



Asia-Pacific Counter-IED Fusion Center

Monthly IED Activity Report



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About the APCFC

The Asia-Pacific C-IED Fusion Center is the premier center for irregular warfare analysis in the U.S. Pacific Command. The center develops and synchronizes C-IED and EOD programs and regional engagements. The center resources USARAPC C-IED training to ensure U.S., Allied, and Partner Nations survivability.



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Content

Past Year Activity
 Executive Summary pg. 1-2
 By Region pg. 2
 Annual Summary pg. 3

July Activity
 Switch Types pg. 4
 Group Affiliation pg. 4
 Device Highlight pg. 4
 Special Assessment pg. 5-6
 Person of Interest pg. 7
 VEO of Interest pg. 7

South Asia
 Significant Activity pg. 8
 Bangladesh pg. 9
 India pg. 10
 Nepal pg. 11


Southeast Asia
 Significant Activity pg. 12
 Philippines pg. 13
 Thailand pg. 14
 Burma pg. 15
 Indonesia pg. 16
 Malaysia pg. 17

Northeast Asia
 Significant Activity pg. 18
 Calendar pg. 19
 Glossary pg. 20


Click on an entry to advance to the associated page.

Executive Summary: In July, the overall IED event rate in the Asia-Pacific region decreased from last month primarily due to a decrease in activity (down 37%), and there was a notable drop in IED-related casualties (down 53%). In South Asia, the IED event rate decreased from June (down 64%), while rates increased in Southeast Asia (up 39%). There were no reported IED events in Northeast Asia.

There were 83 IED events in the Asia-Pacific region in July 2017




Icons depict events for July 2017; heat map depicts event density from July 2016 - July 2017



This document is limited to those personnel performing military, intelligence, law enforcement, or security duties in support of C-IED operations.

July Asia-Pacific IED Events by Region




Executive Summary (Continued)

In South Asia, the IED event rate decreased from 102 events in June to 37 events in July. The IED-related casualty rate also decreased, from 46 casualties last month to 33 casualties in July. In Bangladesh, there was a slight increase in IED activity from June, although there were no IED-related casualties (**see pg. 9**). In India, there was a 33% decrease in IED activity from June, however, there was a marginal increase in the IED-related casualty rate (**see pg. 10**). In Nepal, after two consecutive months of abnormally high levels of IED activity, rates dropped in July as political violence tied to local elections subsided (**see pg. 11**).


In Southeast Asia, the IED event rate increased from 33 events in June to 46 events in July. There was also a slight increase in the IED-related casualty rate. In the Philippines, the IED event rate remained mostly unchanged from June, although there was a significant increase in the IED-related casualty rate (3 casualties in June compared to 25 casualties in July) (**see pg.13**). In Thailand, IED activity marginally increased compared to June, while IED-related casualties dropped by 75% (**see pg. 14**). Burma, Indonesia, and Malaysia experienced elevated levels of IED activity this month (**see pgs 15, 16, and 17**).

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from OPEN SOURCES are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations. Event refers to specific IED activity categories: IED Detonation, IED Found/Cleared, IED Hoax, IED Cache.

PACOM IED Events - Past 12 Months



Past Year IED Event Casualty Count




Icons depict events from July 2016 to July 2017; occasional overlap occurs

South Asia sees the highest level of IED events in the region, primarily due to India's high activity. IED activity across the region is often centered around periods of political unrest or contested elections. Devices thrown or emplaced during those outbreaks of violence vary widely in complexity (e.g. basic, command-wire to radio-controlled) and lethality.


Southeast Asia sees approximately half the activity of South Asia, with the Philippines and Thailand as the primary contributors to the number of events. While Thailand's IED activity is primarily attributable to Muslim-Malay insurgents in the south, the Philippines faces communist, jihadist, and Moro separatist threats. By comparison, attacks in Indonesia and Malaysia are far less frequent.

Northeast Asia sees relatively few IED attacks and they can often be attributed to an individual's act of protest against an employer, the government, or retaliation against an acquaintance. Disaffected groups, such as the Uyghurs in China, occasionally incorporate IEDs in their attacks. Press reporting from the region is limited and generally unreliable, therefore some events may not be reflected.

Past Year IED events




Past Year IED events by Country




IED Activity - Past 12 Months

Switch Type



Group Affiliation



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics are presumed to be approximations. Graphics represent known switch type and group affiliation.

Incident Highlight: Rare VBIED attack in Burma

A motorcycle VBIED with an RC switch detonated in front of a tea shop along Burma's northeastern border, killing one government-backed militia member and wounding four others.

Naw San, 43, an officer in the Lawa Yang Militia, was walking back to his vehicle, returning from a nearby market in Momauk, Kachin, when the attack happened. The motorcycle VBIED was parked next to his vehicle. As he attempted to open the door to his car, unidentified assailants remotely detonated the VBIED. Naw San was initially wounded, but died a short time later while being treated at the Momauk Hospital.



22 JUL 2017: Aftermath from Burma VBIED attack

Naw San was the second son of Tang Lai, a former commander from the Kachin Defense Army insurgent group before it was converted into a Burmese border guard force following a set of peace accords established in 2010. Naw San's position and ties may have made him an attractive target for anti-government insurgent groups. Alternatively, some sources stated that Naw San was known to have worked hand-in-hand with Burmese police bullying and intimidating local Shan civilians while doing business in Nmawk area.

VBIEDs are rarely employed in Burma. Over the past five years, there's been only one other documented VBIED, which occurred in 2013. Although not much is known about the RC switch that was used to initiate the VBIED, it comes at a time of increasingly sophisticated RCIEDs being observed over the past year, and potentially corroborating reports of cross border facilitation.

Sources: GNLM (7/23/17) Eleven (7/26/17) Kachinland News (7/24/17)

Special Assessment: ISIS 3 Years Later, Suicides and Sieges in the Pacific

Three years after declaring themselves a transnational Caliphate, ISIS finds itself on the defensive. Following months of steady territorial losses, ISIS lost Mosul this past July, their most important stronghold in Iraq. Additionally, they are on the brink of losing Raqqa, their headquarters in Syria. Altogether, on its third anniversary ISIS has now lost more than 60 percent of their territory and 80 percent of its revenue from where it once began. While ISIS Core has been on the decline, ISIS affiliates in the Asia Pacific have been gaining strength, particularly in the Philippines and Bangladesh.

The ISIS operational picture in South Asia has changed significantly in year three of the group's existence. While the group is slowly gaining momentum in India, the Holey Artisan Bakery attack in Bangladesh quickly and radically changed the nature of the threat, revealed threads that had previously been unconnected, and solidified some assessments regarding assessed strategy.

In India, the ISIS threat remains low to moderate. In March, ISIS-aligned militants in India conducted their first and only successful attack with an IED attack against the Bhopal-Ujjain train in Uttar Pradesh. The device and planning appeared to be of low sophistication, and the cell was largely dismantled after the attack, some cell members have been captured as late as JUL 2017. While a milestone for the group, at this point the threat remains relatively low and Indian security forces appear to be pursuing any possible cells very aggressively, thwarting at least two Gujarat-based ISIS attack plots and dismantling the respective cells prior to the Lucknow cell's successful attack.

It is unclear why ISIS has made such little progress in India, despite a readily-available pool of disaffected Muslims who at one point supported Indian Mujahideen (IM). One possibility is that other regional Muslim insurgents have proven hostile to ISIS. Remarkably, in JUN 2017 Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT) warned ISIS that they were not welcome in the Kashmir insurgency, going as far as to claim ISIS was "the creation of the US-India-Israel" and that they would take action against the group if crossed—a possible indicator Pakistan is also not sympathetic to ISIS, which would prove a major barrier to significant operations in Indian jihadi circles. Crucially, even the anti-Pakistan Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has shifted back away from ISIS after an initial rush to pledge in 2014. These competing factors could explain the slow growth of ISIS in India.



MAR 2017: Train bombing in India

In Bangladesh, the ISIS-aligned neo-Jamaat'ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) VEO has grown to become more dangerous. The end of year 2 saw the Holey Artisan Bakery attack—the most lethal terrorist attack in Bangladesh history—which marked an inflection point for the nascent neo-JMB and the Bangladesh security establishment. When JMB started fracturing, the ISIS affiliation appeared to manifest through a shift from political violence that was typical of an overzealous political party, to tactics that are more reminiscent of hardened terrorists. The Holey attack was the impetus that led Bangladesh to start openly discussing the metamorphosis of neo-JMB, and galvanized security forces into months of named operations against the group in an attempt to root them out.

In the ensuing months it became clear that neo-JMB had changed significantly in terms of culture and capabilities. From AUG to DEC 2016, the Bangladeshi Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) conducted continuous operations against neo-JMB, killing 41 and capturing 80 of their members, including many high-profile leaders, such as the mastermind behind the Holey attack. Then, in December, the first suicide attack occurred during an operation against a neo-JMB safehouse in Ashkona, Dhaka.

March proved to be the bloodiest month in Bangladesh's operations against neo-JMB so far. RAB raided several neo-JMB "safe zones," capturing an unprecedented number of female suicide bombers (**see April 2017 Special Assessment**). Additionally, there were two offensive PBIED attacks targeting a RAB base and a group of police. Starting in March, there have been 12 PBIED detonations, two PBIEDs found and cleared, and seven PBIED caches, some with multiple devices. This volume of devices and attacks stands in stark contrast to the total of two suicide attacks which took place in Bangladesh between 2005 and 2015. These operations and incidents took place across Bangladesh, demonstrating the ISIS-affiliated group was larger, more widespread, and more capable than had previously been assessed.

In SEP 2016, India uncovered an unexpectedly large JMB support network in the eastern-Indian states of West Bengal and Assam, which was used to help shield neo-JMB elements from RAB pressure following the Holey attack and from where resources for the Holey attack were acquired (**See OCT 2016 Monthly**). Additionally, the IED builder making the suicide devices used in Bangladesh was revealed to be Shahidul Islam, who had ties to the 2014 Burdwan incident where an advanced IED factory was discovered, and which first gave hints at the neo-JMB network. These events made clear that India is being used as a safe haven by ISIS-aligned neo-JMB elements, and helps explain the advanced capabilities faced by RAB in 2017.

Neo-JMB is clearly struggling under the pressure of sustained RAB operations, though the group will likely maintain some level of resiliency given its safe havens along India's eastern border, in spite of Bangladesh's efforts to engage India and the international community on counter-terrorism. The long-term prospects of neo-JMB's survival seem uncertain given Bangladesh's current security posture, but regardless of the outcome, they demonstrate the danger of allowing an ISIS-inspired group to operate unchecked for too long in areas that already have terrorist infrastructure in place.

Special Assessment: ISIS 3 Years Later, Suicides and Sieges in the Pacific

Meanwhile in Southeast Asia, progress by ISIS-aligned VEOs in year three has been mixed, with most of the progress occurring in the Philippines. But the ongoing urban conflict in a Philippine city has the potential to become a catalyst for the region.

In Indonesia, there has been only a single successful attack over the past year by pro-ISIS VEOs, equaling the number of successful pro-ISIS attacks from the previous year. In MAY 2017, two Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) suicide bombers detonated their PBIEDs near a bus terminal in Melayu, East Jakarta. JAD is the same VEO that was also behind the JAN 2016 Jakarta attacks. The lack of successful attacks is not for a lack of ambition. Many more JAD plots this past year were disrupted in the planning stages by Indonesian CT forces or fumbled at the execution stage (see page 16).

Meanwhile in Malaysia, the ISIS threat remains low. There has not been any successful pro-ISIS attacks in Malaysia over the past year, down from a single successful pro-ISIS attack in the previous year. Muhamad Wanndy Mohamad Jedi, Malaysia's most prominent ISIS influencer/facilitator was also killed in an airstrike in Raqqa this past April. Following Wanndy's death, Malaysian security services identified four Malaysians to possibly fill the late leader's role. As of late this month, none of the four identified, Muhammad Rafiuddin, Akhbar Zainal, Muhammad Fuzail, or Muhammad Zahar, have clearly stepped into his former position.



MAY 2017: Twin Suicide Bombings in Indonesia

As ISIS loses its grip in the Levant, the issue of returnees is a rapidly becoming a pressing issue for Southeast Asia, the region where most of the Asia-Pacific foreign fighters hail from. In response, Southeast Asian countries have been taking steps over the past year to improve their ability to address the foreign-fighter / returnee problem.

In Indonesia, their legislative body announced that they will be revamping their CT law and enacting new penalties for returnees in legislation they expect to pass this September. Under the current Indonesian CT law, arresting people returning from a tour with ISIS is a very difficult task. In JUL, Indonesia held a six country minister-level summit where they agreed to establish a Foreign Terrorist Fighters Forum in a bid to strengthen cooperation and intelligence sharing across the region (see page 12). Indonesia's forward progress in addressing the returnee problem is encouraging considering the vast majority of foreign fighters from the Asia Pacific are believed to be Indonesian nationals. In fact according to a recently published list of foreign jihadists who were arrested in Turkey while attempting to cross the border and join ISIS, Indonesia had the second most arrestees of any country. Of the 4957 foreign arrestees, 435 were Indonesian nationals, underscoring the need for Indonesia to take proactive measures.

Malaysia, coming in a distant second with the number of foreign fighters from a given country in the Asia Pacific supporting ISIS, also took steps in the past year to counter the foreign fighter problem. This past year Malaysia established their Counter Messaging Center, which aims to counter extremist narratives being propagated over social media. In OCT 2016, Malaysia also established the National Special Operations Force (NSOF), an interagency task force that has the job of being Malaysia's main security force and first responder to terror threats.


ISIS aligned VEOs in the Philippines have seen the most progress in Southeast Asia. Under the ISIS-declared emir of the Philippines, Isnilon Hapilon, ISIS Philippines has executed multiple mass-casualty attacks over the past year to include the SEP 2016 Davao City bombing and the DEC 2016 Hilongos bombings. They are also suspected of being involved in the APR-MAY 2017 Quiapo bombings. Several of their unsuccessful attacks are also worth mentioning, because of what those attempts might indicate about ISIS Philippines priorities. One of those failed attacks involved an RCIED emplaced near the US Embassy in Manila this past November. The other involved IS-linked militants clashing with Philippine security forces on the popular and Western-friendly tourist island of Bohol, which is far from their strongholds in the southern Philippines.

However it is Hapilon's most recent operation, the MAY 2017 takeover of Marawi, that has really placed a spotlight on the ISIS Philippines leader in the eyes the global jihadist community and earned him a cover page on the tenth issue of *Rumiyah* (see JUN 2017 Special Assessment). In response to the insurrection, which has so far resulted in over 1,000 casualties to Philippine security forces, President Duterte declared martial law throughout the Southern Philippines. The Philippine congress recently decided to extend martial law until 31 DEC 2017.

Marawi has a potential to be a game changer not just for the Philippines, but potentially for the entire region. As Southeast Asian extremists look for opportunities to wage jihad, they may realize that the Philippines is a credible and attractive substitute for the Levant, where ISIS' footprint is shrinking. This is the most dangerous regional prospect of Marawi; that it might reinvigorate Malaysian and Indonesian extremists and provide them with a training grounds to develop the bomb-making, planning, and infantry skills they currently lack.

Sources: CNS Kashmir (6/28/17), Zee News (6/11/16), Hindustan Times (10/24/16), Time (8/14/16), The Telegraph (10/14/14), Dhaka Tribune (12/27/16) Today (5/15/17) News.com.au (7/14/17) Strait Times (7/21/17), Diplomat (11/1/16) NY Times (7/22/17)

Person of Interest / VEO of Interest

POI: Zakir Musa		
ALIAS: Zakir Rashid Bhat DOB: 25 July 1994 (23)	FROM: Noorpora, Village Tral, Kashmir, India AREA OF OPERATION: Jammu and Kashmir, India	
<p>Zakir Musa is the leader of the newly created Al Qaeda (AQ) cell in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), India, Ansar Ghazwat-ul-Hind. In late-July 2017, Musa assumed a leadership role of the organization, after he stepped down as the commander of Hizbul Mujahideen for ideological reasons. According to Indian Police, Ansar Ghazwat-ul-Hind is a loosely structured organization; focused primarily on criminal operations.</p> <p>Musa has always been focused on taking jihad into the J&K conflict. Musa's vision for Kashmir differs from most Islamic separatist groups in the J&K region. Musa believes that installing Sharia Law should be the primary focus of the Kashmir conflict. That other separatist leaders in the J&K region are interfering in this Islamic struggle. Musa vowed to attack such politically-focused separatists; to include conducting Jihad against politically-centric separatists in Pakistan.</p> <p>Musa fully embraces social media for recruitment and pro-AQ propaganda. Exploiting the growing disappointment amongst Kashmiris, in an attempt to revitalize the insurgency against Indian control of the J&K region. While Musa has had little success in garnering support among the ranks of militants, slogans in his support have been heard at many funerals and also during a recent mob attack against J&K police officers.</p> <p>The recent rise of Musa and the Ansar Ghazwat-ul-Hind is a reminder that the J&K region continues to not only remain a potentially contentious ethno-political conflict zone but a fertile ground for jihadist outreach, recruitment and facilitation of attack operations — against both Indian and Pakistan Security Forces. Additionally, while ISIS continues to attract a vast majority of the gravitation pull in global jihad, AQ continues to remain a consistent long-term threat. Not only in the form of broader jihadist movements (i.e. AQ in the Indian Sub-Continent (AQIS)) but also more obscure affiliates, illustrated in the rise of Musa and Ansar Ghazwat-ul-Hind.</p>		
<p>Sources: Global Daily Tribune (7/26/17); The Times of India (7/27/17); News18 (5/13/17); The Times of India; India Today (5/13/17); The Guardian (7/27/17); Hindustan Times (7/28/17); Kashmir Life (8/3/17); Daily News and Analysis India (7/13/17)</p>		
VEO: MARA Patani		
LEADER: Kamaludin Hanapi ALIASES: Majlis Syura Patani; Majis Amanah Rakyat Pantani; Patani Consultative Council	FOUNDED: 25 OCT 2014 AREA OF OPERATIONS: Southern Thailand	
<p>MARA Patani is an umbrella organization formed in 2014 by Southern Thai Insurgent (STI) leaders of the Islamic Liberation Front of Patani (BIPP), Patani Islamic Mujahideen Movement (GMIP), and the three major factions of the Patani United Liberation Organisation (PULO) to negotiate the separation from Thailand. After the original peace talks broke down in 2013 between the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) and Thai government, MARA tried to leverage its position through condemning violence, and offering a way forward though peace talks. In Mid-2015 the BRN joined MARA holding half of the seats and leadership positions – an acknowledgement of their military dominance over the other groups. However BRN's participation was short-lived, and by OCT 2015 the BRN stopped participating in the peace process and returned to violence.</p> <p>Kamaludin Hanapi, better known as Abu Hafez Al-Hakim, is recognized as the key delegate and lead spokesmen for MARA. Al-Hakim, brought three proposals on behalf of MARA to the Thai government in 2016: 1) Recognize MARA Patani as an official dialogue partner. 2) Place the peace talks as an issue of national importance endorsed by the Thai Parliament, so that future administrations must continue to work on it. 3) Impunity for MARA members, so that they can enter Thailand and converse with citizens. The Thai Government has yet to seriously consider any of MARA's proposals.</p> <p>MARA continues to communicate and meet with the Thai government despite the BRN's lack of participation. MARA committed in early 2017 to establishing safety zones inside each province as a trust-building measure, but MARA's inability to prevent and control violent activity in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat will undermine their success. Although both parties are inching towards establishing those zones, the success of the peace talks will ultimately depend on BRNs participation in talks, as well as the Thai government's rigid stance on separation.</p>		
<p>Sources: The Diplomat (7/18/17), Prachatai English (6/23/16), Deep South Watch (5/26/16), The Diplomat (5/12/15)</p>		

South Asia: July Significant Activity

al-Qa'ida in South Asia

On 27 JUL, AQIS announced through its propaganda channel, the Global Islamic Media Front, that Zakir Musa will head the organization. This announcement comes just a month after AQIS released an updated Code of Conduct that outlines its organizational structure and objectives (with special emphasis on Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and Burma), and reiterates its commitment to the Taliban. Additionally, in a move to distance itself from the brutality of ISIS, AQIS stated its position on non-Sunni Muslim sects, the mistreatment of women and children, attacks on special sites (mosques, cemeteries, market places, courts, etc.), and encouraged reducing the number of Muslim civilian casualties. **First Post (7/27/17) Economic Times (7/27/17) Diplomat (7/29/17) Prothom Alo (8/1/17)**

Bangladesh

On 8 JUL, Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) arrested Sohel Mahfuz (see **June 2017 POI**), a key Neo-Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (Neo-JMB) bomb maker, in Chapainawbganj, Bangladesh. Bangladeshi authorities have connected him to several attacks since 2016, including the July 2016 Holey Artisan Bakery attack and a grenade attack that killed two police officers. Mahfuz is also being investigated by Indian law enforcement for involvement in the 2014 Burdwan explosion. He is alleged to be the head of JMB in India's West Bengal State, and was in Tamim Chowdhury's inner circle of ISIS-inspired Neo-JMB militants. Chowdhury, the former leader of Neo-JMB, was killed in August 2016. **BDNews24 (7/8/17) BDNews24 (7/8/17)**

According to Bangladeshi IED experts, Neo-JMB militants have been mixing Triacetone Triperoxide (TATP), a homemade explosive (HME) that can be produced with relatively common ingredients. TATP has been recovered from at least three sites, and precursor chemicals were also recovered over the past several months. Neo-JMB militants have been incorporating the TATP into suicide belts rigged with grenades. **Daily Star (7/9/17)**

India

On 17 July, the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) Chariman Syed Ali Gilani made a statement on the situation in Jammu and Kashmir. He commented on China's increasing interest of the Jammu and Kashmir region; and China's offer to mediate and resolve issues in the region, which was denied by India. He also mentions how both Pakistan and India were making big investments on military expenses, while majority of their population lived below the poverty line. **Nation (7/17/17)**

On July 18, Press reported that the Islamic State (IS) has been showing more interest in the Jammu and Kashmir region, by mentioning the IS' message to its supporters "on the ground in Kashmir", which detailed how supporters could prepare for attacks. The report stated that IS has been using the encrypted messaging service (Telegram) to distribute instructions, manuals, and other IS propaganda. **Brighter Kashmir (7/18/17)**


On July 26, Two men were arrested in the Kanpur district, for alleged ties to an Islamic State-related module in Kanpur. The men were identified as Asif Iqbal (26) and Mohammad Atif (27). The suspects came under suspicion due to Asif's supposed relation "Saifiullah", who was a part of the nine-member Khorasan module in Kanpur, which was held responsible for the Bhopal-Ujjain passenger train on March 7, 2017. **New Indian Express (7/26/17)**

On 27 July, Press reported that the Indian government has approved the addition of three more bomb detection and disposal squads in the Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB). The new squads will be based in Srinagar of Jammu and Kashmir, Gaya in Bihar, and Bhilai in Chhattisgarh. **India (7/27/17)**

Nepal

With the final round of local elections just two months away, the leader of the Rashtriya Janata Party Nepal (RJPN) stated that they will not participate in the Province no. 2 elections if the government does not pass a constitutional amendment that followed through on previously made agreements to the Terai peoples. Mainstream political parties, such as the Nepali Congress, have been critical of the RJPN; there also appears to be a disagreement within the party itself over participation in the polls. Province no. 2 has experienced much of the violence over the last year, including IED activity by the Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (JTMM). **Kathmandu Post (7/25/17) My Republica (7/26/17)**

Bangladesh: July IED Events




There were two IED detonation events, four IED cache events, and one IED found and cleared event.

On 1 JUL, an IED was found and cleared and an IED cache was recovered from Neo-JMB militants in Bheramara, Kushtia, Khulna; three women married to high ranking militants were arrested. The device was described as a suicide vest that failed to detonate because the attacker did not know how to trigger the device. The IED cache contained 10kg gunpowder, two armed suicide vests, one loaded pistol, and one magazine. **BDNews24 (7/1/17) Daily Mail (7/2/17) Dhaka Tribune (7/3/17)**

On 12 JUL, an IED cache was recovered following the arrest of a Neo-JMB militant in Suryanarayanpur, Chapainawabganj, Rajshahi. The cache contained 19kg of explosives. **Daily Star (7/14/17)**

On 16 JUL, thrown IEDs detonated during a raid on a Neo-JMB hideout by Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) in Chowrabari, Pathalia, Savar, Dhaka; four suspects were arrested. A search of the hideout led to the recovery of an IED cache; the cache contained three IEDs. **BDNews 24 (7/16/17) Dhaka Tribune (7/16/17)**


Past Year IED Events by Type



On 20 JUL, a pressure cooker IED detonated in Ghonabanda, Dumuria, Khulna. An image of the device appears to show nails, nuts, and ball bearings inside the pressure cooker. **Dhaka Tribune (7/21/17)**

On 25 JUL, an IED cache was recovered following the arrest of two suspected Neo-JMB militants by RAB in Dorbost, Jaintiapur, Sylhet. The cache contained 3.9kg power gel and 30 electronic detonators. **Dhaka Tribune (7/25/17)**

Past Year IED Event Casualty Count




IED activity in July remained relatively low, with the majority of events being cache recoveries. The RAB continued their CT offensive against ISIS-aligned Neo-JMB militants. The attempted suicide bombing on 1 JUL was particularly concerning, as it continued to show the disturbing willingness for the family members of Neo-JMB militants to kill themselves using suicide belts.

1 JUL also marked the one year anniversary since the Holey Artisan Bakery attack in Gulshan, Dhaka, which claimed the lives of 22 civilians and two police officers, and wounded 50 others. The attack marked a turning point in Bangladesh's security posture and reaction to the threat of terrorism. The efforts put forth by RAB and the Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC) division appear to be paying off, as another major event like the Gulshan attack has not occurred.

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

India: July IED Events



There were 14 IED detonation events, six IED found and cleared events, five IED cache events and two hoax IED events.

On 13 JUL, three IEDs were found and cleared by Assam Rifles in Chhata Berka locality, Biribam district, Manipur. The devices were attached to a bridge, and were successfully removed and rendered safe by bomb experts. **Business Standard (7/13/17)**


On 21 JUL, an IED cache was discovered by Balangir Police and District Voluntary Force in Turekela, Balangir district, Odisha. The cache was found at a deserted Maoist camp, based on a tip. The cache included two boxes with explosives, one empty explosive container, 62 gelatin sticks, 5kg of urea, electric wire, 18 syringes, 10 banners, "battery slips," and other assorted items. **Times of India (7/21/17)**

On 25 JUL, an IED was found and cleared by Indian Army and police personnel in Loran-Mandi, Poonch district, Jammu and Kashmir. The device reportedly weighed 5kg, and was emplaced along Loran-Mand road, a few days ahead of the annual "Buddha Amarnath yatra" pilgrimage. **Hindustan Times (7/25/17)**

On 27 JUL, an IED detonated against Central Reserve Police Force Personnel (CRPF) in Katekalyan, Dantewada district, Chhattisgarh, resulting in one CRPF jawan wounded. The device appeared to be a pressure-activated VOIED which detonated when the jawan attempted to remove a Naxal banner. The detonation resulted in minor injuries to the jawan's hand. **Indian Express (7/28/17)**


On 28 JUL, an IED was found and cleared by 29th Rashtriya Rifles personnel in Parihaspora, Paramulla district, Jammu and Kashmir. The device was emplaced along Baramulla highway and was rendered safe by bomb disposal squad personnel. **Greater Kashmir (7/28/17)**

Past Year IED Events by Type



Overall IED activity declined in July, while returning to a more typical ratio of detonations and recoveries. The decline in activity mostly occurred in Maoist regions, and may have been tied to the return of the monsoons. IED incidents in July were largely small "crude bomb" devices associated with political violence.

Past Year IED Event Casualty Count




During July, it became apparent that the increased amount of IED activity in Jammu and Kashmir appeared to be an effort to target the annual "Buddha Amarnath yatra" pilgrimage, which passes through the Poonch district of Jammu and Kashmir, and which has proven to be an attractive target for religiously motivated militants in the past. Though the target in this case did not appear to be security forces, it is nonetheless an indicator that Pakistan may be turning a blind eye to cross-border militant activity. Despite the relatively low level of IED activity, Jammu and Kashmir remains volatile and has been experiencing many conventional attacks, which could easily translate to IED activity at a later time.


The syringes found at the abandoned Naxal camp are interesting. The trigger mechanisms used in Naxal pressure-activated VOIEDs are not reported, and this cache may indicate they are syringe-based triggers, similar to those seen in Iraq and Afghanistan.

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Nepal: July IED Events



Past Year IED Events by Type



There were two IED detonation events and one IED found and cleared event.

On 7 JUL, an IED was found and cleared by Nepal Army EOD from the premises of the Bhojpur District Court in Bhojpur, Kosi. Authorities suspect the socket bomb was a war remnant, but the emplacement was recent. **Nepal Monitor (7/9/17)**

On 10 JUL, a pressure cooker IED detonated just before the start of a protest by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) in Milan Chowk, Butwal, Rupandehi, Lumbini. **Nepal Monitor (7/11/17)**

On 11 JUL, a pressure cooker IED detonated outside the Ganesh Temple in Bhagawati, Tansen, Palpa, Lumbini. Police suspect the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) was responsible. **Nepal Monitor (7/11/17)**

IED activity dropped significantly in July, as the second round of national elections concluded in June. Two events related to the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) protests occurred this month, continuing the low-level political violence that has been consistent in Nepal for several years. IED activity may increase again in September, as the third round of local elections are held. Certain ethno-political parties have been threatening to protest the upcoming elections if the constitution isn't amended to meet their demands; this could increase overall violence levels in the Terai region.

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Southeast Asia: July Significant Activity

Regional Counterterrorism Cooperation in Southeast Asia

In late July security ministers and officials from Indonesia, Australia, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, and New Zealand held a one-day summit in North Sulawesi, Indonesia focused on strengthening cooperation between intelligence services to counter extremist threats in Southeast Asia. The parties agreed to establish a Foreign Terrorist Fighters Forum which will share information between countries in the region, which would include information on militants and their cross-border movements. They also agreed to encourage cooperation between governments and companies that provide social media services, video file sharing and messaging. The other points of action included fighting terror financing, stepping up cooperation on immigration issues, and undertaking comparative studies on terrorism in their respective countries. An agreement was also reached on more cooperation with countries in the Middle East in the fight against the ISIS militant group. Several countries in the Middle East, including Turkey, are to attend a summit in August to kick off cooperation across the two regions.

Channel News Asia (7/29/17) ABC News (7/29/17) Straits Times (7/30/17)

Burma

Over the last nine months, 44 civilians have been killed and 27 have disappeared in Northern Rakhine state. In response, security forces have stepped up operations in the area, conducting raids on suspected militant camps and arresting hundreds of people. Security forces have charged more than 500 Rakhine Muslims and are seeking the arrest of a further 1,300 for their suspected involvement in the October 2016 border patrol attack. In particular, the areas of Maungtaw and Buthidaung have been affected, where village headmen have been the primary targets. **Frontera (7/16/17) GNLM (7/22/17) RFA (7/24/17) GNLM (7/24/17) RFA (8/1/17)**

Indonesia

In mid-July, a co-founder of the social messaging app Telegram, announced that their company would create a team of moderators who are familiar with Indonesian culture and language to remove "terrorist-related content" from their app in Indonesia. Telegram's decision to moderate terrorism content came days after Indonesia's Ministry of Communications and Information Technology threatened to block Telegram's access unless the company took steps to remove illegal content from its channels. Officials at the Ministry of Communications said the app is used to recruit Indonesians into militant groups and to spread hate and methods for carrying out attacks including bomb making. Telegram has now blocked the channels that were reported to it by the Indonesian government. **CNBC (7/16/17)**

Philippines

On 24 JUL, President Duterte delivered his State of the Nation Address (SONA). Duterte stated he will no longer talk with communist rebels, however has vowed to pursue peace during his term in office. He then went on and threatened to order soldiers and police to shoot rebels if they continue their attacks against government forces. The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) instructed the NPA to carry out these attacks across the country to resist the President's proposal to extend martial law. This comes as on 18 JUL, the military recovered 19 IEDs and materials from rebels to be used before and after the SONA. A day later, the NPA ambushed members of the Presidential Security Group (PSG) leaving members of the detail injured. Police say the NPA are drawing out the peace talks to have more time to recruit more members and they are not sincere in promoting peace for the country. **CNN (7/24/17) Manila Bulletin (7/24/17) Philippine Star (7/25/17)**

This month, there has been little IED activity from the ASG, however on 20 JUL in two separate incidents, seven men were kidnapped. On 27 JUL, the military began airstrikes in Sulu to rescue kidnap victims, which totaled to roughly 25 foreign and Filipino nationals. Reporting indicated there was roughly a hundred ASG men sighted and were planning to march to Jolo. An evacuation of 30 barangays was agreed upon prior to the airstrikes. Days after the airstrikes, the bodies of the kidnapped victims were discovered. **Philippine Star (7/29/17) CNN (7/31/17)**

Thailand

The Royal Thai Navy (RTN) has completed initial testing of a re-engineered and upgraded Cadillac Gage V-150 Commando 4x4 light armored vehicle by Panus Assembly Co Ltd. Given the prevalent mine and IED threat in Thailand's southern provinces, a key aim of the project was to improve both ballistic and blast protection levels of a vehicle originating from a time when 7.62 mm ball rounds and anti-personnel mine protection was considered adequate for a vehicle of this type. The desire was to deliver a product with protection levels comparable to the RTN's in-service Panus Phantom 380-X1 MRAPs. The aim for Panus would be to similarly upgrade the remainder of the service's 24 V-150 vehicles should this effort find favor with the RTN. **Janes HIS (7/6/2017)**

Philippines: July IED Events



There were 12 IED detonation events, two IED found and cleared events, and nine IED cache events.

On 1 JUL, an IED planted by the New People's Army detonated resulting in one soldier killed in barangay Mount Diwata, Monkayo municipality, Compostela Valley province, Davao region, Mindanao island. A firefight ensued between troops and roughly 80 rebels resulting in multiple injuries. **Sun Star (7/6/17)**


On 12 JUL, an IED detonated by the New People's Army in barangay Gahit, Cataingan municipality, Masbate province, Bicol region, Masbate island. Two separate responding forces were targeted by the rebels with IEDs. A firefight with the rebels ensued following one of the attacks. **Inquirer Southern Luzon (7/12/17)**

On 16 JUL, an IED cache was recovered by the Philippine Army following a firefight with New People's Army rebels in barangay Titik, Leon Postigo municipality, Zamboanga del Norte province, Zamboanga Peninsula region, Mindanao island. The cache contained three 40 mm grenades, 15 IEDs, medical paraphernalia, and anti-government propaganda. **Mindanao Examiner (7/17/17)**


ON 25 JUL, an IED, planted by New People's Army rebels detonated at a construction site in barangay San Jorge, Las Navas municipality, Northern Samar province, Eastern Visayas region, Samar island resulting in a construction worker's death. The military reported the device was planted by NPA rebels to scare away the workers at the irrigation project. The rebels are trying to stop the project so residents will not have any irrigation. **Inquirer Visayas (7/25/17)**

On 31 JUL, an IED cache was recovered at the North Cotabato district jail, Cotabato province, SOCCSKSARGEN region, Mindanao island following a raid of prison cells by a joint police and army team. The cache contained one electric circuit used to manufacture an IED, 45 assorted cellular phones, and 69 sharp objects (knives and ice picks). The raid came after roughly twenty high-risk inmates were transferred to a more secured jail. **Minda News (8/1/17)**

Past Year IED Events by Type



Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



This month, the majority of IED events were attributed to the New People's Army (NPA) with attacks targeting primarily security forces. The government has said much of their forces focus has been aligned to the ongoing operations in Marawi, and once Marawi is completed they will shift focus back to the NPA and other terrorist groups such as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF).

A small portion of Marawi is still being held by roughly 50 men tied to the Maute Group. There have been conflicting reports regarding the status of Isnilon Hapilon and the Maute brothers. The military is reporting Hapilon is still in the city fighting rather than fleeing in the days after the start over two months ago, and now one of the Maute brothers has been killed. Lawmakers approved the President's request to extend martial law till 31 DEC. Until the siege ends, it is unclear what the terrorist landscape will look like and the fate of ISIS-PHL, as over 500 fighters have been slain in this siege to date.

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Thailand: July IED Events



There were six IED detonation events and two IED found and cleared events.


On 15 July 2017 a 10KG propane tank RCIED hidden in a motorcycle (VBIED) detonated along the left side of a bridge wounding two police officers and one civilian in Sungai Kolok District, Narathiwat Province. The mounted police patrol which included 11 personnel and three vehicles (two motorcycles and one patrol car) initially drove past the abandoned motorcycle before returning to inspect it. When they returned the VBIED detonated. The source the stolen motorcycle was from within Narathiwat Province and the attackers switched the plates on the vehicle to avoid detection by local law enforcement searching for a stolen vehicle. **Bangkok Post (7/15/2017)**

On 20 July 2017 six steel pipe bombs weighing between 700-800 grams each were thrown at the Tonsai police checkpoint killing one police officer and wounding another. Four of the six pipe bombs exploded. **Bangkok Post (7/20/2017) The Nation (7/20/2017) ThaiPBS (7/20/2017)**



On 23 July 2017 two bombs exploded during a complex attack on a operation base occupied by Infantry Company 2513 of Pattani Task Force 24. Insurgents opened fire at the base, prompting soldiers to return fire. The exchange lasted about five minutes, with the militants firing randomly at the homes of many local villagers. Following the attack, police and soldiers scoured the area and found two bomb craters in front of the military base and recovered more than 80 spent cartridges of M16 and AK47 ammunition. **Thai PBS (7/24/2017)**

On 26 July 2017 A RCIED detonated against a patrolling unit. The device which was concealed in a bush along the road was described as 20kg and detonated by radio left a 50m deep crater; two border patrol officers wounded. Investigators found a spot about 30m off the road where the bombers were believed to have waited for the patrol to arrive and then detonated the bomb. The next day, on 27 July 2017, four people were detained. **Bangkok Post (7/27/2017)**

Past Year IED Events by Type




Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



While IED activity has gone down, the insurgents have continued to use other attacks including small arms fire (SAF) as a TTP. The attack on the military operations base is significant because of its boldness. Most attacks in the past have been on convoys or check points away from any large contingent of troops. While no IED was recovered at the base attack, two bomb craters were found just outside indicating the insurgents have employed some type of explosive device. Vehicle theft remains a standard TTP either as a means of transportation or for modification into a VBIED.

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Burma: July IED Events



There were four IED detonation events and four IED cache events.


On 10 JUL, an IED detonated during a firefight with militants in Tinmay, Buthidaung, Rakhine. Following the end of the firefight, an IED cache was recovered. The cache contained Two Ba-94 cartridge cases, six Ba-94 blank bullets, one handmade gun, one RCIED (remote mine), IED components, one Bangladesh Taka 1000 (USD 12), other Bangladesh Taka denominations, one symphony phone, and other items. **GNLM (7/10/17)**

On 14 JUL, an IED cache was recovered following the arrest of a suspected Kachin Independence Army (KIA) militant by State Police in Kachin. The cache contained detonators and KIA uniforms. **Eleven (7/26/17)**

On 15 JUL, an IED detonated on a hillside in Pyaung Pike, Maungtaw, Rakhine; three farmers were killed and one was wounded. **GNLM (7/16/17)**

On 22 JUL, an RCIED hidden inside a motorcycle detonated outside a tea shop in Momauk, Kachin; one Lawayang Militiaman was killed and four individuals were injured. **GNLM (7/23/17) Eleven (7/26/17)**

Past Year IED Events by Type



On 23 JUL, an IED cache was recovered following the arrest of two suspects in Ward 4, Myawady, Kayin. The cache contained dynamite and 12 detonators. This event is believed to be connected to a 19 JUL weapons cache and the 26 JUL IED cache. **GNLM (7/26/17)**

On 25 JUL, an RCIED hanging in a tree detonated near a passing State Police convoy in Mogaung, Kachin. KIA militants are believed to be responsible. **Eleven (7/26/17)**

On 26 JUL, an IED cache was recovered following inputs from two detained suspects near the Damahyone Buddhist Temple in Ward 5, Myawady, Kayin. The cache contained 100 dynamite pellets, 16 detonators, and four explosive coils (possible det cord). The suspects were detained on 23 JUL, are also believed to be connected to a weapons cache recovered on 19 JUL. **GNLM (7/27/17)**

IED activity in July reached the highest level since January, with the majority of events occurring in the two states of Rakhine and Kachin. In Rakhine, authorities have not named the specific militant group involved in the July events, but indications from June's raid in the Mayu Mountains point to increasing activity by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) in the Maungtaw and Buthidaung areas. In Kachin, the KIA continues operations against the Tatmawdaw and local security forces, to include the use of an RCIED.

Two IED cache events in July were located near the Thai border in Kayin. These two events were also connected to a 19 JUL weapons cache that contained assault rifles. Information about the intended use of the weapons and explosives recovered in all three caches has not yet been released, but they could have been criminal in nature.


IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Indonesia: July IED Events



There were two IED detonation events and three IED cache events.

Past Year IED Events by Type



On 5 JUL, a timed IED detonated outside of the Religious Affairs Office (KUA) in Cilacap, Central Java. No casualties, but it damaged the office's fence, shattered windows, and flung fragments as far as 100 meters. The IED was composed of a 3-kilogram gas canister container and mosquito coil switch. Police are investigating the attack as a possibly terror-related based on pamphlets found at the crime scene that expressed disappointment in a cleric in Cirebon, West Java regency. **Jakarta Post (7/5/17) (7/7/17)**

On 8 JUL, a premature detonation occurred at a boarding house in Bandung, West Java. No casualties. Police responded to the scene and discovered debris from a pressure cooker IED that had prematurely detonated as well as fragments of 7cm-long nails that had been used as fragmentation. Police also arrested Agus Wignua, the 28-year-old man who was renting the room where the explosion occurred. Wignua told the police that he learned how to assemble IEDs from the Internet and had planned to use the pressure cooker IED at café in Bandung on 16 AUG with a tripwire switch. **Straits Times (7/8/17) Netral News (7/8/17) (7/13/17) Jakarta Globe (7/8/17) Antara**

News (7/13/17) Tempo (7/12/17) (7/19/17)

On 20 JUL, an IED cache was seized in Pangkajene and Islands regency, South Sulawesi following the arrests of 15 Malaysian fishermen who were arrested in a series of arrests over the week. The cache contained 1,300 detonators and more than 200 kilograms of ammonium nitrate. Police believe the fishermen were attempting to smuggle the cache material in from Malaysia, to be resold or repurposed for blast fishing. **Jakarta Post (7/24/17)**

IED events in Indonesia this past month were up. The discovery of a Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) cell operating in Bandung led to information on IED caches. Following the 8 JUL premature detonation, investigative efforts by the police revealed that Agus Wiguna was part of a JAD cell that was plotting multiple attacks throughout Bandung. Between 8 and 18 JUL, police arrested five other JAD militants who were part of Wiguna's cell in Bandung, and discovered two more IED caches as they raided the residences of those JAD militants.


The militants admitted that they have unsuccessfully attempted to conduct IED attacks two other times in recent months. In May, they admitted they attempted to detonate a 1.5 kilogram IED at a restaurant in Astana Anyar, Bandung, but the IED failed to detonate. They also attempted to bomb a Catholic church in Buahbatu, Bandung, but that also failed as the device only emitted smoke.

Following Aman Abdurrahman's declaration of support for ISIS-Philippines and the conflict of Marawi in June, there was a question whether his JAD militants would follow this guidance. Wiguna told police that he intended to join the Marawi fight after he pulled off the 16 AUG attack, possibly indicating Aman's guidance is having an effect over his fighters.


The Bandung JAD cell's repeated failure to successfully build an IED and execute an attack is a fairly common theme with Indonesian terrorism. This underscores the danger the Marawi conflict presents, providing fighters like Wiguna an opportunity to travel to the Philippines for jihad and one day return with improved bomb-making and/or operational skills.

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Malaysia: July IED Events



Past Year IED Events by Type



There was one IED found and cleared event and one IED cache event.

On 8 JUL, an IED was found and cleared after it was discovered on the bumper of a car in Kapar, Klang. A 27-year-old nurse, while driving home from work, stopped at her uncle's house to find the source of a suspicious beeping noise. She discovered a suspicious object on the bumper of her car that turned out to be an IED. Police and EOD responded to the scene and rendered the device safe around 0230 on 9 JUL. The device was composed of two cylinders wrapped in black tape, and wires as well as an electronic circuit board and switch. The device reportedly was not designed to cause serious injuries or damage. **Star (7/9/17) (7/10/17) (7/13/17)**

On 10 JUL, an IED cache was seized by police after arresting the suspect wanted for the attempted 8 JUL IED attack at his residence. The cache contained several "electronic devices" and "firecracker explosives" that were identical to what was used in 8 JUL IED. **Star (7/10/17) (7/13/17)**

For the month of July, IED activity in Malaysia remains consistently low. The perpetrator behind the 8 JUL failed attack was the ex-boyfriend of the woman who was targeted. The ex-boyfriend claimed he was only harassing his ex-girlfriend because she failed to make car payments on her car, for which he was the guarantor. This sort of revenge motivated IED attack is a consistent theme in Malaysia. The vast majority of IED events in Malaysia are either criminal or personal/revenge attacks.

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Northeast Asia: July Significant Activity

China

On 26 JUL, the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), a Jakarta-based security think-tank, published a report stating that Indonesian domestic workers in Hong Kong are vulnerable to radicalization by ISIS, and that a number of maids have even used Hong Kong as a launching point to travel to Syria and Iraq. There are approximately 150,000 Indonesian domestic workers in Hong Kong. Members of the Muslim community in Hong Kong have been quick to emphasize IPAC's findings, pointing out that only 45 maids thus far are known to have been radicalized. They also have said that on-going allegations of abuse by employers (to include confiscation of passports) may be playing a role in turning some workers towards radical ideas. **Japan Today (7/26/17)**

Japan

Tokyo police have dubbed 2020 as the "first year of high-tech security," emphasizing the developing role of technology in the prevention or terrorist acts at the upcoming 2020 Tokyo Olympics. The Japan Atomic Energy Agency developed a device capable of detecting nuclear materials during routine baggage screening at the airport, which could be used to commit acts of terrorism. Additionally, it is working to enhance nuclear forensics analytical technology. Other agencies and companies have also been involved in using artificial intelligence (AI) technology to detect terrorist threats sooner, using a combination of biometric analysis and other means. Some of the technologies being developed are already being implemented at other large-scale venues. **Japan Times (7/19/17) Yomiuri (7/26/17)**

On 28 JUL, Japan's Defense Minister, Tomomi Inada, resigned to take responsibility for a data cover up on the peacekeeping mission in South Sudan, from which Japan withdrew in May 2017. Logs from Self-Defense Forces (SDF) troops indicate that they may have been involved in conflict situations that could violate Japan's constitution. Two other high ranking officials will also be resigning their positions over the scandal. Itsunori Onodera, who served as the Defense Minister from 2012 to 2014, is expected to take over the duties again following Inada's departure. **CNN (7/28/17) Diplomat (7/28/17) Japan Times (7/29/17) Nikkei Asian Review (8/2/17)**

North Korea

A recently released report by Financial Security Institute, a South Korean state-backed agency, states that North Korean cyber attacks now focus more on stealing money, versus acquiring classified information or causing social disruption. Cyber experts have implicated North Korean hackers under the name "Lazarus" and other spin-off groups in the 2016 Bangladesh Central Bank cyber heist, the 2014 Sony Studios attack, and possibly the WannaCry global ransomware attack. As North Korea's nuclear program development costs continue to grow, it is increasingly likely that they will use legitimate and illegitimate means to raise funds. **Reuters (7/27/17) The Australian (7/29/17)**

IED Calendar

The IED calendar was established to help our audience maintain awareness of events, such as anniversaries of major attacks, or political, religious or cultural events that often coincide (or can potentially coincide) with a spike in IED events.

	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
<p>1 JUL (BAN): Anniversary of the Holey Artisan Bakery attack</p> <p>13 JUL (INDO): Anniversary of Marriot-Ritz bombing</p> <p>28 JUL - 3 AUG (IND): Martyr's Weeks</p> <p>8 AUG 1988 (BUR): 8888 Uprising</p> <p>14 AUG 1947 (IND): Naga Independence Day</p> <p>15 AUG 1949 (IND): Independence Day</p> <p>23 AUG 2003 (IND): Mumbai Attack - Gateway of India</p>	25	26	27	28	29	30	1 BAN
	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	9	10	11	12	13 INDO	14	15
	16	17	18	19	20	21	22
	23	24	25	26	27	28 IND	29 IND
	30 IND	31 IND	1 IND	2 IND	3 IND	4	5
<p>31 AUG 1957 (MAL/THA): Hari Merdeka Malaysian Independence Day/Bersatu Foundation Day (Southern Thailand)</p> <p>1 SEP 2007 (BUR): Anniversary of Saffron Revolution</p> <p>9 SEP 2004 (INDO): Anniversary of Australian Embassy Bombing</p> <p>25 SEP 2002 (IND): Akshardham Temple Attack</p> <p>28 SEP (NEP): Phase II local elections</p>	6	7	8 BUR	9	10	11	12
	13	14 IND	15 IND	16	17	18	19
	20	21	22	23 IND	24	25	26
	27	28	29	30	31 MAL THA	1 BUR	2
<p><i>IND – India</i> <i>BAN – Bangladesh</i> <i>NEP – Nepal</i> <i>BUR – Burma</i> <i>INDO – Indonesia</i> <i>PHL – Philippines</i></p>	3	4	5	6	7	8	9 INDO
	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
	17	18	19	20	21	22	23
	24	25 IND	26	27	28 NEP	29	30

Common Terms and Acronyms

AN – Ammonium Nitrate	PBIED – Personnel Borne (Suicide Bomb) IED
ANFO – Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil	PCB – Printed Circuit Board
ARMM – Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao	PN – Partner Nation
CIV – Civilian	PPIED – Pressure Plate IED
CBRN – Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear	QRF – Quick Response Force
COIN – Counter-insurgency	RCIED – Radio Controlled IED
CWIED – Command Wire IED	RCP – Route Clearance Patrols
DTMF – Dual-Tone Multi-Frequency	RPG – Rocket Propelled Grenade
EFP – Explosively Formed Projectile	SA – South Asia
EOD – Explosive Ordnance Disposal	SAF – Small Arms Fire
F/C – Found & Cleared	SEA – Southeast Asia
HME – Homemade Explosives	SVBIED – Suicide Vehicle Borne IED
HN – Host Nation (Police, Military, Government)	TATP – Triacetone Triperoxide
IDF – Indirect Fire	TNT – Trinitrotoluene (C ₇ H ₅ N ₃ O ₆)
IDP – Internally Displaced Persons	TTP – Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
IED – Improvised Explosive Device	UXO – Unexploded Ordnance
KFR – Kidnap for Ransom	VBIED – Vehicle Borne IED
KIA – Killed in Action	VEO – Violent Extremist Organization
LOC – Line of Communication	VOIED – Victim Operated IED
LPG – Liquefied Petroleum Gas	WIA – Wounded in Action
MSR – Main Supply Routes	
NFI – No Further Information	
NSTR – Nothing Significant To Report	
PBA – Post Blast Analysis	

Governments, Groups and Organizations

ASG – Abu Sayyaf Group	JeM – Jaish-e-Mohammed
BIFF – Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters	JMB – Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh
BIPP – Barisan Islam Perberbasan Patani	JMJB – Jama'atul Muslim Janta Bangladesh
BRN-C – Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate	KIA – Kachin Independence Army
BSF – Border Security Forces	KIM – Khalifa Islamiya Mindanao
BNP – Bangladesh National Party	KIO – Kachin Independence Organization
BriMob – Mobile Brigade (Indonesia CT Forces)	LeT – Lashkar-e Tayyiba
CPI-M – Communist Party of India (Maoist)	MILF – Moro Islamic Liberation Front
CPN-M – Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)	MILF-SOG – MILF-Special Operations Group
CPP – Communist Party of the Philippines	MNLF – Moro National Liberation Front
CRPF – Central Reserve Police Force (India)	NPA – New People's Army
GMIP – Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Patani	PNP – Philippine National Police
HM – Hizb-ul-Mujahideen	POLRI – Indonesian National Police
HNLC – Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (India)	PULO – Patani United Liberation Organization
HUJI-B – Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami Bangladesh	RAB – Rapid Action Battalion (Bangladesh)
IB – India's Intelligence Bureau	RKK – Runda Kumpulan Kecil
IM – Indian Mujahideen	SJMM – Samyukta Jatiya Mukti Morcha
IrW – Irregular Warfare	SJTMM – Samyukta Jana Tantrik Terai Mukti Morcha
ISI – Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan)	ULFA – United Liberation Front of Assam
ISIS – Islamic State of Iraq ash Sham	UWSA – United Wa State Army
JAT – Jemaah Ansharout Tauhid	YCL – Youth Communist League
JI – Jemaah Islamiya	
JTMM – Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha	
JIB – Jemaat-e-Islami Bangladesh	