearings, gunpowder, and batteries. The owner of the dormitory stated she had received a threatening message from a friend prior to the detonation. Authorities detained one suspect. **Myanmar Times (3/16/18) Mizzima (3/14/18)**

Burma’s IED activity in March decreased compared to previous months. The sole event appeared to be related to a personal dispute and not the work of extremist organizations. The majority of recent activity over the last few months has been related to ethnic extremist organizations, such as ASRA or the AA (see **Device Highlight**). There have been incidents of violence in Kachin and Shan states throughout the month, as armed ethnic extremists and Tatmadaw clash. In the coming months, it is probable that IED activity will continue to affect various locations in Burma, including Rakhine.

Past Year IED Events by Type



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Northeast Asia: March Significant Activity

China

In March 2018, detention rates of Uighurs in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, China, increased sharply. The detention rate has increased over the last year, but especially in the last month, due to Chinese authorities' desire to control and "re-educate" the Uighur population. Some Uighur villages have seen 10-20 percent of the population rounded up, with estimates of up to 120,000 currently detained. These detentions are seemingly rooted in fear of a Uighur domestic uprising.

Detentions and other efforts by the Chinese government to control the Muslim population in Northwestern China are reportedly frustrating former-ISIS Uighur militants and their families in Syria, whose members include some hundreds (official Chinese government estimate is 300 fighters and families) to thousands (estimates of up to 5,000 fighters by a British human rights group). Concerns linger that they may attempt to return to China, and use potentially violent methods to confront Uighur discrimination and efforts to erase Uighur religious practices and culture. In addition to detentions, Chinese authorities are reaching abroad to compel diaspora Uighur populations (estimated at over 1 million) to return to Xinjiang, in order to stymie efforts to raise awareness and internal support for the plight of the Uighurs. According to human rights groups, Uighurs living abroad are forced to return to China, or are being detained and interrogated on foreign soil. Hundreds of them are currently imprisoned in foreign jails. In addition, China actively recruits locals across Central Asia, and in particular along its south-western border, to send back any migrants trying to leave China. Returnees are often detained in re-education camps without cause.

Internationally, the plight of the Uighurs has been publicized more over the last year due to reporting efforts, diaspora actions, and the visibility of the increasing numbers of those being detained and sent to prolonged stays (often for a year or more) in re-education camps. These March detentions combined with the potential for Syrian-based fighters to return to Xinjiang creates conditions favorable for the emergence of potentially violent responses to discriminations against Uighurs internationally and in Xinjiang. **Radio Free Asia (3/19/18) Economist (3/18) AP News (4/22/17)**

IED Calendar

The IED calendar was established to help our audience maintain awareness of events, such as anniversaries of major attacks, or political, religious or cultural events that often coincide (or can potentially coincide) with a spike in IED events.

	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
12 MAR (IND): Anniversary of 1993 Mumbai attack 13 MAR (THA): Anniversary of founding of Barisan Revolusi Nasional 15-16 MAR (IND): United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) Army Raising Day 26 MAR (BNG): Independence Day 7 APR (IND): ULFA Raising Day 13-15 APR (THA): Thai New Year (Songkran) 28 APR (THA): Anniversary of 2004 Krue Se Mosque Incident	25	26	27	28	1	2	3
	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	11	12 IND	13 THA	14	15 IND	16 IND	17
	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
	25	26 BNG	27	28	29	30	31
	5 MAY (IND): Pooram Day 16 MAY (WW): Ramadan begins 28 MAY (IND): Anniversary of 2002 Kaluchak Attack 29 MAY (NEP): National Day	1	2	3	4	5	6
8		9	10	11	12	13 THA	14 THA
15 THA		16	17	18	19	20	21
22		23	24	25	26	27	28 THA
May 2018	29	30	1	2	3	4	5 IND
	6	7	8	9	10	11	13
	14	15	16 WW	17	18	19	20
	21	22	23	24	25	26	27
	28 IND	29 NEP	30	31	1	2	3

IND – India
 THA – Thailand
 NEP – Nepal
 WW – Worldwide

Common Terms and Acronyms

AN – Ammonium Nitrate	PCB – Printed Circuit Board
ANFO – Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil	PN – Partner Nation
ARMM – Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao	PPIED – Pressure Plate IED
CIV – Civilian	QRF – Quick Response Force
CBRN – Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear	RCIED – Radio Controlled IED
COIN – Counter-insurgency	RCP – Route Clearance Patrols
CWIED – Command Wire IED	RPG – Rocket Propelled Grenade
DTMF – Dual-Tone Multi-Frequency	SA – South Asia
EFP – Explosively Formed Projectile	SAF – Small Arms Fire
EOD – Explosive Ordnance Disposal	SEA – Southeast Asia
F/C – Found & Cleared	SVBIED – Suicide Vehicle Borne IED
HME – Homemade Explosives	TATP – Triacetone Triperoxide
HN – Host Nation (Police, Military, Government)	TNT – Trinitrotoluene (C ₇ H ₅ N ₃ O ₆)
IDF – Indirect Fire	TTP – Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
IDP – Internally Displaced Persons	UXO – Unexploded Ordnance
IED – Improvised Explosive Device	VBIED – Vehicle Borne IED
KFR – Kidnap for Ransom	VEO – Violent Extremist Organization
KIA – Killed in Action	VOIED – Victim Operated IED
LOC – Line of Communication	WIA – Wounded in Action
LPG – Liquefied Petroleum Gas	
MSR – Main Supply Routes	
NFI – No Further Information	
NSTR – Nothing Significant To Report	
PBA – Post Blast Analysis	
PBIED – Personnel Borne (Suicide Bomb) IED	

Governments, Groups and Organizations

ASG – Abu Sayyaf Group	JMB – Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh
BIFF – Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters	JMJB – Jama'atul Muslim Janta Bangladesh
BIPP – Barisan Islam Perberbasan Patani	KIA – Kachin Independence Army
BRN-C – Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate	KIM – Khalifa Islamiya Mindanao
BSF – Border Security Forces	KIO – Kachin Independence Organization
BNP – Bangladesh National Party	LeT – Lashkar-e Tayyiba
BriMob – Mobile Brigade (Indonesia CT Forces)	MILF – Moro Islamic Liberation Front
CPI-M – Communist Party of India (Maoist)	MILF-SOG – MILF-Special Operations Group
CPN-M – Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)	MNLF – Moro National Liberation Front
CPP – Communist Party of the Philippines	NPA – New People's Army
CRPF – Central Reserve Police Force (India)	PNP – Philippine National Police
GMIP – Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Patani	POLRI – Indonesian National Police
HM – Hizb-ul-Mujahideen	PULO – Patani United Liberation Organization
HNLC – Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (India)	RAB – Rapid Action Battalion (Bangladesh)
HUJI-B – Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami Bangladesh	RKK – Runda Kumpulan Kecil
IB – India's Intelligence Bureau	SJMM – Samyukta Jatiya Mukti Morcha
IM – Indian Mujahideen	SJTMM – Samyukta Jana Tantrik Terai Mukti Morcha
IrW – Irregular Warfare	ULFA – United Liberation Front of Assam
ISI – Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan)	UWSA – United Wa State Army
ISIS – Islamic State of Iraq ash Sham	YCL – Youth Communist League
JAT – Jemaah Ansharout Tauhid	
Ji – Jemaah Islamiya	
JTMM – Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha	
JIB – Jemaat-e-Islami Bangladesh	
JeM – Jaish-e-Mohammed	