



Asia-Pacific Counter-IED Fusion Center

Monthly IED Activity Report



DOI: 30 September 2017

About the APCFC

The Asia-Pacific C-IED Fusion Center is the premier center for irregular warfare analysis in the U.S. Pacific Command. The center develops and synchronizes C-IED and EOD programs and regional engagements. The center resources USARPC C-IED training to ensure U.S., Allied, and Partner Nations survivability.



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
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
Executive Summary: In September, there was a 2% increase in IED events across the Asia-Pacific region. IED-related casualties decreased by 8% from August. In South Asia, IED activity increased by 42%, but there were 36% less IED-related casualties than last month. In Southeast Asia, IED-related casualties were 15% higher than last month's even though overall IED events were down 33%. For a third consecutive month, there were no reported IED events in Northeast Asia.

There were 98 IED events in the Asia-Pacific region in September 2017




Icons depict events for September 2017; heat map depicts event density from September 2016 - September 2017


September IED events



September IED events by Country




September IED Casualties



This document is limited to those personnel performing military, intelligence, law enforcement, or security duties in support of C-IED operations.

September Asia-Pacific IED Events by Region




Executive Summary (Continued)

In South Asia, IED activity increased from 42 events in August to 62 events in September. IED-related casualties decreased from 33 in August to 21 casualties in September. In Bangladesh, there was an increase in IED activity, to include incidents related to the execution of a five-day raid on a militant hideout ([see pg. 9](#)). In India, there was a 3% increase in IED events along with a 58% decrease in IED-related casualties. The increase appears to be related to the resumption of Maoist activity, after a months-long hiatus due to flooding ([see pg. 10](#)). In Nepal, IED activity spiked due to the final phase of local elections, but is expected to drop again next month ([see pg. 11](#)).

In Southeast Asia, IED activity decreased from 54 events in August to 36 events in September. Casualties increased slightly in September, primarily due to attacks on security forces by militants in southern Thailand. In the Philippines, reported IED activity decreased despite the on-going siege in Marawi ([see pg. 13](#)). In Thailand, IED activity increased in the second half of the month, though it is uncertain if this trend will continue into October ([see pg. 14](#)). In Burma, IED activity dropped in September following a spike in activity perpetrated by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) in August ([see pg. 15](#)).


IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from OPEN SOURCES are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations. Event refers to specific IED activity categories: IED Detonation, IED Found/Cleared, IED Hoax, IED Cache.

PACOM IED Events - Past 12 Months



Icons depict events from September 2016 to September 2017; occasional overlap occurs

Past Year IED Event Casualty Count




South Asia sees the highest level of IED events in the region, primarily due to India's high activity. IED activity across the region is often centered around periods of political unrest or contested elections. Devices thrown or emplaced during those outbreaks of violence vary widely in complexity (e.g. basic, command-wire to radio-controlled) and lethality.


Southeast Asia sees approximately half the activity of South Asia, with the Philippines and Thailand as the primary contributors to the number of events. While Thailand's IED activity is primarily attributable to Muslim-Malay insurgents in the south, the Philippines faces communist, jihadist, and Moro separatist threats. By comparison, attacks in Indonesia and Malaysia are far less frequent.

Northeast Asia sees relatively few IED attacks and they can often be attributed to an individual's act of protest against an employer, the government, or retaliation against an acquaintance. Disaffected groups, such as the Uyghurs in China, occasionally incorporate IEDs in their attacks. Press reporting from the region is limited and generally unreliable, therefore actual events are likely higher than shown here.

Past Year IED events




Past Year IED events by Country




IED Activity - Past 12 Months

Switch Type



Group Affiliation



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics are presumed to be approximations. Graphics represent known switch type and group affiliation.

Incident Highlight: New IED TTPs reportedly discovered in Marawi, Philippines

In late September, Philippine press reported security forces engaged in the fight for Marawi have possibly encountered new IED TTPs in recent months.

A leaked video from the Grand Mosque, which was seized from Maute Group (ISIS Philippines) control in late August, depicts an explosive-laden vest that was left behind. The existence of the vest has raised concerns that the ISIS-PHL terrorists may resort to PBIED attacks as the area under their control continues to collapse.

The discovery of a possible PBIED in the Philippines is potentially significant as the country has yet to experience a single suicide bombing. The Philippine military believes that the TTP has been taught by 10-12 foreigners embedded with ISIS Philippines in Marawi.

Southeast Asian foreign fighters which make up the vast majority of foreign fighters in Marawi, are coming from areas whose militants have experience using PBIEDs. This may explain in part why a completely novel TTP to the Philippines has appeared in Marawi.

In addition to possible suicide vests, Philippine security forces have reported the existence of devices containing multiple firing switches, such as an IED that contains a pressure switch combined with a mobile phone radio-controlled switch. While devices with separate firing and arming switches are known, albeit uncommon, to the Philippines, devices with multiple firing switches are possibly a new TTP.



Stills taken from a video produced by a Philippine news agency. The stills depict a purported explosive-laden vest recovered from recent operations in Marawi, Philippines.

Sources: GMA News (9/27/17) Benar News (9/27/17) Free Malaysia Today (9/28/17)

Special Assessment: Rohingya Crisis and the Waxing Tide of Jihad

On 25 AUG, another wave of violence in Western Burma's Rakhine state erupted when ARSA militants attacked 30 police outposts (**see August 2017 monthly**). In response to the attack, the Burmese Army launched a series of raids against settlements in Rakhine, ultimately forcing tens of thousands to flee into neighboring Bangladesh. An estimated 400,000 refugees have streamed into Bangladesh since October 2016, straining infrastructure and supplies in the areas around Cox's Bazaar and Chittagong. The developing humanitarian crisis has gained international attention; while much of the outcry has been benign, there have also been calls for action by radical Islamic groups outside Burma. If left unaddressed, authorities in many nations have raised concerns that the Rohingya crisis could destabilize Southeast Asia (SEA) and lead to an increase in violent extremism across the Asia-Pacific region.


In early September, protests erupted worldwide against the actions of the Burmese Army in Rakhine; protest movements were active in the Asia-Pacific region, and also in distant locations, such as Russia, Canada, and Pakistan highlighting the global reach of the crisis. In the Asia-

Pacific, Islamic organizations organized protests in cities across the region. In Hong Kong, approximately 1,000 civilians rallied to demand an end to the violence in Rakhine. While the majority of the protests and rallies remained peaceful, some ultra-conservative Islamic organizations used the protests as a platform to push for retaliatory violence. The Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) (**see November 2016 VOI**), one of Indonesia's most powerful Islamist organizations, called for continuous protests outside the Burmese Embassy in Jakarta. They have also indicated they are willing to wage Jihad in Burma, with over 2,000 civilians already registered to volunteer for violent action. In Malaysia, officials released a statement in mid-September stating some volunteers had already travelled to Burma via Thailand and Bangladesh, and others were preparing to leave for Burma to fight against the Burmese Army. According to Malaysian police, those who have already left for Burma are affiliated with ISIS, though it is unclear how deep the affiliation goes.

As details continue to emerge about fighters from SEA countries heading to Rakhine, counter-terrorism (CT) authorities have become increasingly concerned that al-Qa'ida (AQ) and ISIS affiliated groups will capitalize on the Rohingya crisis. In fact, there are already signs that the violence in Rakhine is being used as a rallying cry for militancy across South Asia (SA) and SEA. In mid-September, a senior leader of AQ's Yemeni branch, Khaled Batarfi, called for attacks on Burma by militants in Bangladesh, India, Indonesia and Malaysia. Increased visibility on the issue by AQ leadership has CT forces in Indonesia worried that Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) could rise again; though largely defunct now, JI killed hundreds with IED and terror attacks in the early 2000s. Though many AQ affiliated groups have taken a back seat in media coverage since the rise of ISIS in 2014, many groups are still active. In Bangladesh, where ISIS-aligned Neo-JMB has captured attention, members of Ansar al-Islam (formerly Ansarullah Bangla Team, ABT) has been active online, disseminating jihadist propaganda such as al-Zawahiri's "General Instructions to Jihad" in Bengali. Bangladeshi authorities have also uncovered that AQ and ISIS aligned militants have been seeking jobs in the private security sector, potentially giving them access and placement within the infrastructure of key industries.



Indonesian FPI (**see November 2016 VOI**) protestors calling for jihad in Burma in 2013



Rohingya refugee numbers by country (as of September 2017)

Calls for jihad in the Asia-Pacific region, and more specifically in Burma, by militant leaders have been on an upward trend. Following the crisis in Rakhine in 2012, when violent riots erupted between Rohingya and Buddhists, AQ's leader al-Zawahiri mentioned Rohingya persecution in his 11 SEP 2013 speech to commemorate 9/11; the following year, he included Burma in the AQ of the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) area of operations. In 2015, AQ branches, (such as al-Shabaab in Africa, the Taliban in Paki-

Special Assessment: Rohingya Crisis and the Waxing Tide of Jihad

stan, and AQ affiliates in Bangladesh), also expressed support for jihad against Buddhists in Burma. ISIS-aligned Neo-JMB's former leader Tamim Chowdhury (alias Shaykh Abu Ibrahim al-Hanif, deceased August 2016) called for action on behalf of the Rohingya in his April 2016 *Dabiq* interview. Later in 2016, after the initial attack by ARSA and retaliation by Burmese troops in Rakhine in October, Indonesian ISIS-aligned jihadists were intercepted before committing attacks; Jakarta-based jihadists planned to blow up the Burmese embassy in Jakarta, and Malaysian authorities stopped an Indonesian on his way to Burma. Other pro-ISIS groups in South Asia, such as LeT and IM, have also expressed support for jihad in Burma. While major attacks by outside jihadist groups have been thus far averted, it is highly possible that extremists will continue to target Burma each time actions are taken against the Rohingya.



Indonesian protestors outside the Burmese Embassy in Jakarta (4 SEP)

In addition to the possibility of increasing radicalization, the situation in Rakhine could destabilize the relationships between countries or between groups within countries. ASEAN, whose mandate supports economic development and social cooperation between nations in SEA, has become a space for dialogue about the violence in Rakhine. Muslim majority countries in ASEAN, namely Malaysia and Indonesia, have vocally protested actions by the Burmese government against the Rohingya. In response to this criticism, Burma has insisted the Rakhine crisis is an internal, local matter; Aung San Suu Kyi, Burma's

State Counselor and Nobel Peace Prize winner, clearly stated that countries should uphold ASEAN's principle of non-interference. Malaysia's Prime Minister Najib Razak responded in December 2016 that he rejected Burma's demand to stay out of the situation, stating that ASEAN's commitment to human rights trumped the non-interference principle.

Concurrently, Burma's relations with Bangladesh have been greatly challenged because the influx of refugees since October 2016 has placed an incredible burden on the border areas, especially Cox's Bazaar. Bangladesh's Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina addressed the UN General Assembly on 21 SEP, requesting increased UN intervention to help the Rohingya. Approximately 900,000 Rohingya have fled to Bangladesh, with the vast majority residing outside designated UN refugee camps; this has strained medical facilities and social services, and the UN has had to allocate an additional USD 12 million to help with relief efforts, on top of additional millions of dollars designated specifically for the welfare of children who are believed to have made up over half of the refugees that have entered Bangladesh. At the beginning of October, Sheikh Hasina called for an end to hostilities, and has been working with the Burmese government on plans to return the Rohingya. Thus, despite Burma's continued assertion that the crisis is an internal matter, it is clearly having potentially lasting regional effects in both SA and SEA.

Unlikely to be resolved soon, the Rohingya crisis is a phenomenon to be watched closely for its potential to galvanize individuals to join extremist organizations and conduct jihad. The plight of the Rohingya has the potential to be the new rallying cry similar to how the plight of the Palestinians has been used in decades past by AQ. It would be especially effective within SEA that has seen the bulk of the public outcry and diplomatic pushback. Presently, attempts to co-opt the crisis by VEOs are complicated by the ongoing siege in Marawi, Philippines whose coverage has dominated the Asia-Pacific sections within jihadist literature. However, with the impending collapse of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, and Marawi drawing to a close, the potential for the Rohingya to become a new regional, or possibly even global, flashpoint cannot be ignored.

Sources: RNA (3/5/13) Reuters (8/24/16) Channel News Asia (12/4/16) Conversation (3/17/17) RSIS (4/13/17) Prothom Alo (8/12/17) Reuters (9/2/17) Reuters (9/3/17) National Post (9/4/17) al Jazeera (9/8/17) RFA (9/8/17) SCMP (9/9/17) SCMP (9/10/17) RFA (9/13/17) Dhaka Tribune (9/13/17) Channel News Asia (9/14/17) Nikkei (9/14/17) Malay Mail Online (9/17/17) Coconuts (9/18/17) Straits Times (9/19/17) Straits Times (9/20/17) CNN (9/22/17) Asia Times (9/25/17) Malaysia Chronicle (9/25/17) Hindustan Times (9/25/17) Free Malaysia (9/25/17) Straits Times (9/25/17) UN (10/2/17) al Jazeera (10/2/17) UN (10/3/17)

Person of Interest / VEO of Interest

POI: Mohammad Masood Azhar Alvi

ALIAS: Masood Azhar; Masud Azhar; Wali Adam Isah; Wali Adam Esah
AREAS OF OPERATION: Pakistan and India **AFFILIATIONS:** JeM, AQ, Taliban

Masood Azhar is the founder and leader of Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). Azhar was born in Bahawalpur, Punjab Province, Pakistan in 1968. He studied at Jamia Uloom ul Islamia, a leading Islamic school in Karachi. During his studies in Karachi, Azhar became involved with Harkat-ul-Ansar (HuA), a Pakistan-based Islamic militant group operating primarily in Kashmir. Azhar is believed to have authored seven jihad-related books.

Azhar has been involved in terror-related activity for nearly 25 years. His activities include support to AQ affiliates in Somalia, public speaking, fundraising, and recruitment in the UK. Azhar is associated with multiple deadly complex IED attacks in India, including the 2001 Parliament attack (with Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT)), the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and the 2016 attack on an Indian airbase in Pathankot. Due to his terrorist activities, India has listed Azhar as one of their most wanted terrorists. The US, UK, and France are pushing to have Azhar designated a terrorist under United Nations authorities.

Most recently, in September 2017, Azhar called for JeM followers to get ready "to do something" for the "sacrifices" of the "Myanmar Muslims." This call-to-arms echoes the sentiments of AQ core leadership, who called out (to jihadists in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and the Philippines) to travel to Burma and fight against the Burmese Government and Armed Forces. Indian intelligence services believe JeM has been providing Rohingya extremists training in Bangladesh since 2013-2014. Should JeM and likeminded jihadist organizations focus efforts to support groups like ARSA, it will likely bring increasingly extreme militant ideologies and linkages to global jihadist networks (see **Special Assessment**). This could manifest into providing much needed training as well as operational and IED skill-sets.

Sources: Hindustan Times (12/9/08) Treasury (11/4/10) Upclosed News18 (1/14/16) News18 (9/12/17) Indian Express (9/12/17) Eurasia Review (10/11/17)



VEO: Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM)

AREA OF OPERATIONS: Pakistan and Kashmir, India **HEADQUARTERS:** Bahawalpur, Pakistan **AFFILIATIONS:** Taliban and AQ **ALIAS:** Tehrik-ul-Furqan

JeM is an Islamic extremist group that operates along the border between Indian Administered Kashmir (IAK) and Pakistan, with the historical goal of uniting Kashmir with Pakistan. The organization was founded after its leader, Masood Azhar, was released from prison as a part of the 1999 Indian Airlines hijacking by Harkat ul-Mujahideen (HuM). Azhar fled to Afghanistan and spent time with Osama bin Laden and the Taliban, where he was able to consolidate a power base that later allowed him to funnel away about three quarters of HuM's members to join JeM.



JeM began conducting attacks in April 2000, with a suicide VBIED detonation outside an Indian Army barracks in Badami Bagh, Kashmir. Following a hiatus, JeM began conducting attacks again in the last three months of 2001. In October, the group attacked the IAK legislative assembly, killing 30 people. In December, it attacked the Indian Parliament in Delhi, after which the United States added the group to the Foreign Terrorist Organization list. JeM has continued its operations, focused on *fidayeen* (suicide) operations and attacks on government targets, but was also responsible for the kidnapping and murder of US journalist Daniel Pearl in 2002. As recently as 26 AUG, JeM militants conducted a *fidayeen* attack against a police barracks in Pulwama district, killing eight Indian Security Forces personnel and wounding a further five.

In September, Masood Azhar released a statement in the magazine *al-Qalam* calling for jihad in Burma due to the crisis in Rakhine state (see **Special Assessment**). It is possible that this call to action could have far reaching effects in South Asian extremist circles, especially because the Indian government stated that it would seek to expel 40,000 Rohingya refugees over security concerns. This action could further galvanize militants in the region to increase attacks locally against Indian government targets.

Sources: Stanford (6/25/15) SATP Indian Express (9/12/17) SBS (9/17/17) al Jazeera (9/18/17)

South Asia: September Significant Activity

Bangladesh

Following on successes by the Dhaka Metropolitan Police's CT unit in the fight against Neo-JMB, the Chittagong Metropolitan Police (CMP) has revealed it will also seek to have a specialized CT unit to counter violent extremist activity. **Daily Star (9/9/17)**

On 18 SEP, police intercepted a scheduled march to lay siege to the Burmese Embassy in Dhaka by Hefazat-e-Islam (Hel). The march was in protest of the Burmese government's treatment of the Rohingya. Hel is a group of madrasa teachers and students that attempts to pressure the Bangladeshi government into reducing secularism throughout various levels of society. **SATP (9/19/17)**

On 24 SEP, an IED blast in the West African country Mali killed three Bangladeshi UN peacekeepers and wounded four others. The peacekeeping forces were escorting a convoy when the IED detonated. **Prothom Alo (9/24/17) Reuters (9/24/17)**

A plan to assassinate Bangladesh's Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, on 24 AUG was foiled by Bangladeshi and Indian authorities. According to sources, the attack would have been similar to the assassination of Indira Gandhi, in which her own security detail would have killed her. Neo-JMB was to set off IED detonations near the PM's office to divert attention of the rest of her security detail. Cooperation between Indian and Bangladeshi intelligence organizations prevented the attack by monitoring communications between the conspirators. **First Post (9/24/17) Free Press Journal (9/24/17)**

India

On 13 SEP, security forces managed to arrest three suspected ISIS terrorists who had allegedly been utilizing internet cafés in order to publicize extremist ideology. Of the three suspects, Taushif Ahamd Khan, was accused of the 2008 attack in Gujarat State that killed 56 people; when security forces investigated him in September, they found photos of Hindu temples and Buddhist shrines in his mail, prompting security forces to secure the temples. **Gulf News (9/14/17) Times of India (9/16/17)**

On 17 SEP, media reported that Zeenat-ul-Islam had been appointed LeT Commander in Jammu and Kashmir, though it has not been confirmed. Zeenat is a 28-year old from Shopian District, who is allegedly an expert IED maker and was a member of Al-Badr before joining LeT in November 2015. **Firstpost (9/17/17) Outlook (9/16/17)**


On 19 SEP, a suspected attempt at conducting a "dry run" of explosives/IED smuggling through the Mangalore Airport was stopped by airport security. Sources reported that a 26-year old man from Mangalore, bound for Dubai, created a "home-made power pack" to contain a "clay-like substance" that acted as a possible substitute for explosives, in order to test airport security. While many media sources downplayed the incident as a simple scare, similar devices were discovered on the same day at several other Indian airports, raising suspicions from security personnel. **Mirror.co.uk (9/19/17) Times Now (9/19/17)**

On 23 SEP, media reported that the Chhattisgarh Police Housing Corporation Limited (CPHCL) have completed the Injiram-Bheji road in Chhattisgarh, making it the "first step of penetrating inside the Maoist stronghold". The road, which was completed on Friday, has been built using concrete cement (CC) instead of damur (tar) to make it difficult for insurgents in the area to destroy it. The road was the target of numerous IED attacks throughout the construction project, and is expected to greatly improve freedom of movement for security forces traveling through areas that were traditionally considered Maoist strongholds. **Hindustan Times (9/23/17)**

Maldives

On 14 SEP, Maldivian authorities arrested a suspected ISIS militant, who allegedly been planning an attack. Just a week later, three Maldivians arrested by Turkish authorities trying to cross into Syria were extradited back to the Maldives. These are the latest in a series of ISIS-related incidents involving Maldivians both at home and abroad. Concurrently security was increased at Male's Velana Airport, though officials rejected claims of an elevated risk of attacks; new measures include guards carrying weapons and explosives detectors. **Maldives Independent (9/24/17) Maldives Independent (9/24/17)**

Bangladesh: September IED Events



There were two IED detonation events, three IED cache events, and one hoax IED event.

On 1 SEP, a timed hoax was found and cleared at a cattle market in Ashulia, Dhaka. The hoax incorporated a watch, wires, and sand wrapped in duct tape. **Dhaka Tribune (9/1/17)**

On 5 SEP, IEDs detonated during a five-day operation against a Neo-JMB hideout in Darus Salam, Mirpur, Dhaka. Some of the devices were thrown from the building at security forces. Ultimately, the militants detonated a suicide device that killed five adult militants and two children, and wounded four Rapid Action Battalion members. Following the raid, authorities recovered an IED cache that included multiple large and small IEDs, chemicals, gelignite, improvised grenades, and other weapons. **Dhaka Tribune (9/5/17) Daily Star (9/7/17) Dhaka Tribune (9/8/17) Daily Star (9/8/17) BD News 24 (9/8/17)**

On 8 SEP, an IED cache was recovered by Dhaka Metropolitan Police (DMP) in Khilikhet, Dhaka following the arrest of two suspected Neo-JMB militants. The cache contained 30 detonators. **Dhaka Tribune (9/11/17)**


On 29 SEP, an IED cache was recovered by DMP in Dholaipar, Dhaka following a raid on a suspected Jamma-e-Islami (Jel) hideout; nine suspected militants, including two senior Jel leaders were arrested. The cache contained IEDs, machetes, and jihadist books. **Daily Star (9/29/17) BD News 24 (9/30/17)**

In September, events remained consistently low as Bangladeshi security forces continue to conduct operations against Neo-JMB and other militants groups. The vast majority of the operations over the last several months are pro-active and follow arrests, which have had the cumulative effect of preventing another large scale attack like the July 2016 Holey Artisan Bakery attack.


Despite the prevention of further attacks, raids on Neo-JMB hideouts continue to reveal the changing and developing nature of the threat. The 5 SEP operation revealed a concerning amount of chemicals and gel sticks, in addition to large IEDs attached to refrigerators and other devices. Thus, while CT operations continue, it appears that Neo-JMB militants are sustaining their operations as well.

In the coming months, it is likely the established pattern of arrests leading to operations will continue. Elements of Bangladeshi security forces will continue to aggressively pursue militants. The announcement that Chittagong Police will have its own counter-terrorism task force is a positive step towards counter-militancy efforts in an area that has been stressed by the influx of refugees and pre-existing social issues.

Past Year IED Events by Type




Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

India: September IED Events



There were 13 IED detonation events, nine IED found and cleared events, 13 IED cache events and one hoax IED event.

On 4 SEP, an IED cache was recovered by Darjeeling Police during a raid in Dabaipani, Darjeeling, West Bengal, resulting in one detainee. The cache was spread across two neighboring houses, and included gelatin sticks, power gel, metal splinters, shrapnel, a large number of detonators, pipes, cast iron, bullets, and “3.3 ammunition.” According to police, the detainee’s husband along with two others escaped, taking several completed IEDs with them. **One India (9/4/17)**

On 6 SEP, an IED detonated against a Public Works Division bungalow in Mirik, Darjeeling, West Bengal. Of note, a relatively new group calling itself the “Gorkha Liberation Army” (likely associated to the Gorkha Janmukti Morcha (GJM) party) claimed responsibility for this IED attack, and those that preceded it during the *bandh* (protest) in Darjeeling. **Outlook India (9/7/17) Firstpost (9/7/17)**

On 8 SEP, an IED cache was recovered by Darjeeling Police during a raid in Limbu Bustee, Darjeeling, West Bengal. The cache was described as being part of an IED factory associated to the cache recovered on 4 SEP, and to GJM leader Bimal Gurung. The cache included “a huge amount of IED and other explosive materials,” iron pipes, detonators, splinters (fragmentation enhancements), bullet heads, and other materials. **Mumbai Mirror (9/8/17) Business Standard (9/8/17)**


On 25 SEP, an IED cache was found and cleared by Indian Army personnel in Kalgai village near Uri, Baramulla, Jammu and Kashmir. The cache was found with the body of a militant who had been killed in an encounter which had started two days earlier. When the body was found, police discovered the killed militant was wearing a suicide belt, which was likely intended for a *fidayeen* attack. **Rising Kashmir (9/25/17)**

Overall IED activity remained steady in September. In a reversal from August, Maoist activity started to rise again after several months of depressed activity likely due to unusually severe monsoon flooding. Early in the month, the burst of activity in Darjeeling continued, but tapered off following two large cache recoveries in the area. Otherwise, India exhibited normal trends of sporadic IED-related violence.


While this appears to be the Gorkhaland Liberation Army’s (GLA) first major operation, there have been scattered reports on the group since 2009, when it was hanging posters to request weapons and recruits. In late 2014, however, investigations on a weapons cache recovered in Assam revealed that 15 GLA personnel had received 14 days of weapons training in Nagaland sometime in 2013, possibly foreshadowing the capabilities demonstrated during the 2017 Darjeeling *bandh*. Even then, the group was tied to the Gorkha Janmukti Morcha, whose roots go back to the 1980’s, including one violent uprising for a Gorkhaland state which left 1,200 dead.

The suicide vest recovered in Jammu and Kashmir is the second recovery of a suicide device in a four-month period. While *fidayeen* “fight to the death” attacks are relatively common in the region, suicide bombings remain rare. This second event may indicate a desire from militant organizations to execute an attack of this type in India in the near term.

Past Year IED Events by Type




Past Year IED Event Casualty Count




IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Nepal: September IED Events



Past Year IED Events by Type



There were 13 IED detonation events, six IED found and cleared events, and one IED cache event.

On 6 SEP, an IED detonated at a construction site in Bardibas, Mahottari, Janakpur. The IED incorporated a tiffin box, switch, power source, and explosives. **Nepal Monitor (9/6/17)**

On 8 SEP, an IED detonated at the home of a Communist Party of Nepal United Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML) candidate and youth leader in Manaharwa, Bara, Narayani. The IED incorporated a gas cylinder. **Nepal Monitor (9/10/17)**

On 11 SEP, an IED was found and cleared at a controversial bazaar construction site in Prithvi, Pokhara, Kaski, Gandaki. The IED incorporated a gas cylinder and a battery. The new bazaar will displace 217 local vendors. **Nepal Monitor (9/12/17)**

On 14 SEP, an IED was found and cleared near a bridge over the Triyuga River in Saptakoshi Kanchanrup, Saptari, Sagarmatha. The IED incorporated a timer and was found inside a black plastic bag. **Nepal Monitor (9/15/17)**

On 14 SEP, an IED detonated under a Nepali Congress election campaign vehicle in Hariwan, Sarlahi, Janakpur. The device incorporated a tiffin box; however, the initiator and other details were not reported. **Nepal Monitor (9/15/17)**

On 16 SEP, an IED detonated in an area where children were playing in Balara-2, Sarlahi, Janakpur; one child was injured. Three other devices were found and cleared from the same area by Nepal Army EOD. **Nepal Monitor (9/17/17)**

On 18 SEP, two IEDs were found and cleared outside the residence of suspended politician, Chief of Inland Revenue Development Chudamani Sharma, in Budhanilakantha, Kathmandu, Bagmati. The IEDs incorporated gas cylinders. **Nepal Monitor (9/18/17)**

IED activity increased in September from August, directly correlated to Phase III local elections on 18 SEP (the final phase). While expected to increase, the number of events was still relatively low when compared to the spikes ahead of Phase I and Phase II local elections in May and June. This was surprising because Phase III elections were held in an area that has regularly experienced increased IED activity due to increased tensions with ethnic minorities and agitating militant groups. Voter turnout, with over 70% of registered voters participating, was high for all three Phases of local elections.

In the near term, IED activity is expected to drop; however the next phase of elections for Provincial offices will be held on 26 NOV; shortly thereafter national elections will be held in December. There will likely be spikes in IED violence before and during both of these election cycles. Completing the elections before 2018 will ensure that the government has followed through on requirements set forth by the constitution to hold elections at all three levels of governance.

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Southeast Asia: September Significant Activity

Philippines

The Armed Forces of the Philippines denied reports of the emergence of a new armed group in Marawi City. The Maranao Victims Movement (MVM), is an alleged group composed of armed evacuees from Marawi City and is calling for the Maute Group to leave the city and free hostages. They posted a video on social media and demanded an end to the fighting and for the internally displaced persons to be allowed to return. Additionally, they want local leaders to be accountable for failing to prevent the Maute Group from taking over the city. And if these demands are not met, the group says they will launch a jihad against the military and militants. **Benar News (9/19/17) Inquirer (9/20/17) Benar News (9/20/17)**

On 21 SEP, Malaysian Police detained seven Filipinos suspected of being involved with the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). The men were said to be working as private security guards in Kuala Lumpur. These arrests bring the total to around 40 foreigners being suspected as “terrorist fighters” who have been detained in Malaysia just this year. There have been fears that Muslim militants were increasing their activities in Malaysia, being inspired by the on-going Marawi conflict in the Philippines. **Rappler (9/21/17)**

Thailand

In September, police in Songkhla province issued a warning for residents to be on the lookout for suspiciously placed traffic cones. This public announcement was released due to intelligence reporting that insurgents had stolen a large number of traffic cones and plan to use them to conceal IEDs. Usually focusing attacks in Yala, Narathiwat, and Pattani provinces, southern Thai insurgents have successfully used various road markers to conceal IEDs in the past. This warning released by the Songkhla police should be considered a serious threat, as the coming month (October) is an anniversary month for the violent extremist group Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), during which attacks have been conducted outside the three southern provinces and/or across multiple provinces in previous years. **The Nation (9/11/17)**

Malaysia

Between 8-10 SEP, Malaysian police arrested three people for being involved in activities related to ISIS. One individual, an unidentified 21-year-old male, allegedly received instructions from Mahmud Ahmad, presently Malaysia’s most wanted terrorist, and from an unnamed Saudi Arabian IED expert on how to make a large-scale IED. The man had also been instructed to purchase hand grenades and various weapons to be used in attacks against “non-Muslims in Malaysia and their places of worship.” A 38-year-old man was arrested for planning to join ISIS militants in the Philippines and a militant group in Rakhine, Burma. Police also arrested a 41-year-old bus driver who was planning to join ISIS in Syria at the end of the year. **Channel News Asia (9/14/17) Today Online (9/14/17) New Straits Times (9/14/17)**

Singapore

On 23 SEP, ISIS Al-Hayat media center released a propaganda video featuring a Singaporean ISIS recruiter for the first time. The three-minute video featured Megat Shahdan Abdul Samad, a 39-year-old, and the third Singaporean known to be fighting on the frontline for ISIS. In the video Shahdan, identified as “Abu Uqayl,” spoke in English as he attempted to reach out to Singaporeans and others in the region to join ISIS. In a statement, Singapore’s Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) stated that the MHA has been monitoring Shahdan for some time. This case is of particular concern to MHA as they have seen a spike in the number of self-radicalization cases following the rise of ISIS and proliferation of its propaganda. **Strait Times (9/26/17) Strait Times (9/28/17) The Newspaper (9/27/18) Today Online (9/24/17)**

Philippines: September IED Events



There were three IED detonation events, one IED found and cleared event, and 11 IED cache events.

On 1 SEP, an IED cache was recovered by police conducting a search warrant in Carmen, Agusan del Norte, Caraga, Mindanao; two suspects detained. The cache contained bomb making materials, 3.3kg Ammonium Nitrate/Fuel Oil (ANFO), detonating cords, blasting caps, two hand grenades, one .45 caliber pistol, magazine and ammunition. **Manila Bulletin (9/3/17)**


On 23 SEP, an IED cache was recovered from an ASG rebel in Taluksangay, Zamboanga, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga Peninsula, Mindanao; one suspect detained. The cache contained one IED, one .45 caliber pistol, one fragmentation grenade, two identification cards and a cell phone. Intelligence reporting indicated the ASG were planning to bomb a public place in a few days which prompted troops to conduct the operation. **Sun Star (9/24/17)**
Mindanao Examiner (9/24/17)

On 27 SEP, a coordinated attack occurred against troops and first responders in Semba, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Maguindanao, Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), Mindanao; four injured. The first explosion occurred along a road leading to the military's Division Training School. About ten minutes later, a second explosion occurred as first responders were en route to the first event. **Inquirer Mindanao (9/27/17)**
Manila Bulletin (9/27/17)


On 28 SEP, an IED cache was recovered by the 66th Infantry Battalion following small arms fire with New People's Army rebels in Mangayon, Compostela, Compostela Valley, Davao, Mindanao. The cache contained one M16A1 rifle, two IEDs, assorted personal belongings, and other war materials. **Manila Bulletin (9/30/17)**

On 29 SEP, an IED planted roadside by militants detonated near the Tambunan bridge in Tambunan, Guindulungan, Maguindanao, ARMM, Mindanao. Investigators believe the device that was packed with nails, detonated prematurely as there is a strong possibility it was meant to explode the following morning while public deliveries were to pass. **Philippine Star (9/30/17)**

Past Year IED Events by Type



Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



This month, IED activity dropped from previous months, with the majority of events being cache recoveries. The drop in events may be somewhat misleading, as there has been a lack of reporting out of the conflict area at Marawi City. With no peace negotiations nor ceasefire scheduled, the NPA are continuing with their usual attacks against government troops and harassment of civilians.

The Marawi siege has entered its fourth month; troops have made progress in clearing the city, taking control of key mosques. However, the Maute Group militants are now burning buildings to slow security forces operations. Government troops have been able to take control of key mosques such as Bato, White and Grand mosques. The White Mosque served as the Maute's logistics area and hostage holding area; it is believed the Bato Mosque was used to assemble IEDs, as coins being used as fragmentation were recovered there. A suicide vest was also recovered from the Grand Mosque during clearing operations, indicating more evidence of foreign fighters (see **Device Highlight**). Though the fighting continues, it is very likely that the militants in Marawi have been weakened due to lack of food and ammunition; a few have already surrendered, but even with their strength reduced to about 50 militants, the siege has continued.

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Thailand: September IED Events



There were eight IED detonation events and two IED found and cleared events.

On 13 SEP, an IED was found and cleared by a paramilitary teacher escort patrol on Sungai Padi-Chatwarin Fall Road in Paluru, Sungai Padi, Narathiwat. The device was found concealed near a power pole in a green bag. EOD reported the device's container was a 20kg gas cylinder, and had a radio control as the initiator. EOD used a water cannon to render the device safe; no casualties were reported. **The Nation (9/13/17)**

On 14 SEP, a complex IED attack targeted first responders in Padaeru, Yaha, Yala; two rangers were killed and 28 civilians and security forces were injured. The first detonation occurred at 0130 local in Kabang, Yala. At 0900 local an RCIED detonated targeting the police and EOD teams responding to the 0130 IED detonation; two EOD rangers were injured. During the exploitation of the second IED blast scene, a third IED detonated killing two rangers and injuring 26. **Thai PBS (9/14/17) Bangkok Post (9/14/17) Reuters (9/13/17)**


On 22 SEP, an RCIED detonated targeting a teacher security unit in Taping, Sai Buri, Pattani; four soldiers were killed, and one civilian and five soldiers were injured. The device, estimated to weigh 80-100kgs, was contained in a gas cylinder buried under the road. During the post-blast investigation, EOD found a plastic box with circuit boards and batteries near the scene and determined the device was detonated by radio control. **Khoasod English (9/29/17) The Nation (9/23/17) Bangkok Post (9/22/17)**

On 25 SEP, an IED was found and cleared by the 11th Ranger Regiment and an EOD team of the 446th Border Patrol Unit while patrolling Sukhirin-Chanae Road in Sukhirin, Narathwiat. The device was estimated to weigh 20kg and was contained in a gas cylinder with electrical circuitry attached. **Bangkok Post (9/26/17) Thai PBS (9/25/17)**


On 29 SEP, a VBIED detonated in front of a defense volunteer outpost in Pa Rai, Mae Lan, Pattani. The device, contained in a gas cylinder in a motorcycle side car, detonated shortly after being parked near the outpost. EOD reported the device weighed an estimated 80kgs. **Thai PBS (9/29/17) Bangkok Post (9/29/17)**

IED activity in September increased slightly over August, particularly in the second half of the month. Whether this upward trend will continue into October is uncertain due to conflicting factors. The month of October has shown elevated attacks in 2011-2015, as it is an anniversary month for the BRN in southern Thailand; militants have routinely conducted at least one large scale IED attack. Past large scale IED attacks in October have included coordinated attacks across multiple provinces or involved a large VBIED detonation in a civilian populated area. In 2016, this trend dropped due to the mourning period for the King of Thailand. Thus, as Thailand commemorates the one year anniversary of the King's passing on 13 OCT, it is uncertain if militants will increase IED operations (like in 2011-2015) or if they will hold off on operations (following the 2016 trend).

Past Year IED Events by Type



Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Burma: September IED Events



There were 4 IED detonation events and five IED found and cleared events.


On 5 SEP, an IED was found by the Thingaha Kanglet Rakhita aid group and cleared by authorities in Loungdon, Maungdaw, Rakhine. The device was reportedly wrapped in black duct tape and plastic and had det cord attached to it. **Eleven (9/5/17)**

On 6 SEP, an IED detonated and three were found and cleared in Man Kan, Muse, Shan; one civilian was killed. A post blast inspection of the scene revealed three more IEDs contained in bamboo poles. It was believed the device were emplaced by the Ta'ang National Liberation Army. **Myanmar Times (9/11/17)**

On 15 SEP, an IED was found and cleared by security forces in Kyaukpanu, Maungdaw, Rakhine. Security forces believe it the was the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) that was responsible for emplacing the IED. **Eleven (9/23/17)**

On 19 SEP, an IED detonated on the Sittwe-Yangon highway between Tant Sit and Set Kyar, Minbya, Rakhine. **The Irrawaddy (9/20/17) Narinjara (9/20/17)**

On 23 SEP, seven IEDs were found and cleared by security forces in Chein Khar Li, Yathedaung, Rakhine. While on patrol, security forces came across the IEDs in a hole dug in the ground. It is believed the devices were being stored there by ARSA. **Mizzima (9/25/17) Eleven (9/23/17)**



IED activity dropped in September, from its peak in August. However, the majority of activity occurred in Rakhine as government troops engaged with civilians and militants in the area. The Burmese government has insisted that ARSA is responsible for the majority of destruction in Rakhine, though conflicting reports have arisen from refugees who have fled to Bangladesh. Without increased exploitation and post-blast analysis, it is difficult to identify or track TTPs.


In the coming months, it is possible that activity in Rakhine will continue to worsen. An overly aggressive security posture combined with an increasingly active ARSA network could lead to further civilian casualties and instability.

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Malaysia: September IED Events



Past Year IED Events by Type



There was one IED cache event.

On 8 SEP, an IED cache was recovered in conjunction with the arrest of a Malaysian male with ISIS ties in Began Serai, Perak. The cache contained chemical precursors believed to be used for explosives manufacturing. The 21-year-old unidentified male had ties to Mahmud Ahmad, a renown Malaysian terrorist, and an unidentified Saudi Arabian IED expert. The arrestee had been instructed by those individuals on how to build a large-scale IED. He allegedly tried to produce an IED three times, although the media did not state if those attempts were successful. **Channel News Asia (9/14/17) Today Online (9/14/17) New Straits Times (9/14/17)**

In September, Malaysian IED activity remained consistently low from last month. Malaysian security forces have disrupted a handful of “lone wolf” militants with ISIS ties plotting attacks over the past year, and the 8 SEP event followed this trend. Dr. Mahmud Ahmad’s alleged involvement in this month’s IED event is notable and could be an indicator of his growing prominence in jihadist circles within SEA. Dr. Ahmad is currently believed to be in Marawi fighting alongside ISIS-Philippines and has been a key part of their growth since 2014. Since the April death of a key Syria-based Malaysian ISIS-leader, Muhammad Wanndy Mohamad Jedi, there has been uncertainty as to who might step into the Wanndy’s former role. Dr. Ahmad’s alleged involvement from the Philippines in a plot that was to be carried out in Malaysia, could be an indicator that he’s advancing as the new Malaysian ISIS figurehead.

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Vietnam: September IED Events




There was one IED hoax event.

On 1 SEP, an IED hoax was recovered after it was used in an attempted bank robbery in Gia Ray, Xuan Loc, Dong Nai. The bank robber, Pham Manh Hung, used the hoax device to coerce the bank teller to hand over 200 million Vietnamese Dong (USD 8800). The bank robber left the hoax device behind as well as a bag of some of his personal effects. When the military analyzed the hoax device, they realized that although it looked like a genuine IED, it had no explosive material within. Police have been unable to find and arrest Pham Manh Hung, but subsequently arrested his brother, Pham Van Lam, for allegedly "failing to report [his brother]." **NLD (9/6/17) VN Express (9/28/17) Nguoi Viet (9/1/17) Kenh 14 (9/11/17)**

Vietnam rarely experiences IED activity. The IED event that happened this month is the first in 11 months. Despite this event being a hoax, the Pham brothers have a history of building and using genuine IEDs. Both brothers were arrested in a 2010 after attempting to use RCIEDs to extort and intimidate a provincial government politician.

Past Year IED Events by Type



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Northeast Asia: September Significant Activity

China

The online magazine *Turkestan al-Islamiyyah* or "Islamic Turkistan" is published on the Turkish Islamic Party (TIP) Telegram channel "Voice of Islam" with the purpose of recruiting militants for AQ and ISIS by centering their propaganda on perceived oppressions of Muslims around the world. Their current focus is on China and Afghanistan, and calls for terror attacks against China and various Middle Eastern, African and Asian countries. A particular concern are Roman Catholic churches and cathedrals in Europe and the West, and a chilling call to arms in preparation for a 'jihad' against China in particular and Christianity as a whole. **Express (9/1/17)**

Malaysia, through bilateral cooperation with China, has arrested 29 Uighur militants affiliated with ISIS. The militants are from a Muslim-majority region in China; biometric information since 2011 between Malaysia and China enabled Malaysian officials to apprehend the Chinese militants. Deputy Prime Minister Zahid Hamidi stated that further cooperation between the two countries has improved the capabilities of the Malaysian Counter Messaging Center, responsible for tracking and solving information on terrorist activities, and the Mutual Legal Assistance program that allows both countries to deport individuals related to trans-border crimes. In addition, Malaysia is proactively addressing online gambling and fraud by arresting and deporting 416 Chinese nationals. **Free Malaysia Today (9/28/17)**

Officials in the Xinjiang province in China, home to Uyghur Muslims, are demanding that every ethnic Uyghur, Kazakh and Kyrgyz hand over all Islam-related personal possessions like prayer mats and copies of the Quran, or face harsh punishment. Amnesty International calls the actions of the Chinese government a violation to freedom of religion. Since the beginning of the conflict in 2009, hundreds of Uighurs and Han Chinese have died. Beijing continues to blame Islamist militants for the violence while rejecting any responsibility for the repressive policy. **RFA (9/27/17)**

IED Calendar

The IED calendar was established to help our audience maintain awareness of events, such as anniversaries of major attacks, or political, religious or cultural events that often coincide (or can potentially coincide) with a spike in IED events.

<p>1 SEP 2007 (BUR): Anniversary of Saffron Revolution</p> <p>9 SEP 2004 (INDO): Anniversary of Australian Embassy Bombing</p> <p>18 SEP (NEP): Phase II local elections</p> <p>21 SEP-19 OCT (WW): Al-Hijrah Islamic New Year</p> <p>25 SEP 2002 (IND): Akshardham Temple Attack</p> <p>1 OCT 2005 (INDO): Bali attack anniversary</p> <p>24 OCT 2002 (THA): Tak Bai Incident</p> <p>21 NOV 2006 (NEP): Signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord ending the civil war</p> <p>23 NOV 2009 (PHL): Maguindanao Massacre</p> <p>26 NOV (NEP): Provincial Elections</p> <p>26 NOV 2008 (IND): Mumbai attack</p>	September 2017						1 BUR	2
		3	4	5	6	7	8	9 INDO
		10	11	12	13	14	15	16
		17	18 NEP	19	20	21 WW	22 WW	23 WW
		24 WW	25 IND WW	26 WW	27 WW	28 WW	29 WW	30 WW
		October 2017	1 INDO WW	2 WW	3 WW	4 WW	5 WW	6 WW
8 WW	9 WW		10 WW	11 WW	12 WW	13 WW	14 WW	
15 WW	16 WW		17 WW	18 WW	19 WW	20	21	
22	23		24 THA	25	26	27	28	
November 2017	29		30	31	1	2	3	4
	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	
	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	
	19	20	21 NEP	22	23 PHL	24	25	
	26 NEP IND	27	28	29	30	1	2	

IND – India
NEP – Nepal
BUR – Burma
MAL – Malaysia
INDO – Indonesia
THA – Thailand
WW – Worldwide

Common Terms and Acronyms

AN – Ammonium Nitrate	PBIED – Personnel Borne (Suicide Bomb) IED
ANFO – Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil	PCB – Printed Circuit Board
ARMM – Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao	PN – Partner Nation
CIV – Civilian	PPIED – Pressure Plate IED
CBRN – Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear	QRF – Quick Response Force
COIN – Counter-insurgency	RCIED – Radio Controlled IED
CWIED – Command Wire IED	RCP – Route Clearance Patrols
DTMF – Dual-Tone Multi-Frequency	RPG – Rocket Propelled Grenade
EFP – Explosively Formed Projectile	SA – South Asia
EOD – Explosive Ordnance Disposal	SAF – Small Arms Fire
F/C – Found & Cleared	SEA – Southeast Asia
HME – Homemade Explosives	SVBIED – Suicide Vehicle Borne IED
HN – Host Nation (Police, Military, Government)	TATP – Triacetone Triperoxide
IDF – Indirect Fire	TNT – Trinitrotoluene (C ₇ H ₅ N ₃ O ₆)
IDP – Internally Displaced Persons	TTP – Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
IED – Improvised Explosive Device	UXO – Unexploded Ordnance
KFR – Kidnap for Ransom	VBIED – Vehicle Borne IED
KIA – Killed in Action	VEO – Violent Extremist Organization
LOC – Line of Communication	VOIED – Victim Operated IED
LPG – Liquefied Petroleum Gas	WIA – Wounded in Action
MSR – Main Supply Routes	
NFI – No Further Information	
NSTR – Nothing Significant To Report	
PBA – Post Blast Analysis	

Governments, Groups and Organizations

ASG – Abu Sayyaf Group	JeM – Jaish-e-Mohammed
BIFF – Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters	JMB – Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh
BIPP – Barisan Islam Perberbasan Patani	JMJB – Jama'atul Muslim Janta Bangladesh
BRN-C – Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate	KIA – Kachin Independence Army
BSF – Border Security Forces	KIM – Khalifa Islamiya Mindanao
BNP – Bangladesh National Party	KIO – Kachin Independence Organization
BriMob – Mobile Brigade (Indonesia CT Forces)	LeT – Lashkar-e Tayyiba
CPI-M – Communist Party of India (Maoist)	MILF – Moro Islamic Liberation Front
CPN-M – Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)	MILF-SOG – MILF-Special Operations Group
CPP – Communist Party of the Philippines	MNLF – Moro National Liberation Front
CRPF – Central Reserve Police Force (India)	NPA – New People's Army
GMIP – Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Patani	PNP – Philippine National Police
HM – Hizb-ul-Mujahideen	POLRI – Indonesian National Police
HNLC – Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (India)	PULO – Patani United Liberation Organization
HUJI-B – Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami Bangladesh	RAB – Rapid Action Battalion (Bangladesh)
IB – India's Intelligence Bureau	RKK – Runda Kumpulan Kecil
IM – Indian Mujahideen	SJMM – Samyukta Jatiya Mukti Morcha
IrW – Irregular Warfare	SJTMM – Samyukta Jana Tantrik Terai Mukti Morcha
ISI – Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan)	ULFA – United Liberation Front of Assam
ISIS – Islamic State of Iraq ash Sham	UWSA – United Wa State Army
JAT – Jemaah Ansharout Tauhid	YCL – Youth Communist League
JI – Jemaah Islamiya	
JTMM – Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha	
JIB – Jemaat-e-Islami Bangladesh	